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Abstract
The persuasive power of music is often relegated to the dimension of pathos:
that which moves us emotionally. Yet, the music commodity is now situated in and
around the liminal spaces of digitality. To think about how music functions, how it
argues across media, and how it moves us, we must examine its material and immaterial
realities as they present themselves to us and as we so create them. This dissertation
rethinks the relationship between rhetoric and music by examining the creation,
performance, and distribution of music in its material and immaterial forms to
demonstrate its persuasive power. While both Plato and Aristotle understood music as
a means to move men toward virtue, Aristotle tells us in his Laws, through the
Athenian Stranger, that the very best kinds of music can help guide us to truth. From
this starting point, I assess the historical problem of understanding the rhetorical
potential of music as merely that which directs or imitates the emotions: that which
“Soothes the savage breast,” as William Congreve writes. By furthering work by
Vickers and Farnsworth, who suggest that the Baroque fascination with applying
rhetorical figures to musical figures is an insufficient framework for assessing the
rhetorical potential of music, I demonstrate the gravity of musical persuasion in its
political weight, in its violence—the subjective violence of musical torture at
Guantanamo and the objective, ideological violence of music—and in what Jacques
Attali calls the prophetic nature of music. I argue that music has a significant function, and
as a non-discursive form of argumentation, works on us beyond affect. Moreover, with
the emergence of digital music distribution and domestic digital recording technologies,
the digital music commodity in its material and immaterial forms allows for ruptures in
vii

the former methods of musical composition, production, and distribution and in the
political potential of music which Jacques Attali describes as being able to foresee new
political realities. I thus suggest a new theoretical framework for thinking about
rhetoric and music by expanding on Lloyd Bitzer’s rhetorical situation, by offering the
idea of “openings” to the existing exigence, audience, and constraints. The prophetic
and rhetorical power of music in the aleatoric moment can help provide openings from
which new exigencies can be conceived. We must, therefore, reconsider the role of
rhetorical-musical composition for the citizen, not merely as a tool for entertainment or
emotional persuasion, but as an arena for engaging with the political.

viii

On the Digital-Political Topography of Music
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We read of how various harmonic modulations have the power to instill diverse effects in the listener:
moving them from hysteria to a pacified state;
from lust to chastity;
from a serious illness to good health;
from being beset with demonic forces to being freed of them;
from all we can gather concerning rhetoric, its effects are never so extensive as those of music.
There is a great power yet still latent within music—a greater energy and capacity to influence effectively
the human mind, than that possessed by rhetoric.

-Athanasius Kircher, Musurgia Universalis (1650)
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Chapter 1
Rhetoric and Music: An Introduction

Song to mortals of all things the sweetest.
-Museaus

Sonic Studies and the Soundscape
In this chapter I introduce the persuasive power of music. From the epigraph
provided from Kircher’s Musurgia Universalis, we begin to see the sometimes
confrontational, often muddled ideas of the place of music in argumentation, and
argumentation in music. I begin, here, by introducing the field of sonic studies, a recent
field of study which engages with the sounds of the world. Sonic studies emerged as a
grouping of academic work that is interdisciplinary in nature. It encompasses acoustics,
listening and sound cognition, noise and architectural planning, media studies, and
much else that is related to not only sounds that humans decisively make, but sounds
that occur from, for example, our footsteps, or the crack of a branch in winter, laden
with heavy snow. Herein we begin to understand the distinction from musicology,
which is primarily concerned with the theory, application, and analysis of organized
musical composition. The term soundscape comes from work by R. Murray Schafer, in
his The Tuning of the World (1977). Soundscapes constitute a sort of acoustic ecology;
they are made up of all the sounds of an environment. Bernie Krause adds

1

specifications on Schafer’s framework to develop such dimensions as anthrophonous,
biophonous, and geophonous sounds (2012).
Humans make all sorts of sounds. And they aren’t all pleasant. Two
neuroscientists, Pawel and Margaret Jastreboff, have been studying what they call
misophonia, a certain neurological disorder which causes sufferers great anxiety and
distress over hearing certain sounds (2002) It’s also known as selective sound
sensitivity. We clank spoons on ceramic bowls. We tap our fingers rhythmically in
boredom and unconsciously let our uvulas ripple around in latenight snoring. Yet, we
also sing in harmony with one another. We hear a bird song and replicate it in a
whistle.1 Biophonous sounds are those produced by other living species. There’s no
doubt a bit of anthropocentricism in this framework, but we must admit: humans are
undoubtedly the loudest of all animals, with our engines and mining blasts, fireworks
and space shuttles and planes and war. Then again, the perception of loudness varies
depending on the particular auditory receptive structures of a species, and can of
course vary from member to member of a given species. And loudness in human
perception varies based on frequencies and relative noise levels: the Decibel or dB is
not a universal unit of measurement, but rather a relative way of measuring apparent
1

Granted, it should be noted, too, that the sound of a whistle is unpleasant to many.
Herein we see in plain view the problem of the aesthetics of music, and are faced with
a subjective-objective problem. Why is it that we have cross-cultural musical tropes
such as descending melodies or minor tonalities that almost always move the listener to
an affect akin to melancholy, while much else is case-by-case? Andrew Schultz,
Professor of Music at UNSW, in a lecture titled “The Minor Fall and the Major Lift:
Music, Power, and the Composer’s Black Art,” tells us there should be a division
between psychoacoustics, or “the logic of music,” against culturally shaped perceptions
of aesthetics for “individuals.” (Oct. 2010). This “aesthetic position,” the combination
of the subject and objective influence, constitutes the ever-changing, “organic” nature
of what we might call musical taste according to Schultz.
2

amplitude. I imagine that earthworms do not think we are very loud, until we start
digging them up and the world is rumbling all around them. Sounds made by animals
other than the human—this category of biophonous sounds—appear to us as both
structured and unstructured, much like anthrophonous sounds. Richard Dawkins notes
in his Selfish Gene that bird songs are apt to change from generation to generation,
working somewhat like mutations in genes, and these songs then go through a sort of
memetic transference (1976). There are some age-old questions regarding the songs of
birds. It’s entertaining to wonder: do human musical structures reflect the melodic
phrasing of winged life? Did we derive some scales from our friends in the trees? On
the other hand, we know too well the caw of the crow at 5am on a Saturday when a
little extra sleep is needed. But Geoffrey A. Keller, in his studies of the American crow,
has found at least twenty different caws that seem to have definitive purposes in crow
communities, such as signaling for danger (2014). So a rattling, disturbing caw that
heralds the discovery of a fresh feed is likely to sound of music to a murder of crows.
Lastly in these ideas we have geophonous sounds, which are the sounds of the
earth, roughly. Wind, waves. We run into some trouble, which we can note for
entertainment: if I step on crunchy Autumn leaves in October, is the earth sounding, or
am I sounding? We’re sounding together, I think. When avalanchial ice starts cracking
and a group of snowshoers dives for cover and startles a mountain goat, or some
young couple in love hears a warm breeze sweep over them on a sandy beach with
lapping waves but wearily eyes the seagulls gurgling overhead, we can start to see how
soundscapes are put together. And they are infinitely intricate. The addition I make
here is to note that there are certainly extra-geophonous sounds, or sounds that are not
3

made by earth, but beyond it. Some of these sounds are made by humans and their
technologies, some by astronomical objects. We might call them cosmophonous sounds.
Colonel Chris Hadfield made field recordings of the sounds of the International Space
Station (ISS), such as “Sleep Station – Fan on High,” “Caution Alarm,” and “Sounds
from the Dining Table,” as well as his own musical creations such as “Jewel in the
Night,” which he has classified as belonging to the Space Folk genre on his
SoundCloud page where he published these recordings. Granted, we can call these
anthrophonous sounds, as they are produced by humans and the machines they have
built. But what do we make of, for example, a volcanic eruption on a distant world,
perhaps in altogether different galaxy? We can call these sounds cosmophonous, from the
Latin cosmos and what became the Middle English “cosmos” and remains today as
synonymous with “the universe.” Pythagoras is thought to be the first to use kosmos as
a way to mean the entirety of the universe, including the earth, though it then carried a
meaning of order and arrangement: the universe, yes, but the universe and all of its
interweavings and interconnectedness, all of its harmonies and its mathematical
machinery (Uzdavinys 2004, p. 4).2
There is a paradox that has been jostled around for some time: “If a tree falls in
the forest, and no one’s there to hear it, does it make a sound?” We can trace this
2

NASA, too, has been using the plasma wave science instrument on Voyager I to
“listen” to the sounds of space as Voyager I leaves the heliosphere—the sun’s great
magnetic field—and traverses into interstellar space. Humans themselves cannot
“hear” plasma waves, but because those recorded by Voyager I were in the range of
audible human frequencies, between a few hundred a few thousand Hz, they can be
played back and turned into the pressure waves which humans recognize as sound
(Gurnett). Thus, the addition of cosmophonous sounds to the field of sonic studies may
not only better help us understand human music, but could aid us in far-distant
research in inter-stellar communication and translation.
4

particular phrasing to Twiss and Mann’s Physics from 1910, though such a strain of
inquiry has been floating around and considered seriously for some time. It’s a
philosophical thought experiment with which many of us are familiar. The human
ear—as well as many other animals’ ears—detects sound not as vibration, immediately
and directly, but as differentiations of pressure in the air. Inner ear bones and cochlear
hairs process this input into pitch (frequency) and loudness (amplitude), as well as
directionality (location) by a quick calculation that we perform with our binaural set of
ears. I imagine this is why we tilt our heads to the side as a sign of confusion. Our
domestic pets do this, too, but it’s not because they picked up on the symbolism of the
gesture: tilting the head adds a vertical difference between ears as well as the preexisting horizontal difference, and better helps to locate the source of a sound by
sending more information to the brain. So if a distant civilization that lives in a similar
frequency range as humans on a planet halfway across the Milky Way sings a song,
does that civilization make a sound? It does. They’re making all sorts of sound, I
imagine. And beyond that: sounds we just can’t hear, yet, or may never. Sounds in
other ranges and using different mechanisms. Sounds we might never hear, and that we
might not be able to perceive given our particular anatomy, or our particular situation
in time and space. Or perhaps they’ll sing along with us someday. While this may seem
at first like a trivial consideration—what should we care about the sounds and goingons of places we know nothing about?—we should always be mindful of that which is
around us, beyond the simple bounds of a geocentric worldview. We might call this
tendency to disregard the extraterrestrial going-ons of the universe as the “geocentric
conceit”: whether in sonic studies, philosophy, or even in some STEM fields, we forget
5

our size and place in our academic work. On the other hand, we can remember the
Golden Record placed aboard the Voyager I spacecraft that, at the time of writing this
work, is thought to have left the heliosphere to travel beyond our solar system. On the
Golden Record is a collection of human understanding, composed in a way that was
thought might be universally legible. Yet, on the Golden Record, too, are the sights and
sounds of earth and its species, from Blind Willie Johnson, Beethoven, traditional
Senegalese percussion, and a wealth of other human musical works. To consider the
addition of cosmophonous sound to the soundscape is to open up our understanding
of sound to be more inclusive in an age when humans are, through the aid of
technology, exploring other worlds. It also allows us to understand that sound is not
bound to the conventions we have limited it to: our understanding of sound is always
changing. Indeed, as Jacques Attali tells us, music can even be prophetic (2009).
There are many lenses through which we study the sounds of our world and in
our work toward identifying the sounds that occur beyond the limitations of the
geocentric worldview. What has been lost in the study of sound is the way in which we
structure music to make arguments, in particular contexts, for particular purposes. The
purpose of this project is to re-introduce rhetoric to the theory of music and thus
contribute to the growing body of work emerging as sonic studies, and to suggest for
rhetorical scholars an attention to be paid toward music and its persuasive abilities
beyond emotion. Music is too often passed off as a segment of a soundscape, as a
passive source of enjoyment. And we are too often left with the notion from ancient
Greek theories of music that our songs are merely that which plays with pathos, that
which stirs the emotions. This work seeks to examine the ways in which music
6

persuades us through its political appropriations, through its subsumption into
capitalism as the digital music commodity, and in its material and immaterial properties.
So, too, does this work hope to bring some light to the political potential of music in its
ability to bolster political revolution and to foresee new political realities, in what, as
above mentioned, Jacques Attali calls the “prophetic” nature of music (2009).

Music as Argument
On earth, here, humans have started organizing their sounds into complex
patterns using arrangements that feature multiple sounding sources to create unified
entities. We have our English “music” from the Latina musica, but the etymological
train follows back to ancient Greece, at least, from mousikê. Music is often seen as the
lengthy organization of multiple sounds for particular contexts with expected
outcomes. We get this general idea of music as the organization of sound from the
composer Edgar Varèse (Goldman 1961). But we know that music varies greatly crossculturally. And some languages have no word for music at all. What was intended to
make one dance might simply put a smile on another’s face, or even force one out of
the room: “it’s just noise!” As we understand it, music is a uniquely human creation and
endeavor—it is anthrophonous sound. Elephants trumpet and mourn over the loss of
a family member. Though it is communal, emotive, personal, and meaningful, their
sounds of grief form a soundscape, a collection of sounds, rather than music. Bird
songs most often than not are direct, message-like signals, more like a mandative tense
in English; “Watch out!” or “Get over here!” are certainly persuasive in crow caw form,
7

to other crows, but they are, seemingly, singular in their intended meaning.3 Music, on
the other hand, is rich and slippery in its multilayered and complex arrangements.
Music carries multiple meanings through its sonic qualities and character, its dynamic
crescendos, its various movements and sections, its appropriation of language in lyrical
form, and in its particular ability for us to memorize its passages.
The relationship between rhetoric and music has been opened up, cast aside,
disregarded, and altogether tossed around since its early works set out the tradition of
musica poetica. Of the first to publish on the connection between rhetoric and music was
Nikolaus Listenius in his Rudimenta Musicae Planae from 1533. This has left a trail of
ambiguous associations between the classical study of rhetoric and the theory of music.
It may have even been more of social reality. Rhetoric was, perhaps, more widely
taught then, and thus its influence may have crossed into musical composition,
demonstrating an interesting fluidity between the studies. Musical theories with
rhetorical characteristics—discussions of pathos, predominantly, and emotional affect
for the audience—predominated in the 16th and 17th century German thought—and
praxis—though this connection did not continue. Indeed, contemporary musical theory
is decidedly unconcerned with rhetorical considerations. Yet, new interest in this
tenuous tie between rhetoric and music surfaced again in the work of American scholar
George J. Buelow beginning in the 1970s as he sought to investigate the rhetorical
groundwork set out by the German baroque composers: Burmeister, Dressler,
Mattheson. It may have been the near-concurrent explosion of cultural studies and its

3

The Cornell Lab of Ornithology has a research group dedicated to this study of the
American crow and its call.
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engulfment of music—and so much else—that drew attention away from this new
research. Or, perhaps, like those German composers, the time had simply not yet come
for a meaningful assessment of music as argument.
It is plausible, too, that rhetorical theories of music have been overlooked
because of their historical situatedness of what is known widely to the West as classical
music, an umbrella term that is used to encompass periods that are distinguished
usually as Baroque, Classical, and Romantic. Classical music can also refer to any art
music that derives from these European traditions or precedes them, making it
dangerous in the ease with which it can misguidedly group unrelated material together.
On another side of the matter, it is also plausible that the area of scholarship that
promenades with both the study of rhetoric and the study of music has been dismissed
because of its extraordinary ambivalence. Early baroque theories that developed from
the tradition of musica poetica, such as the doctrine of the affections, sought to apply the
rhetoric of oratory to musical composition with the pepper of emotive binaries
(joy/sorrow). Yet no direct correlation between rhetorical tropes and those of music
were cemented—though numerous rhetorical-musical figures were suggested—nor was
a serious attempt made to formulate a new conclusive and applicable theory of the
rhetoric of music. Looking back with our vantage point, it seems that a rather confused
commingling occurred considering the passionate fire of rhetoric and bubbling
ebullience of that time’s talented songsmiths. It’s often the conditions under which
ideas meet that are more important than what some call chemistry.
Joachim Burmeister described in the opening to his 1606 treatise Musica Poetica
what a musical poetics would entail:
9

…how to put together a musical piece by combining melodic lines into
a harmony adored with various affections of periods, in order to incline
men’s minds and hearts to various emotions. (1993)
Burmeister was restricted in his analysis by relegating the rhetorical potential of music
to only have affective properties. He drew from Plato and Aristotle, who, although they
were advocates of musical education for the youth, wrote with a preconception of
music as chiefly a method to stir the passions, though noted its manifold powers.
Burmeister wrote, too, that to experience these emotional powers of music, one must
be “not altogether unmusical” (1993). This privileges those with a formal musical
education and background, something not widely available to many at the time of
Burmeister’s writing, and still not universally available. Music in contemporary 21st
century digital society is still not a sort of lingua franca. Though instruments are mass
produced and, for certain peoples, relatively inexpensive, and digital composition and
recording tools present themselves as freeware for public proliferation, we must be
very careful here: we do not all have access to these tools. It is very much because of
the prevalence of music in the digital age—in advertising, in politics, in education, in
games—that we must understand how music does more than merely move our moods.
Commentary on music is evident throughout the work of both Plato and
Aristotle, as aforementioned, in Laws, Politics, and Republic, where music is often
regarded with much seriousness, due to its incredible ability to move the mind and
soul. It is unusual to me, then, that a theory of musical composition which took into
consideration a rhetorical grounding did not seem to develop until the 16th century in
European musical composition in the form of musica poetica (Listenius 1533). The
10

ancient Greeks developed a loose body of works that here can act as a starting point
for the foundation of a rhetoric of music: though I do not intend to be so
presumptuous as to re-write history, I suggest that because of the prevalence of
rhetorical considerations in the lives of so many educated ancient Greeks, it’s likely that
a composer of music may have considered such elements as audience or the appeals of
ethos or logos in performance, and certainly beyond narrow heuristical understandings
of rhetoric, as an education in rhetoric extended centuries beyond ancient Greece, and
seems to have dwindled only in the 1800s following practices of standardization in
education which began to slowly occlude rhetoric from the curriculum.
Music is a human system, one that is heavy with meanings. The perception of
music by animals is unfounded and, unfortunately for our domestic pets, the linking
together of sonic phrases into arrangements doesn’t seem to register to them. But this
is surely an important understanding: when encountering a protective, aggressive black
bear in the woods, better to yell at the fellow than to start singing a lullaby. Though we
often hear an anecdote along the lines of “Music soothes the savage beast,” this is a
misappropriation of the opening lines of William Congreve’s The Mourning Bride.
Congreve’s text goes as follows:
ALMERIA:

Musick has charms to soothe a savage breast,

To soften rocks, or bend a knotted oak.
I've read that things inanimate have moved,
And, as with living souls, have been inform'd,
By magic numbers and persuasive sound.
What then am I? Am I more senseless grown
11

Than trees, or flint? O force of constant woe!
‘Tis not in Harmony to calm my griefs.
Anselmo sleeps, and is at peace; last night
The silent tomb received the good old king;
He and his sorrows now are safely lodged
Within its cold, but hospitable bosom.
Why am not I at peace? (Congreve 1855, p. 237)
My argument in this work is that music is persuasive, not merely in terms of emotion,
of pathos. I suggest an investment of rhetorical studies into interdisciplinary work that
will seek to understand the complex ways that music effects us, beyond affect. And it is
not in the “magic numbers” of music—in purely technical music theory—in which we
must identify the arguments that are made by music, and by the performers and
composers of music. While music may not soothe the savage beast, it soothes the savage
breast so very often. Yet, its lyrical contents and musical structures can also enrage.
Motivate. Inspire. Incite introspection. It can carry heavy ideological weight and bring
forth patriotic thoughts in view of a national flag. Thus, in defining music, we must
look beyond this notion of music as an arrangement of organized sounds, and
understand that music is experiential, that it conveys meaning, and carries particular
persuasive structures.
It would be too much to say that through the philosophies and writings of
Plato and Aristotle that a directly stated “rhetoric of music” or a comprehensive
rhetorical theory of musical composition was established. There is no mention of this
in any surviving texts. However, the parallels and points I have above offered
12

demonstrate that for ancient Greek thought, both musical and rhetorical performances
rely on careful consideration of intent, situation, and audience, and wee see that the end
goals of both the pursuit of oratory and of musical training, done in the right way, lead
the individual to the cultivation of virtue, and lead listeners to truth. In Phaedrus, good
rhetoric is lead along by philosophy—in this very pursuit of truth. And the best of
music to be found in the polis is that which not only moves the
emotions but searches for “truth” and so guides its players, performers, and listeners. 4
Rhetoric, a scholarly tradition on the methods and theory of persuasion, has
come to us with plentiful connotations. What was once the art of oral delivery in the
Athenian courtroom now means something more. Aristotle’s famous definition, from
Rhetoric, regarding the use of all the available means of persuasion, has a sort of
addendum in another work, Topics: the rhetorician must be able to see what is
persuasive [VI.12, 149b25] (W. Rhys Roberts 1994). That is, the rhetorician must be
able to not only apply but also identify the set of skills available for persuasion.
Contemporary scholarship, such as that by Joddy Murray, in his Non-Discursive Rhetoric:
Image and Affect in Multimodal Composition, tells us that “By considering non-discursive
texts, all possibilities of symbolization become tools for the rhetor: the symbols of
math, music, textiles, food, poetry, commerce, violence, inaction, and even silence”

4

Now, we must understand that Aristotle and Plato mean seemingly different things by
the same word of “truth.” Plato’s “truth” is derived from what we commonly call the
Theory of the Forms. It seems that when Plato tells us that music can direct us toward
truth, he means that particular musical arrangements point to the universal principles
which have informed its structure and composition. Aristotle, on the other hand, might
have argued that music which leads us to truth does so by means of offering a
particular replication of an emotion. From both meanings of “truth” in music, we can
see how singular musical pieces takes particular stances.
13

(2009, p. 12). Aristotle conceived of rhetoric in a sort of neutral fashion. That is: it can
be put to use for the good or bad, for just or unjust purposes.5 Through Plato’s
Phaedrus we can understand the rhetorician as being one who identifies the type of soul
that is being addressed, and moves that soul.
We can begin to understand a relationship between rhetoric and music in
ancient Greek thought, as it was situated in particular contexts: the ways theorized
regarding how music should be taught to the Athenian youth, where it fit into the polis,
and its contingent pedagogy through work by Mary B. Schoen-Nazzaro and Thomas J.
Mathiesen (1978, 1984). Plato and Aristotle wrote extensively on music, and disagreed
at times, as well: especially regarding which modes were best suited for which occasions
or audiences. These sorts of considerations by the ancient Greek philosophers
demonstrates what I think to be a very early consideration for the persuasive power of
music. Both speech and music in ancient Greek thought were seen as modes to move:
to move the soul, the mind, or the emotions. I thus stake the claim that Aristotle and
Plato found agreement in the power of music to effect its listener, that certain forms of
music and modalities are best fit for certain audiences, and that the pursuit of music in
education and the performance of music in public in its best form was a sort of guiding
light toward “truth.” Here, then, we can argue that a series of similar structures arise
between ancient Greek theories of music and rhetoric, and that musical performance
for the ancient Greeks was an inherently rhetorical activity, from the Athenian
classroom to the festival.

5

Chapter 4, I discuss the rhetoric of music in its subjective and objective appearances
through violence.
14

Plato has Socrates tell us in Phaedrus that the true rhetorician must define the
soul, categorize every type of it that might be, and what sorts of speeches will direct
these soul types, as “the nature of speech is in fact to direct the soul” (Nehamas &
Woodruff 1995, p. 548). The speakers in Phaedrus realize, of course, this is a daunting
task. Similarly, Mary B. Schoen-Nazzaro tells us that Plato understood that music is
useful for education “because more than anything else rhythm and harmony find their
way into the inmost soul and take strongest hold upon it” (1978, p. 262). Let us first
explore Socrates’ understanding of rhetoric as relayed by Plato in Phaedrus. Socrates tells
us:
Well, then, isn’t the rhetorical art, taken as a whole, a way of directing
the soul by means of speech, not only in the lawcourts and on other
public occasions but also in private? Isn’t it one and the same art
whether its subject is great or small, and no more to be held in
esteem—if it is followed correctly—when its questions are serious than
when they are trivial? Or what have you heard about all this? (Nehamas
& Woodruff 1995, p. 537)
What should be of interest, here, is that Socrates is willing to place his understanding of
the art of rhetoric—“a way of directing the soul by means of speech”—outside of the
Athenian lawcourts (Nehamas & Woodruff 1995, p. 537). It is fitting, then, that in this
dialogue, Phaedrus and Socrates have wandered outside the walls of the city, and have
found themselves in private. Here, by the shade of a tree and in view of the Ilissus
river, the two share speeches and offer critiques. We might backtrack to understand
what Socrates means by the soul—though it is a complex notion, he tells us that the
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soul is always in motion, and that it is a “self-mover” with no “source” or “beginning,”
and thus it is immortal, as we read near Stephanus number 245c (Nehamas &
Woodruff 1995, p. 524). In this revision of Phaedrus’ speech that Socrates offers, he
goes on to liken the soul to a chariot, which he imagines is pulled by good horses and
bad. The bad horses weigh down the chariot and bring it closer to earth. The good
horses can steer the soul to the “high ridge of heaven,” where the soul may “gaze upon
what is outside heaven” at 246a-247e (Nehamas & Woodruff 1995, p. 524-525). Here
we have a bit of a theoretical conundrum—if the soul is self-moving and self-steered,
what do we make of rhetoric and all that which moves the soul?
Socrates’ explication of eros in the Phaedrus can help us, here. Eros threatens the
selfness of the soul, and it seems the soul has inherent tensions, as evidenced by the
white and black, good and bad horses in the example of the chariot. For Plato’s
Socrates, learning is a sort of remembering—a tapping into the eternal. The mad,
divine love that Socrates speaks about shows that beauty can awaken us to these truths,
but beauty also leads to a sort of drugged state: the trope of the pharmakon. But there
are many different “kinds of souls,” for Socrates, and “whoever intends to be a
rhetorician must know how many kinds of soul there are…” as “some people have
such-and-such a character and others have such-and-such” [271d] (Nehamas &
Woodruff 1995, p. 548). There is no singular soul, then, and there is thus no perfect
speech fit for every person and every occasion. While we might not be able to directly
reconcile this apparent conflict between the self-movement of the soul and external
influences on its movement, it is for Socrates that a rhetorical speech should be of
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good intent—that is, to aid the soul in its movement toward the Good and to the
limitless and that which is beyond the ridges of heaven: a sort of return to the eternal.
Gorgias, in his Encomium of Helen, is also fascinated with the trope of the
pharmakon, of the drug, of the “potion” that we see at 230c in Phaedrus (Bizzell &
Herzberg, 2001). Phaedrus tells Socrates that he had to charm or seduce him to get him
outside the city. Socrates later uses the trope of the pharmakon to discuss writing and
memory. Gorgias more directly applies this to his theory of how speech effects the
soul:
The effect of speech upon the condition of the soul is comparable to
the power of drugs over the nature of bodies. For just as different drugs
dispel different secretions from the body, and some bring an end to
disease and others to life, so also in the case of speeches, some distress,
others delight, some cause fear, others make the hearers bold, and some
drug and bewitch the soul with a kind of evil persuasion. (Bizzell &
Herzberg 2001, p. 46)
Plato and Gorgias are not completely at loggerheads, here, as both put forth a theory of
speech as that which effects the soul. Aristotle writes in his Politics—to which I will
return—that certain “mystic melodies” can even bring “healing and purgation to the
soul” (1342a). Rhetoric, then, in what I have examined, is a way of moving the soul, of
directing the soul through Plato, and for Aristotle the identification and use of the
available means of persuasion. The good rhetorician is also a good philosopher for
Socrates in the Phaedrus, for the speaker must know the “truth” of what he is saying
before he then goes on to assess the souls of those to whom he is speaking [277b]
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(Nehamas & Woodruff 1995, p. 554). As music is that which moves the listener, and
the ends of music, the goals of music, for the best sort of music, as explained by
Aristotle in his Laws is to approximate, locate, or identify that which is true. Such an
importance granted to music by the ancient Greek philosophers is undoubtedly what
led them to write of the proper education of music for the Athenian youth.

The Pedagogy of Music in Ancient Greece
In Plato’s Laws, the latest of his dialogues to have been written, an Athenian
Stranger speaks of the education of the youth:
Education has two branches—one of gymnastics, which is concerned
with the body, and the other of music, which is designed for the
improvement of the soul. (Jowett 2001, p. 223)
Yet, these distinct associations fall apart within the dialogue to reveal a more organic
and embodied approach to musical pedagogy. Music, for Plato’s Athenian Stranger, is
characterized by its ability to incite pleasure in the listener (Jowett 2001, p. 233). Yet, it’
is proposed in a utopian state that there should be three years of musical education
following three years of intensive study in what were seen as fundamental literacy skills,
roughly reading and writing. We know, too, that the mathematics of music found its
origins in Ancient Greece. Pythagoras first wrote of simple ratios between notes from
which we derived such musical mainstays as the major third and perfect fifth. There is a
two to one ratio for the octave, for example, and three to two for a perfect fifth, in
terms of frequency—Pythagoras wasn’t measuring wavelengths, though, but the
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lengths of vibrating strings. Here we can argue: is there something universally appealing
about the perfect fifth both in the ratio of the frequencies between the notes and its
aesthetic quality, or are we left with this fifth that still haunts our popular music today
because a mathematician was enamored with the apparent perfection of these ratios?
Pythagorean scales, it should be noted, dominated Western music until Bach began
experimenting with his “well-tempered scale,” seeing that composers wanted more
notes with which to play. The resulting well-tempered, and later even-tempered scales
deviate from Pythagorean models, and, it seems, the ratios of the frequencies of the
modern piano are not quite Pythagorean-perfect.
Rather than focusing on the mathematics of music in education, Aristotle
moves beyond, to the moralistic. Aristotle uses Book VIII of his Politics to describe a
liberal education for the youth, the place of music and gymnastics therein, and to
discuss the role of the professional musician in his ideal polis. He then goes on to clarify
three purposes for the study of music: “education,” “purgation,” and for “intellectual
enjoyment” or “relaxation after exertion” [1341b] (Ellis 2009, p. 314). The educational
dimension has less to do with the eternal soul and more to do with the mortal being
and his morality. For Aristotle, the right sorts of music—that is, learning to play the
right sort of music—can aid the youth in developing a proper temperament and
facilitate a coming-into awareness of what is virtuous. Aristotle sees music, here, as an
imitation of the emotions. As Schoen-Nazzaro tells us, regarding Aristotle: “...the
power of music is to move the listener in harmony with itself, it follows that the skillful
musician will be able to reproduce almost any emotion so that it can be felt and
recognized by the listener… This is what imitating emotions entails” (1978, p. 268).
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This theme of imitation is evident throughout ancient Greek theories of music, and not
only in application to the emotional states of humans, but also the intellectual and the
philosophical. As Thomas J. Mathiesen tells us in his “Harmonia and Ethos in Ancient
Greek Music,” Aristoxenus, a pupil of Aristotle, understood music “as an analogue for
higher philosophical truths” (1984, p. 265). Though Aristotle and Plato were very
careful in their rendering of music, it is ascribed much more power and wider depth in
subsequent ancient Greek scholarship following from their traditions.
Despite the evident phonetic and linguistic etymological link between our
present day “music” and the ancient Greek mousikê, we should not be so quick to
equate the two terms. Indeed, much has changed over some 2500 years in
understanding the role and purpose of music, as well as its place in education and
society. Babette Babich, in “Mousike techne: The Philosophical Practice of Music in
Plato, Nietzsche, and Heidegger,” writes that:
As mousikê is only partly equivalent to the contemporary conception of
music, our tendency to reduce music to the “organized” art of sound
obscures the equiprimordial sense in which Musik is the quintessence or
enabling element of intellectual or spiritual education and in which
Musik figures as the determining force of both individual and societal
character or ethos. (Babich 2005, p. 172)
Much has changed in the pedagogy of music. My personal experience in public
education music classes—once a week from kindergarten to 5th grade, and then a daily
middle school band class from 6th to 8th—showed an extreme favoritism to the reading
of notation and the recitation and mechanical reproduction of music rather than the
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creation of music, or even the understanding of music theory. Certainly, never were we
asked to compose music, or to think about the structures of music, or to analyze the
figures of the music we were performing. It is easy to harken to a “Golden Age” and
think that the ancient Greeks might have had it all right. But, it is clear that ancient
Greek musical pedagogy for the youth was more concerned with music as a passageway
to a liberated mind, a virtuous soul, and ultimately as a way to seek truth. We come
across the Athenian stranger make this claim in Plato’s Laws: “And those who seek for
the best kind of song and music ought not to seek for that which is pleasant, but for
that which is true…” [668a-668b] (Jowett 2009). Schoen-Nazzaro clarifies this for us in
terms of Plato’s work on music:
…in some way, although not in exactly the same way as Aristotle, Plato
sees the type of music chosen in a particular instance as dependent
upon the nature of the one performing or benefitting from it (1978, p.
273).
Here, we begin to see the connection between the oratorical choices of the rhetor and
the contextual choices of the musician. The musician attempt to identify his audience
and their nature—much like the orator attempts to identify the souls of his listeners—
and makes particular choices about how to direct them with music. Granted, we should
again stray away from thinking about music as simply that which moves the emotions.
For, both Aristotle and Plato recognized the music can bring about order and carry
more profound moral meaning in its structures: this rhetorical link, or rhetorical
parallel, between defining the right structure/arrangement for the right moment for the
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given audience is present in both Plato’s rendering of rhetoric in Phaedrus and in the
theories of music and musical education put forth by Plato and Aristotle.
Because of this power of music, musical education for the youth is necessary in
the thinking of both Plato and Aristotle, as this education leads to the cultivation of
virtue—we might even say, in a sense, that for these philosophers a musical education
precedes and facilitates the development of higher, critical thought, and it is thus
considered an integral part of pedagogy. This is not a merely technical training that the
philosophers are concerned with: not the skilled use of an instrument, which can with
leisure be learned in adulthood, but a sort of ear for music, and the connectivity
between being and sound. Schoen-Nazzaro tells us more:
A musical education neither trains a child to be a skillful musician nor
teaches him a science. What Plato says about the fine arts as fostering
learning can be applied to music in particular. He speaks of these arts as
preparing the mind for understanding by providing a cultural
formation. They do this first by arousing and feeding man’s love of
knowledge and secondly by purifying and sharpening his perceptions.
(1978, p. 265)
This is a vastly different form of musical pedagogy than we know of in today’s
American public schools. From early note-reading and the playing of the plastic
recorder, to the high school marching and pep band, musical composition is not
stressed, but rather the reification of musical notation: the translation from text to
sound. For, we know that the ancient Greeks had only a rudimentary system of relative
notation, of which few remnants survive in Pohlmann and West’s Documents of Ancient
22

Greek Music: The Extant Fragments (2001). This relative notation seems to have acted as
guiding marks rather than universally recognizable symbols which identify a common
tone at a particular frequency, such as today’s “A440” which is used as a tuning
standard, setting the musical note A above middle C at 440Hz. We might wonder, too,
what the implications of such an unregimented musical notation system would have
had on musical composition, improvisation, and invention. Musicologist Susan
McClary comments on this tension which still holds true in Western society regarding
musical pedagogy:
Now it is quite clear to most listeners that music moves them, that they
respond deeply to music in a variety of ways, even though in our society
they are told that they cannot know anything about music without
having absorbed the whole theoretical apparatus necessary for music
specialization. But to learn this apparatus is to learn to renounce one’s
responses, to discover that the musical phenomenon is to be
understood mechanistically, mathematically. Thus non-trained listeners
are prevented from talking about social and expressive dimensions of
music (for they lack the vocabulary to refer to its parts) and so are
trained musicians (for they have been taught, in learning the proper
vocabulary, that music is strictly self-contained structure). Silence in the
midst of sound. (2009, p. 150-151)
We might even assume a link between the lack of stagnant, concrete notation for the
ancient Greeks and their insistence on a musical pedagogy with such high aims beyond
the reading and playing of notation. Emily Howell, the computer program created by
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Dr. David Cope, then professor of music at the University of California, Santa Cruz, is
said to compose music. I would argue that, rather, it is improvising within certain
structures and within established keys and modalities, that it relies on particular
patterns, and that it is not creating anew. Another thought problem that is often posed:
“Will we ever run out of music?” Using Dirichlet’s box principle, I readily say “no”:
there is an infinite number of musical possibilities, considering distinct timbres, and
with unlimited multi-track digital recording a theoretically infinite number of possible
arrangements, among other considerations. But, we must understand: it’s not all like to
be rich with meaning. These meanings of music are, as previously discussed, often
rooted in cultural histories and trajectories of musical tradition, as well as seemingly
“natural” psychological reactions to particular musical moves and motifs.
More concrete examples of the interweaving of rhetoric and music in Athenian
society can be identified. Debra Hawhee makes a bold claim regarding the presence of
the aulos in Athenian schoolyards, and how the rhythm of music may have influenced
the making of speeches, and thus their rhetorical design: “Given the proximity of
athletic and rhetorical training, as well as the noisiness of auloi... it is also likely that
music flowed into recitations and sophistic lectures, producing an awareness of—
indeed, facilitating—the rhythmic, tonic quality of speeches.” (2002, p. 146) Though we
cannot readily place origins, we might wonder if such early musical compositions were
influenced by the patterns of speeches, or at least of conversational language, and thus
a reciprocal relationship was established between music and speech of the time: in
terms of phrasing, rhythm, and pacing. This claim by Hawhee demonstrates the everpresent reality of music in the educational environment and even a direct link between
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the composition and practice of speeches and the performance of music. We know, at
least, that various genres existed in musical composition for the ancient Greeks, such as
the Doric Hymn, which had structure that could be compared in part to rhetorical,
oratorical speech, where introductory phrases might lead into distinct melodies which
are repeated for emphasis, and certain conclusive or closing figures were used to end
pieces. Thus, we see parallels in the classical structure of the canons and their early
application to music: Invention, Arrangement, Style, Memory, and Delivery. As
oratorical speeches were thought to have certain necessary arrangements, so too were
certain compositional styles in music thought to have necessary arrangements.
Quintilian, in his Institutio oratoria, explains a hypothetical legal case where, during a
sacrifice, the flute-player performs in the Phrygian mode, a mode thought to be
unsuited by Plato; the priest jumps off of a nearby cliff in madness [1.10.33] (Watson
2006). Here we see music acting beyond what Cicero called mesos, the rhetorical
partition of style with the intention to please the listener. Quite literally, and physically,
in this anecdote, music is functioning in the partition of style of adros: to move the
listener.

Music Beyond its Affective Dimension
A resurgence of scholarly interest in looking at the music of ancient Greece has
again blossomed. Egert Pohlmann’s Documents of Ancient Greek Music, first published in
1970, is a collection of the remaining 61 fragments of ancient Greek musical notation.
While the Greeks, in general, rejected the idea of a musical notation system—much like
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Plato rejected the concept of the written word and condemned it—the 61 surviving
fragments are of much curiosity and excitement to scholars interested in ancient Greek
music. Unfortunately, these fragments have come to us more by chance than by
purposeful, selective preservation, so we must be careful in considering their value and
we must wonder if they are, in any sense, representative of the music upon which our
ancient philosophers theorized so often and with such conviction (Pohlmann 1970, p.
5). In summary: we know very little of what the music of our Western intellectual
ancestors would have sounded like, nor can we perfectly imagine what the subjective
experience of music would have entailed, or how listeners would react: might they
dance carelessly and freely to this particular tune, might they dance spiritually and
ritualistically, or might they rally in political fervor? Some interesting digital projects are
being done to recreate virtual amphitheaters based on archeological work at Pompeii
(Hawkins 2011, p. 1-6) as well as to recreate both physical and digital instruments of
ancient Greece (Georgaki 2009, p. 58-59). Yet, these are still distant echoes, haunting
howls of what would have been.
We remain curious, and much contemporary scholarship continues to
investigate theories of ancient Greek music. Mary B. Schoen-Nazzaro, again, writes of
the musical approaches of Aristotle and Plato in “Plato and Aristotle on the Ends of
Music” (1978, p. 261-273). She quotes from Plato’s Laws: ‘All young creates are
naturally full of fire, and can keep neither their limbs nor their voices quiet.’ (via Plato,
Schoen-Nazzaro 1978, p. 261). Motion, energy, and sound are a natural inclination for
the young according to the thoughts of Plato. And as I have mentioned above, Debra
Hawhee writes how gymnastics and music were intertwined in Athenian schools, as
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students would have heard the steady sounds of the aulos bleeding through the air to
set the pace of their movements, and speculates that those practicing rhetoric in the
form of oratory may have used sound to set the rhythm of their speeches (Hawhee
2002, p. 142-149). A musical education, then, for Plato, is meant to help the youth
control their bodies and minds in harmonious ways that will move them toward virtue.
Here we begin to see the potential dangers of unassessed music, and why rhetorical
concerns for the study of music are necessary—though perhaps not as conceived and
dreamed by our ancient philosophers. Music is incredibly persuasive, and can carry
deep ideological structures that often go unanalyzed but are nonetheless promulgated
to listeners. It is interesting now that we often perceive music as a way to engage our
passions, our emotions, rather than to control them, as our ancient Greek philosophers
suggested. Yet this contradiction of sorts is apparent, too, in both the works of Plato
and Aristotle; music can both calm and rally, quell and entice. It depends on the sort of
music, and the nature of the audience.
The multiplicity of effect and affect that could be derived from and through
music was well known to the Greeks, though they seemed to distance themselves from
the practice of it. This is evidenced especially by fleeting, seemingly strange comments
by Plato that adult men should not take up the learning of an instrument, that it should
be reserved for the youth. Still, though, Aristotle recognizes the “natural sweetness” in
music that moves us, and seems to appeal universally to humans (Schoen-Nazzaro
1978, p. 267). Schoen-Nazzaro writes that the Greeks understood that “music is a
movement which moves us” (1978, p. 267). Yet, both Aristotle and Plato are reductive
in their assessment of music as that which imitates human emotions. Indeed, it is
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reductive to think that music functions only at the level of human emotion, and does
not influence other aspects of both body and mind and life. Aristotle, in Chapter VII
of his Politics, recognizes that there are certain situations in which particular modes
(Phrygian, Dorian, Lydian) are fit to particular situations (Ellis 2009). And, in
Aristotle’s Minor Works, a piece “On Things Heard,” most likely wrongfully attributed
to Aristotle but written in the Aristotelian tradition, features a discussion of the
importance of the body in creating sound:
All voices and in fact all sounds arise either from bodies falling on
bodies, or from air falling on bodies; it is not due to the air taking on a
shape as some think, but to it being moved in the same way as bodies,
by contraction, expansion and compression, and also by knocking
together owing to the striking of the breath and by musical strings.
(1955, p. 51)
Sound, here, is a very physical, even violent phenomenon. It has less to due with
form—‘it is not due to the air taking shape’—but more to do with collision, materiality,
vibration and resonance. This is indeed interesting to our early understanding of the
physics of sound, but it is also rather important in understanding the historical
trajectory of our relationship with sound and music. For, contemporary physical
theories of sound tell us that much is due to compressions and rarefactions in the air.
For the ancient Greeks, song and dance, and thus song and body, were closely coupled.
Music could also be used for relaxation rather than excitement: to remedy uneasiness in
the mind, in what Aristotle saw as this ‘natural sweetness’ of music, all with the
eventual end of moving the soul to virtue, for helping us find the ‘good’ emotional
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dispositions (Schoen-Nazzaro 1978, p. 267). It should be noted that, contrary to Plato,
who admonished the learning of musical instruments by the adult, Aristotle saw music
as an important part of the education of a man, and thought children were unsuited to
take it up as a discipline; children could be pleased by music but not see the ‘good’ in it
(Schoen-Nazzaro 1978, p. 269). Music was an integral element of festival, ritual,
funeral. Of theatre and of wars. Yet, mere mechanical recitation was less important in
the pedagogy of music for the youth. Invention and original composition were stressed
over the simple ‘mastery’ of an instrument: the ‘musical’ over the ‘mathematical’
elements were emphasized, and while it may be difficult to retrospectively decipher
what was meant by this, it seems fairly evident that an involved, embodied, creative,
and improvisational approach to music would have been stressed over regimented
performance (Schoen-Nazarro 1978, p. 272-273). Thus, as mentioned, though it is
dangerously reductive to view music only in terms of its potential to stir us emotionally,
Aristotle no doubt understood the incredible rhetorical power of music not only
through pathos. Music, as described by Aristotle, must play to its audience, and the
listener, similarly, must be actively involved in the process of listening, of
understanding, of immersion. It was, perhaps, a sort of rudimentary and early theory of
interactivity and interplay between listener and audience that was no less participatory
and dialogic than the work of rhetorical political orators.
Where do these theories then lay today? While some music is openly political in
nature—something like the protest songs of Phil Ochs, as in “I Ain’t Marching
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Anymore”—music is also appropriated into the political realm6. Slavoj Žižek examines
this phenomenon in his The Pervert’s Guide to Ideology, directed by Sophie Fiennes, in
which Žižek brings us an analysis of Beethoven’s famous “Ode to Joy” from his 9th
Symphony :
What does this famous “Ode to Joy” stand for? It is usually perceived
as a kind of ode to humanity as such, to the brotherhood and freedom
of all people. And what strikes the eye here is the universal adaptability
of this well-known melody. It can be used by political movements
which are totally opposed to each other. In Nazi Germany, it was
widely used to celebrate great public events. In Soviet Union,
Beethoven was lionized and the “Ode to Joy” was performed, almost,
as a kind of a communist song. In China, during the time of the Great
Cultural Revolution, when almost all Western music was prohibited, the
9th Symphony was accepted. It was allowed, to play it, as a piece of
progressive bourgeois music. At the extreme right, in South Rhodesia,
before it became Zimbabwe, it proclaimed independence to be able to
postpone the abolishment of Apartheid. There, for those couple of
years of independence, South Rhodesia, again, the melody of the “Ode
to Joy”, with changed lyrics of course, was the anthem of the country.
...When Germany was still divided, and their team was appearing at
Olympics, when, one of the Germans won golden medal, again, “Ode
6

Chapter 4 deals more specifically with the violence of sound, ideology in music, and
the politics of music.
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to Joy” was played instead of either East or West German national
anthem. And even now today, Ode to Joy is the unofficial anthem of
European Union. (Fiennes 2012).
Thus, across global geographic, cultural, and political divides, we come to understand
how a single piece of music can be appropriated in the support of seemingly limitless
political ideologies—though the strength of the argument of this particular piece of
music, the “Ode to Joy,” is in its apparent ability to grant its listeners a sense of
solidarity, of unity. Whether in its use in “Nazi Germany” or in its present use as the
“unofficial anthem” in the European Union, the power of this swelling movement is in
its ability to persuade its listeners to rally. Herein we begin to see the political
significance of aleatoric music—from the Latin alea, meaning dice—or music that is
unpredictable in nature, music that disrupts the expectations of its listener. Those
musical structures to which we have become so accustomed can be so easily
reappropriated to divisive ends, violent ends.
We see another such example in “My Country, ‘Tis of Thee,” wherein Samuel
Francis Smith adapted the melody from what is now the United Kingdom’s national
anthem, “God Save the Queen,” and rewrote the lyrical content to fashion a hearty,
patriotic, American song. “My Country, ‘Tis of Thee,” also called, simply, “America,”
was used often as an unofficial national anthem before “The Star-Spangled Banner”
was given official anthemic status in 1931. Though it should be noted, too, that “The
Star-Spangled Banner” originates from a composition called “The Anacreontic Song,”
or “To Anacreon in Heaven,” attributed to the British composer John Stafford Smith.
We must move to critique this apparently open and ideological nature of music—for, it
31

is not that any piece of music is reappropriated with varied lyrical content. There is
already, in the music itself, a persuasive structure which so enraptures its audience.
There is already a musical signification—that is, the music is already pointing toward a
particular symbolic meaning—before it is lyrically adorned. And, following the mass
distribution and reproduction of a song, it becomes culturally significant, and so we
modify our national anthem for further meanings still, such as Jimi Hendrix’s lone, lead
electric guitar interpretation at Woodstock in 1969, or something genre-specific and
trivial as the pre-game performance of Steve Vai in 2010 at Madison Square Garden,
whose contribution was to add technicality and speed as a sort of run-off from metal
guitar virtuosity. A point in case—it took only some forty years and political contextual
shifting for distortion as a sonic characteristic in the signal processing of an instrument
to fall from a violent, human, protestive wail in Hendrix to a normalized attribute of a
particular genre in Vai.

The Exigency for Such a Work
A significant decline in scholarship has occurred between these two fields of
rhetoric and musicology—nearly a complete forgetting, leaving little for scholars to
draw from in analyzing music rhetorically. In Brian Vickers’s “Figures of
rhetoric/Figures of music?” the state of this relationship between rhetoric and music is
presented as having changed very little since the first of the treatises on the subject,
Joachim Burmeister’s work in 1599, and subsequent work by Unger, wherein the
basework for this rhetoric of music is presented as lists of figures of rhetoric and
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figures of music (Vickers 1984). This mostly consists of the application of rhetorical
figures to musical tropes—such as seeing a certain similarity in the written and oral
figure of anaphora to a musical composition which has a repetition of a set of similar
notes at the beginning of parallel phrases. It is a simple equating or conflagrating of
terms across rhetorical language and rhetorical music, and may even lead to
misunderstanding in the nuances of both written, oratorical, and musical composition.
A framework for understanding the persuasive nature of music must look beyond
creating these simple parallels between figures. Rather, we must address the situations
out of which music is composed, the networks in which it is distributed, and the
contexts in which it is played back. And further still, we must look beyond music as
that which moves the emotions, that which plays with pathos. To restrict the power of
music to the realm of affect is to disregard the intricate relationship between humans
and the music they make. From ancient theories of music through Aristotle and Plato,
to the treatises of German Baroque composers from the 1500 and 1600s, we see that
rhetorical theory has had a significant role in the composition, analysis, and
understanding of music. Music is persuasive in nature, and not only in such a way as it
imitates the emotions or stirs in us particular feelings. I hope to bring the history of
rhetoric and music to a table on which also sits our latest digital recording technologies,
so as to better understand the topography of contemporary music: how it is made,
shared, played, and how it moves us. I ask, too: how does the independent, domestic
production of music influence its composition, let alone its distribution? Through
changes in the means of production of music—specifically the turn to domestic,
independent, digital production—we see changes in the aesthetics, meanings, and
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rhetorical characteristics of independent music, and thus new offerings for the
directions of social movement.
Ancient Greek theories of music help us to understand the foundations for
historical theories of music. While Plato and Aristotle seem most concerned with the
ability of music to help men move toward virtue, we also see the hint that music can be
disruptive, that it can heal the mind and body, that it has almost mystical properties. A
rhetorical reconsideration of musical invention, composition, production, and
distribution is needed to grasp the gravity of music beyond the emotional dimensions
of musical argumentation—to begin to consider seriously why we have clearly
understood the ability of music to move us over the millennia and yet have disregarded
how it does so, relegating it either to the dimension of ex nihilo or ex deus inspiration, or
to the mathematical dimension of discrete frequencies and ratios. Herein, I hope to
expand the field of sonic studies through demonstrating that through a revised
harmonization of rhetorical theory and music we may reveal the argumentative nature
of music, not only through its structures, arrangement, tonal qualities, lyrical content,
and in the methods of its production and distribution—but also in the social, cultural,
and political scapes from which it is composed and on which it works.
The theory of the soundscape is, at times, limiting in its passivity: allowing us to
hear the world only as a collection of disparate parts which are by the nature of their
locality brought together. Thus, in this dissertation I seek to evaluate contemporary
issues in the digital-political economy of music and independent music production
through its material and immaterial properties, to examine how music is distributed,
stored, and remembered, and to see how music carries with it worlds and ideologies
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through sonic figures. We can, in this way, move beyond thinking about music in the
affective dimension and assess its political gravity, its agency. Through the example I
provide from the localized musical community of Marquette, MI, and through the
theoretical steps I take through issues in the non-presence of presence, the
(im)materiality of music, and digital music in virtual worlds, I suggest a rhetorical
framework for examining the arguments in music as that which is beyond affect. A
theoretical framework that builds on and passes over those theories of rhetorical
figures in music from the Baroque period of German musical composition will inform
these analyses; from work by Vickers (1984) and Farnsworth (1990), we can understand
why scholarship on the role of rhetoric in music has largely been left alone: there is
little insight to be gained from applying figures of rhetoric to figures of music by, for
example, labeling a series of repeated notes at the beginning of parallel musical phrases
as the rhetorical figure of anaphora. Neither field gains from this cross-pollination of
terminology. What I investigate instead is the situations in which the exigency for
composition arise, and the relationship between rhetorical invention and musical
invention. I turn to Lloyd Bitzer’s “rhetorical situation” and adapt his framework of
exigence, audience, and constraints to think about where music comes from, why we
make it, and who listens to it. I add to this framework the antithesis to constraints:
openings. We see in theories of music the suggestion the music is prophetic, that it
points toward future social, cultural, and political realities (Attali 2009). How does this
happen? I suggest that the aleatoric moment in musical composition and performance
signals the musician’s ability to not simply improvise, but cause a rupture in the form
being followed. These aleatoric moments, I believe, are crucial to persuasion. They are
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kairotic moments that change our perceptions of the possibilities of a medium or a
mode.
Theories derived from the science of music from key contributors in 19th and
early 20th century—Helmholtz (1885), Rayleigh (1896), and Jeans (1937)—will further
inform the exploration of digital music as a material and immaterial commodity. While
scholarly work has been written on the history of the relationship between rhetoric and
music, little contemporary work on rhetoric and music, especially digital music, exists. I
seek through this work to contribute to the field of rhetorical studies by opening an
avenue of concerns in the creation, production, and distribution of audio, while
expanding the field of sonic studies by providing a theoretical bridge for rhetorical
scholars. We must address both the materiality and immateriality of the digital music
commodity and its distribution networks to understand the musical commodity as it
currently functions. And here is where music as a commodity also concerns us: there is
an apparent dissonance between public desire and what is actually produced through
the music-industrial-complex. There have been interesting cultural backlashes, such as
postmodern joke music: Rebecca Black’s “Friday,” which only came into popular
attention through its online distribution and rapid Internet sharing. For, a completely
fulfilled desire is the death of the desire itself, and musicians often write very different
music than that which they take pleasure in listening. A politics of music matters most,
here, in the intersection of public and private life, in the intersections of our desires and
the realities of production and distribution, and in the peculiar role of the musiciancitizen as something of a subversive character. Yet, we all are continually, endlessly

36

shaping the sonic realities around us by the very necessity of living. As long as we are
alive, we are always sounding. Music is inherently political in our world.
What does it mean, then, when the popular music of a culture does not satisfy
its listeners? We are always surrounded by vibrations, and are often unmindfully
influenced by song and music. We dismiss much of it to the “background,” as a way to
pass time, and as a method of changing our immediate subjective realities. As Robert
Bruce Lindsay writes, “Life is full of sounds… pleasant and vital ones… [and] the
unpleasant and dangerous variety” (1945). Jacques Attali writes that music is the order
of sound—as opposed to noise—and Plato insists that music must move us to
“Good,” while Adorno laments the loss of a “serious music.” In this work, I expand on
theories by Jacques Attali in his Noise: The Political Economy of Music and seek to identify
how the digital music commodity functions, moves, replicates, and exists in the world.
What are the political ramifications of widespread digital recording technologies and
the recent outburst of independent music production? What does the changing
relationship between major industry label music production and independent
production tell us about the political stakes of music? What is the theoretical
relationship between the apparent materiality and simultaneous virtuality of digital
music, and the presence and non-presence of the stage performer? From this point, I
look at movements and the resurgence of independent music in American popular
culture. Why, for example, have we seen increased sales of “outdated” media such as
the LP vinyl record? Why have artists such as Sufjan Stevens moved almost entirely to
online based sales through websites such as BandCamp? What are the implications of
file-sharing and intellectual copyright law on the musician-artist-producer, and what are
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the implications for the citizen who happily “pirates” such content? Playing off of
Marx’s work on commodity fetishism and Derrida’s explication of archivization in
Archive Fever, I look at how digital recording and distribution technologies have
influenced the digital music commodity as well as the musician, who has become selfpublisher. How has independent music been appropriated into popular music, how has
the “folk” aesthetic been commodified, and most recently in American musical culture,
how has it been appropriated into popular music? How might we reconcile the material
reality of sound as vibration with such phenomenological tropes as the Derridean idea
of the specter, or the non-presence of presence? How can we revitalize the role of the
musician-citizen, who has been so often cast as a delinquent madman since Plato’s
Republic?
Yet, beyond ancient theories of music, this project deals with both concrete and
theoretical issues of musical composition in the digital age: a call for independent
musicians to reclaim autonomy from the music-industrial-complex. I assess the
ideological and political gravity of music—from musical torture at Guantanamo, to the
corporate use of Muzak, to the persuasive power of music in the shaping of our
political realities. Our sounds are both virtual and immediate. Here and not here. No
longer is the musician solely a writer and performer. Reception and listening are
becoming at once increasingly private—through headphones, earbuds, personal
computers, mobile devices—yet also widespread through their digital distribution. The
author envisions this work as being an important contribution on a theoretical level as
well as a practical guide for contemporary independent musicians and scholars
concerned with music and sound across the humanities. Further, this dissertation also
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serves as a manifesto for scholars to reconsider the significance of applied rhetorical
theory to sonic studies.

Overview of Chapters
The trajectories of this work appear as such. Chapter 1, “Rhetoric and Music:
An Introduction,” serves here as a review of literature on ancient Greek theories of
music, pedagogical approaches to music, and to offer the suggestation that we must
move beyond examining music in its ability to move us emotionally. Though there
seems to us to exist several historical bursts of interest between rhetorical studies and
musical composition from extant writings, we can see that a long human understanding
exists of the persuasive power of music. But should we trust Vargese when he tells us
that music is just an “ordering” of sound? No, we must expand this notion beyond
mere “ordering” and delve into the intricacies of non-linear processes and
phenomenological inquiries into invention. It is from the Athenian Stranger in Laws
that we see a glimmer of the extraordinary gravity attributed to music by the ancient
Greeks: here, we see the possibility of music to help men find truth. Yet, while music
for the ancient Greeks in its best forms would move men to virtue, we see that even in
antiquity the power of music to do much more than this was understood: to move men
to violence, to move us to madness.
Here, we move to Chapter 2, “Rhetorical-Musical Invention Through the
Material and Immaterial Properties of Music,” in which I set up a theoretical
framework for musical inspiration and composition in terms of rhetoric through a
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close analysis of Phaedrus and Derrida’s figure of the ghost and the non-presence of
presence. In this space between the apparent mystery of musica ex nihilo and the source
of musical inspiration and musica ex materia, or music which arises out of something, out
of our interactions with the immediate, physical vibrations of sound and of the
interfaces of instruments, it is in this space between that we find the figure of the ghost
and can examine the functioning of rhetorical-musical invention and composition.
Herein, I ask: where does musical inspiration come from, through what properties, and
how is musical invention a rhetorical act? The voice presents itself to itself. In Derrida’s
critique—or response—to Husserl, we find a better understanding; Derrida explains
that Husserl imagined a pre-expressive element to “lived-experience” (2011, p. 13). It is
through the difficulty in discerning between the “element of language” and the
“element of consciousness” that a certain “indiscernibility” arises: this
interdiscernability brings “non-presence and difference” forward, “right into the heart
of self-presence” (Derrida 2011, p. 13). Thus, through the voice, there is a sort of
mediation that occurs. The non-presence arises through the dismissal of the Mind, of
the Ideas, of “ideal objects,” which are not ideal objects at all but “historical products”
(Derrida 2011, p. 13). Derrida continues, from Ghost Dance:
Therefore, if I’m a ghost, but believe I’m speaking with my own voice,
it’s precisely because I believe it’s my own voice, that I allow it to be
taken over by another’s voice. Not just any other voice but that of my
own ghosts. So ghosts do exist… and it’s the ghosts who will answer
you. Perhaps they already have. (McMullen 1983)

40

From Derrida we have the theoretical front porch to address this key duality of the
material/immaterial properties of music, and of the musician being both here and not
here.
I move, then to the recording, distribution, and storage of music in digital
spaces through Chapter 3, “The Digital-Political Economy of Music: Memory,
Notation, and Reproduction.” I ask, here: how has the political economy of music
changed with the introduction of relatively inexpensive, domestic recording
technologies and digital file sharing and selling? Chapter 3 looks at archivization first in
terms of ancient Greek musical notation, the problems surrounding the archivization
of digital music, the moveable substrates of digital archives, and further issues on the
(im)material nature of digital music. I introduce Marx and commodity fetishism, the
fetishism of the virtual, and ideology and the interface: I call on Nusselder’s Interface
Fantasy and Pohlmann and West’s Documents of Ancient Greek Music: The Extant Fragments
for these analyses (1970). I introduce the digital-political economy of music as a way of
understanding how rhetorical choices are made not only by composers but by
individuals who are enveloped in a vast and connected network of composition,
performance, and listening.
In Chapter 4 I address the larger, socio-political implications of the persuasive
power of music and examine instances of musical torture and applications of audio by
military means. I ask, in this chapter: who orchestrates musical torture? I then call upon
anecdotes about the role of music in contemporary protests by sharing some personal
experiences from my participation in the Six Month Anniversary March on the
Brooklyn Bridge with the Occupy Wall Street movement, while drawing from work by
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Jonathan Sterne and others on Muzak while using a framework from Slavoj Žižek
regarding subjective and objective violence. Music has extraordinary political stakes,
and the independent production of music—and indeed, as it is sometimes silenced—
plays into the organization of protest and revolution.
In Chapter 5 I present what I call the significant function of music as a conclusion
from these approaches to understanding music beyond its affective dimension: through
parallels in ancient Greek theories of rhetoric and music, through the notion of
invention and in Derrida’s non-presence of presence, through our digitization,
archivization, and storage of the digital music commodity, through the relationship of
game music to virtual worlds, and through the political violence of music. I adapt the
term significant function from Huizinga to explain how music works not only pathetically,
but with a significant function, especially as music arises in its new, digital form: arising
from domestic recording technologies, independent production. Herein, we must ask,
then: what is “independent music”? I define independent music as music performed,
recorded, and shared by the members of a localized community, composed or
produced independently of the music-industrial complex. This might seem easily
complicatable: what happens when traditional music of a culture is recorded in a studio
funded by a major label? The music was nonetheless composed outside of the musicindustrial complex. We can ask: what about the musical influences that carry through
from our interconnected, telecommunicative world? Independent music, as I
understand it, is also that music which is produced by members of a community outside
of the music-industrial complex. This encompasses home-recording, local shows and
performances, and homemade media for the distribution of music. I come by this
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definition through work by Alan Lomax in his cantometric system of musical analysis
in his comments on the significance of the timbre of the voice and Roland Barthes’s
notion of the “grain of the voice”: rhetorical analyses can especially help us, here, for
other methods of music analysis often disregard timbre as that “unique” or “special”
quality on which we cannot put our fingers. Yet, a rhetorical-musical analysis can be
directed at these particularities which are reified somewhere in between the apparent
subjective and objective qualities of musicality.

Methodology
I use what approximates a postdisciplinary approach to the problems I have
presented to suggest an interdisciplinary cooperation in scholarship between rhetorical
studies, sonic studies, and musicology.7 It is necessary to work outside of the particular
limitations of certain fields of study because of the broad scope and multiple
interterpretative models that have been suggested for understanding music, from
ancient philosophy to the physical sciences, behavior therapy to digital media studies. I
must qualify my claim, here, though, for it is simple to say that “this problem is too
complex to be limited to a single field” or “conventional approaches simply won’t
work, here.” While I draw on scholarship from diverse academic fields to represent
important findings and research on music and audio—its creation, reception,
distribution, and our experiencing of it—to constitute a theoretical space of work, it is
very much unlike a knot—such as the trefoil, or the Lacanian Borromean knot. Rather,
7

See Petrisor 2013 for work outside of the humanities on inter-, cross-, multi-, and
trans-disciplinary approaches, and Salmons and Wilson 2007 for a general layout.
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I am suggesting a denouement, an untying, and an untangling of tensions. We must first
understand the strings with which we are working before we start to loop them
together again. And thus, this dissertation might be seen as such: a card table brought
outside to sit by the fire on an August evening, placed on it a worn and weary coil of
rope, another tied into it, another still, and another. Together, with no beginning nor an
apparent end, is the complex mass we have made of our theories of music: the crack of
the logs and the light of the flame are that enchanting mystery of music always in our
minds, our ears, all around us. I hope to begin the work of the hands that helps to see
how these overlaying theories, philosophies, ideas, and writings about sound and music
have come together, and to attempt to make sense of the present moment where we
find ourselves—to trace the coils and to tug on the discordances, to see how we’ve
folded together this story about music that we have made together.
Musical composition, itself, is a non-linear process. It is not so simple as: I
imagine a song spontaneously while I am walking down the street to Monticello’s
grocery store on the corner, I come home and pick up my instrument, reify the song
from start to finish, and pen it down to remember it for later. Rather, a snippet might
erupt that is half a melody. But is it a call or response, and to what? Just some inkling.
Perhaps it grew out of a song that just happened onto my Pandora Internet radio
station by Bill Bragg that I was only partially attentive to while washing dishes, or a
musical number from an old Disney movie I haven’t heard in fifteen years. I might run
right to my computer to hum the little thing, to save it; because ideas, verbal and
musical and visual, disappear quickly! We all know the disappointment of an idea lost.
Then, I might return later and find that I simply don’t like it, or find that in the
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adaptation from hum to the plastic keys of my MIDI controller there is a more exciting
variation, and something altogether new takes shape. So, too, with writing: some idea is
not transferred to the page, but ideas pull and tug on the words we know and the
cursor might curse us with a little block. So we walk outside and forget the song, the
idea, again. Is it even a song, yet? Maybe in this time, a few lyrical lines pop up, or
maybe they’re borrowed from a song I wrote three years ago that didn’t quite work out
in a way that I found fulfilling. Or I might find that it sounds suspiciously like a tonedowned adaptation of a Tony Iommi lead guitar lick from Black Sabbath’s “Fairies
Wear Boots.” In which case I can decide to tease out something new from it, or throw
it away as an empty recitation of an old theme. David Plans Casal, in “Crowdsourcing
the Corpus: Using Collective Intelligence as a Method for Composition,” shows how
non-linear musical compositions are becoming more common with digital
technologies. Eric Whitacre, an American composer, has used such methods to create a
“virtual choir” by sending out sheet music to 250 participants (Casal 2011, p. 26).
Vocalists then recorded their parts and uploaded a YouTube video. The finished
production, Lux Arumque, is an edited and spliced version of these voices, from across
the world, recorded at different times, woven together into a media object that has a
linear form. So, too, has this dissertation been composed from diverse inspirations,
smaller projects, ideas too grand and ridiculous to publish, manic latenight writing,
sleepy January afternoons in my office. I sing along with other voices—here Derrida,
there Listenius—and allow an arrangement to develop.
Thinkers and philosophers from all disciplines have been fascinated with music
for millennia, and I do not mean to offer some universal theory of musical analysis
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which de-mystifies music. Rather, the rhetorical study of music should better help
composers to understand their decisions in the composition process, to allow
spontaneous inspiration and derivations from form through the aleatoric moment and
non-linear composition, and to aid rhetorical scholars and teachers of multimodal
composition a set of tools for addressing music in the classroom, even where a
background in technical, traditional musical theory is not necessarily held.

Summary
To review the trajectories plotted here, we may first turn to the title of the
work. This dissertation examines what we shall call the digital-political topography of
music, or the places and spaces that are occupied by music in its digital and political
positioning. So, too, does this work examine the ways in which music moves in
distribution networks, from invention to performance to playback, as well as how
music moves us: ideologically, socially, with promise for new political potentialities and
with the violence of the suppression of these dreamings. In Chapter 1, I have begun by
examining the argumentative nature of music through ancient Greek theories of music,
and set up the groundwork for this project. In Chapter 2, I look to the moment of
musical invention and the role of the audience in the musical composition process
through the figure of the ghost. Chapter 3 examines the digital music commodity in
light of the phantasm: how sound is stored, transmitted, and archived in the liminal
spaces of digitality, as sound is composed in the liminal spaces of being. Chapter 4
introduces the violence of music in its subjective and objective properties to further
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demonstrate how music moves us: not merely in the emotional dimensions, but also in
protest, in silencing, in the potentiality for the musician-citizen to stake a claim against
the music-industrial complex. Chapter 5 returns to our theoretical beginning by calling
on work by Brian Vickers who criticized the long-standing tradition of the application
of figures of rhetoric to figures of music; I propose a new way of understanding the
relationship of rhetoric and music through what I call the significant function of music,
the culmination of the elements herein discussed as the persuasive power of music
(1984). To inquire about the topography of music—that is, the place of music, the
space of music—is to inquire about not only how music moves us emotionally, socially,
culturally, politically, but also to ask how music itself moves. How does music circulate,
and how is it distributed in digital networks? The persuasive power of music is now
mediated by and situated in and around the liminal spaces of digitality. To think about
how music functions, how it argues across media, we must examine its material and
immaterial realities as they float and form around us, and as we float and form them
around ourselves. This dissertation thus seeks to identify the changing scope of the
digital music commodity, and the changing role of music in society and in the shaping
of new political realities.
If, as Jacques Attali tells us, music is prophetic, that the superstructure is not
determined indefinitely by the base of society, that indeed our musical culture can play
reciprocally back into the base, then we might think that in the digital-political
economy of music, we have the same opportunity—and at once, the same dangers
ahead of us. Yet what is certain is that it is our responsibility to listen to ourselves and
to each other, to understand the persuasive power of music across all its forms and in
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all its figures, not merely in the application of immediate, apparent figures of rhetoric
to discrete tropes in musical composition. Here we expand our understanding of the
power of music in society, and the power of the citizen to use music to contribute to
the human future, not merely as an aesthetic contribution but as a pertinent political,
rhetorical device. Within the figure of the ghost we know ourselves—we are at once
here, and not here, in a world that is not our own but has been handed to us, but
nonetheless a world in which we set our feet, let rattle our voices, and compose.
Through our technologies we have built instruments that can be amplified, songs that
can be transmitted on electromagnetic waves, trans-oceanic cables that permit the
passage of digital file formats across the world. And so, too, have we engineered
devices of torture, let our songs be cyclically recycled for profit, and forgotten that
incredible power of music. And so bringing together that study of persuasion—
rhetoric—with the study of music, we can begin to attempt to, as Jacques Attali
phrased it, dream up our own “criteria,” and better still to understand to which criteria
we presently “conform” (2009).
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Chapter 2
Rhetorical-Musical Invention Through the Material and
Immaterial Properties of Music

The unlike is joined together,
and from differences result the most beautiful harmony.
-Heraclitus, Fragments

Invention
Rhetorical invention—we have, from the Latin invenire, “to find”—was thought
to be, by Aristotle, the most important of the canons of rhetoric and the seat of the
development of argument (Crowley 2010, p. 3-4). And, for Crowley, in our modern
understanding, “invention” encompasses “the study of all the possible means by which
arguments or proofs can be discovered and developed” (Crowley 2010, p. 2).
Quintilian, in Volume 5 of his Institutes of Oratory, first published around CE 95, likens
topoi to what Crowley describes as “haunts,” or, “‘the secret places where arguments
reside, and from which they must be drawn forth’ (5.10.21)” (Crowley 2010, p. 3). The
translation I have referenced, by John Selby Watson, renders this line slightly
differently: “ ...the seats of arguments in which they lie concealed and from which they
must be drawn forth.” [5.10.21] (Watson 2006). Yet, whether we understand this as
some secret place or some concealed content waiting to be discovered, scholars have
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long disagreed about the origins of these wells from which we draw up our pails.
Quintilian tells us:
21. For as all kinds of fruits are not produced in all countries, and as
you will be unable to find a bird or a beast if you are ignorant where it
is usually produced or makes its abode, and as among the several kinds
of fishes, some delight in a smooth and others in a rocky bottom of the
water, while particular sorts are confined to particular regions or coasts,
and you could not attract the ellops or the scarus to our shores, so
every kind of argument is not to be got from every place and is
consequently not everywhere to be sought. (Watson 2006)
In this chapter, I present the figure of the ghost as a mediator to explain the process of
musical invention. How does the song materialize amongst us, and in through which
media? Having examined parallels in the theories of music and rhetoric in Plato and
Aristotle, and the pedagogy of music in Athens, we are faced with the question: where
8

do songs come from? Further, if it is not a technical training in music that allows the
composer a sense of musicality—as is suggested by Aristotle—what is the origin of
musicality, of the tools for musical composition? Through a close reading of Plato’s
Phaedrus, I expand on the notion of audience to include the venue, the environment, as
a contribution to the rhetoric of music, and its role in the subjective experience of
8

Parts of this chapter are adapted from an article first published in the Rupkatha Journal
on Interdisciplinary Studies in Humanities, in a special issue on Performance Studies, under
the title “Singing Specters: Phenomenology in the Performance of Music,” October
2013. With thanks to and permission from Dr. Tarun Tapas Mukherjee, editor of
Rupkatha.
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musical inspiration. Through Derrida’s rendering of the non-presence of presence and
in the figure of the ghost, and the madness of inspiration, we can begin to see the
rhetorical invention of music as a process that both calls upon history and
simultaneously seeks to annex the musical roots from which it emerges.9
First, through a phenomenological inquiry, we address the mind and musical
inspiration: how, from the theoretical figure of the ghost, we can understand how
compositional and performative responsivity functions in musical creation. That is, by
looking to problems in rhetorical-musical invention, we can ask: where do songs come
from? This chapter looks at the Derridean figure of the ghost and the duality of being
here and not here as a sort of liminal space where material and immaterial properties of
music are brought together by the composer. We transition, in Chapter 2, from the
explication of early theories of music by the ancient Greek philosophers in Chapter 1
as that which moves men to virtue and that which can move the soul, but also that
which moves us toward truth, to the extension of our understanding of the role of
rhetoric in music by addressing issues in invention and audience.
It is through the figure of the ghost that we can begin to reconcile the apparent
problem of musica ex nihilo—that is, music out of nothing, or the apparent mystery of
why a melody seems to form from nothing in the mind of the composer—and those
old Ancient Greek notions of inspiration which are not entirely helpful for the

9

Later in this chapter, the topic of historical trajectories of sonic figures emerges
through work by Theodore Adorno on “popular” and “serious” music and their
distinctions, where Adorno laments “popular” music as being highly derivative, and
formulaic. Despite my earlier assumptions, perhaps we should be worried: might we
someday “run out of music?” No, but we must look to potentialities in the breaking of
form to invent new possibilities for our music that is replicated and reproduced.
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composer, to say that music comes to us ex deus—from the gods—with the idea of
musica ex materia—or music from something, from the composer’s and performer’s
interaction with the world. Through the figure of the ghost, we come to understand
that musical invention occurs in the composer’s interaction with the immediate world
as well as with the liminal, with the technological interfaces of instruments, with the
physical reality of sound and with the elusive dimension of time. Thus, in this chapter I
turn to assess materiality of sound, its immediate physical properties and the
instrument as a technology with which we interact to mold our sonic creations, as well
as the figure of the ghost who brings us this reconciliation of musica ex nihilo and musica
ex materia. To begin I write along with key 20th century thinkers—Maurice MerleauPonty and Jacques Derrida—to understand how a phenomenological examination of
the performance of music can contribute to a meaningful exploration of the roles of
consciousness and presence in the process of rhetorical-musical invention. I begin by
looking at Plato’s Phaedrus and assess the notion of “fit” as it relates to rhetoric and
performance as well as the mythical trope of the cicadas (Nehamas & Woodruff 1995).
I will then explore how Plato’s rendering of madness in this piece might help us
understand Derrida’s almost paradoxical construction of the voice in Voice and
Phenomenon (2011). From here, I move to analyze the figure of the ghost as presented by
Derrida and relate this to the non-presence of presence while asking: how might this notion
better help us understand how rhetorical decisions are made by musicians?
I both criticize and applaud the recent American revival of “folk” music. The
Swedish folk musician Kristian Mattson, popularized in the United States, said in an
interview: "I don't consider my work to be a part of any tradition. This is how I play.
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This is how I write songs,” despite stylistically similar songwriting to American
folksters such as Bob Dylan, who drew heavily from Woody Guthrie, who channeled
ghosts of Appalachian ballads strung from Old English ballads, and so on. To discredit
history and suppose some sort of ex nihilo composition as potential for social change is
to attempt to uproot a hundred-year oak with bare hands. Rupture must come from
roots, and so the ghost is as new as it is old. A phenomenological framework to assess
musical invention in a rhetorical assessment of music should hope to welcome the
ghost with open arms—though it will never quite touch it, we can watch and listen,
still:
GLENDOWER

Do so, and those musicians that shall play to you

Hang in the air a thousand leagues from hence,
And straight they shall be here. Sit and attend.
[3.1.220-22] (Shakespeare 1997)
And as we sit and attend, we now turn from our philosophical inquiry to the physical
properties of sound to further our understanding of rhetorical-musical invention. From
this investigation into the (im)materiality of the self, we turn to the materiality and
physicality of sound itself: as it appears to us, as we understand it, and the ramifications
of such.

Audience, Invention, Rhetorician
I begin, here, with a rough etymological inquiry. The notion of the Platonic
Idea stems from the Greek “to see,” from iden. Audience has an interesting
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relationship, here, from the Greek root au which is “to perceive,” to feel or grasp, even,
aisthanesthai, and through time audience has come to mean both an assembly of listeners
and then later, through French it seems, to mean the reader of a text. This notion of
the audience as those who encounter the text directly correlates most with our
contemporary understanding in rhetoric and composition studies, but might we expand
this notion? Plato distinguished that the work of the mind is separate—we abandon the
senses to think theoretically, as in the Pythagorean theorem, where we think of the law
behind the triangle and not the triangle itself—and it is from Plato that we have this
understanding of the idea. This idea is the distinct knowledge of something, the mind’s
eye, and is distinct from what was perceived as an empirical reality.
What of audience, then? G.R.F. Ferrari, in his “Listening to the Cicadas: A
Study of Plato’s Phaedrus,” provides an interesting analysis of the notion of being “fit”10
that I would like to here incorporate (1990). Phaedrus is unique among the Platonic
dialogues in its descriptions of environment and for setting up a narrative which

10

Ferrari’s figuring of “fit,” or what we might call fit-ness, is an exciting contribution to
rhetorical theory. In my following analysis, I describe the influence of the speakers’
environment in Phaedrus. But we can easily transfer these ideas beyond our old Platonic
dialogues. In terms of the musical performance, much thought and preparation is put
into a set, based on the specificities of the venue—that is, not only the members of the
audience, but of the environment. I once arrived at a small coffee shop gig to realize
that there was no amplification system! Beyond that, I was to play outside of the store,
in cold, late-Autumnal Calumet, MI, standing by a small portable heater. Being
accustomed to performing with a microphone and DI (direct input) box for my
acoustic guitar on stage, rather than unamplified and on the street-corner, I had to
adjust my entire set-list and approach accordingly. Further, these decisions are not all
made in preparation. As I was playing, I found that my voice, in certain registers,
reverberated off of the buildings across the street and helped carry the sound down a
ways—there aren’t many vehicles driving through Calumet in the evening—and I thus
selected songs from my memory that allowed me to sing in this range, and invented
new verses for these songs, and repeated some.
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corresponds to the themes of the dialogue itself. Socrates was known for having
seldom left the city—so it is significant that we find Phaedrus and Socrates outside of
Athens in this dialogue. Ferrari explains:
He [Socrates] takes pains to select a suitable place for reading. A tall
plane-tree nearby marks a zone of shelter from the sun, he judges, ‘just
the right breeze’ (pneuma metrion), and soft grass to accommodate
whichever posture they prefer, whether sitting or lying down (229a8b2). On the way to this bower he speculates that they are passing the
very spot where according to story Boreas the wind-god snatched off
the princess Oreithyia. What fuels his conjecture is, again, the
recognition of fit: that the alluring purity of the water at this point
makes it suitable (epitedeia) for girls to play in (229b4-9). Furthermore,
had Phaedrus not been struck at the outset of the dialogue by how
especially ‘appropriate’ (prosekousa) Lysias’ speech on love would be for
the notoriously ‘erotic’ Socrates to hear (227c3-5) he would not now be
applying to the environment this ability to recognise fit. (Ferrari 1990,
p. 8)
How can we understand this characterization of nature and environment? Do we
simply impose, anachronistically, the nature/culture divide or the divide between
nature and city? No, for it seems that, while Socrates is not accustomed to the land
outside the walls of Athens, he seeks to use his environment in his speech. He finds
himself in the country and so incorporates it. This is now his venue. Similarly, Plato has
Socrates speak throughout Phaedrus about the relationship between the body and
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rhetorical composition: “Every speech must be put together like a living creature, with
a body of its own; it must be neither without head nor without legs; and it must have a
middle and extremities that are fitting both one another and to the whole work
(Nehamas & Woodruff 1995, p. 541).” Despite this concentration on the physical
body, it is still Socrates’ assertion that “the nature of speech is in fact to direct the soul”
(Nehamas & Woodruff 1995, p. 548). Mary B. Schoen-Nazzaro writes in “Plato and
Aristotle on the Ends of Music” that Plato understood music to be an essential part of
the education of young Athenian boys because of its ability to shape “proper order in
man’s nature”: gymnastics worked toward the ordering of the body, while music
worked “principally toward his soul” (Schoen-Nazzaro 1978, p. 261).
Further, Schoen-Nazzaro reads Plato to tell us that musical education should
not just give “dexterity to the fingers or strength to the voice”—that is, a sort of
technical training that is most common in today’s Western musical pedagogy—but
rather that “musical education should measure and order the movements of the soul”
so that the child can learn to “feel pleasure and pain the right way” (1978, p. 262). And
in many ancient theories of music, we see this theme of “ordering.” Ptolemy wrote
extensively on the harmony of the universe and its various spheres in his Harmonics: a
sort of music of the heavens (Solomon 1999). We now know much more concerning
astronomical objects and their movements, but the religious and cultural influence on
the logic of music theory is still evident. There are certain obvious relationships
between what we often identify as “pleasant” sounds in music: a note one octave above
another has twice the frequency in Hz, for example.
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We can return to Debra Hawhee to help us further understand the role of
rhetoric, here, by linking oratory, the body, and music in educational environments in
her “Bodily Pedagogies: Rhetoric, Athletics, and the Sophists’ Three Rs”:
Given the proximity of athletic and rhetorical training, as well as the
noisiness of auloi—their shrill sounds approximate those produced by
modern-day bagpipes—it is also likely that music flowed into recitations
and sophistic lectures, producing an awareness of—indeed,
facilitating—the rhythmic, tonic quality of speeches. As Kenneth J.
Freeman points out, the aulos did not merely provide background noise,
but rather played an integral role in training, as the instrument was used
“in order that good time might be preserved in the various movements”
(128). Music’s role in the gymnasium, then, was to introduce a rhythm,
to provide a tempo for the practice and production of bodily
movements. In short, music established a rhythm through the cyclical
repetition of patterns, and this rhythm was replicated in the bodily
movements of those in training. (Hawhee 2002, p. 146)
It seems that the practical use of music in Athenian society may have differed from
Plato’s hopes, then. Here, music is being used to keep time for gymnastic exercises, and
is leaking out into the study halls, into the classrooms. Of course, we have many types
of music, now, and certainly so did our ancient friends. Yet, this trope of repetition
remains in contemporary rhetorical composition practices in both musical composition
and in the writing classroom. But here, we see the significance of the sounds of an
environment. Might we better think about how we design the acoustic spaces of our
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classrooms and our universities? Not in architecture, as an end, but in thinking of how
sound works rhetorically on us. Yet here too we must be reminded as to why we
should pay attention to the sounds around us and to listen: the rhythms at play effect
our experience, or even constitute our experience. We are the sound, and in the sound,
as much as it has an effect on us. As in the example of the Athenian orators above, we
find a rhythm to our oratory from sounds that come from our environment. Walter
Ong in his Orality and Literacy describes how, while vision “dissects,” sound is a means
of centering (2002, p. 72). Through our hearing, we are the experiential centers of not
the world of sound but our world of sound. But can we say so easily that the experience
of hearing is not one of dissection? The very biological reality of binaural hearing—of
having two ears—we locate sound sources, a sort of automatic calculation that is
conducted through the difference between our ears: this is why we see a dog tilt its
head in “confusion”: it is trying to listen “better,” to get a sense of the source of the
sound. We are thus always looking for origins, for causes to the experiences which we
come by, whether sound or sight. We should be careful with Ong, who argues that
“The spoken word is always an event, a movement in time, completely lacking in the
thing-like repose of the written or printed word” (Ong 2002, p. 75). For, our written
texts are ephemeral, too, and only seem to have permanence.
We can transition back, then, and bring forth the cicadas in Phaedrus. What role
do they play for the dialogue? The backdrop of the pastoral countryside provides many
discussion points for Socrates and Phaedrus, and the cicadas are noted throughout the
text. Socrates spins a myth to explain their existence and their presence:
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When the Muses were born and song was created for the first time,
some of the people of that time were so overwhelmed with the pleasure
of singing that they forgot to eat or drink; so they died without even
realizing it. It is from them that the race of the cicadas came into being;
and, as a gift from the Muses, they have no need of nourishment once
they are born. Instead, they immediately burst into song, without food
or drink, until it is time for them to die. After they die, they go to the
Muses and tell each one of them which mortals have honored her.
(Nehamas & Woodruff, 2005)
There is a close relationship here between the role of song and the role of madness.
The people were “so overwhelmed with the pleasure of singing” that they died without
“even realizing it” and were given a gift from the Muses: they would no longer need to
eat. Now, these creatures can “immediately burst into song” from birth, and continue
singing until they die. There is a sort of strangeness, here, however. The mythological
people who were converted to the race of cicadas died without knowing, so we can
assume they felt no pain, so powerful was their love of song, so great was their
pleasure. What need was there to change their form, if already present in the human is
the capacity to be “so overwhelmed”? I’ll leave this point for another time. But we
might take this rendering of the cicadas as an indication of the celebratory power of
music for Plato. Or is this too far? There is, too, a more morose mythology here being
crafted: that the allure of song, of sound can be so great that it leads to death, a
complete loss of the self and a stripping of life to bare performance. But is this not
experience itself, a coming together of desire and action? Perhaps in the myth of the
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cicadas we see a notion of the embodied rhetoric of music: the cicada is not-present
and beyond its own “self-control”: it leads itself unwillingly to death. An early critique
of phonocentricism? Most likely no, considering Plato’s distrust of the written word,
but we’ll approach this notion of writing and the voice later in the paper. And of
course it would be anachronistic to think of Freud in the venue of the Phaedrus, but the
death drive here seems to call strongly through the song, through the cicadas.
Let us think again about what role the cicadas have in the framing of the
dialogue we read in Phaedrus. The always present sound of the cicadas makes for an
ensounded environment. The dialogue occurs in the sound, with the cicadas. Ferrari can
perhaps help us again with his notion of the “impresario”: “Phaedrus’ careful matching
of audience to performance and performance to environment shows him turning from
the mere consumption of others’ art to the exercise of the art to which he is peculiarly
devoted” (Ferrari 1990, p. 8-9). Here I have come back to my original etymological
inquiry. What is the significance of audience in the Phaedrus, and for the rhetor? This is
part of Socrates’ critique of writing, that with oratory, one can know the souls of his
audience: the rhetor can see to whom he is speaking. But with writing, it is not known.
The performing musician, similarly, can see and hear his audience, be in a sort of
dialogic responsive atmosphere with them, but with recorded music, there is the
possibility of being heard through tinny speakers or being remixed, edited, spliced up
through a digital audio workstation.
Ferrari sees that Phaedrus is acting as a sort of impresario, here, as Ferrari
argues—traditionally and interestingly, an impresario is a manger of a concert hall or
venue—that Phaedrus is trying to manage the conversation through “fussing” over
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“fit” in assessing the “landscape” and the “environment” (4). Yet, Plato seems to
engage with wherever they find themselves, though he does deliberately choose a
shaded area. Perhaps this is why Ferrari is critical of the role of Phaedrus as impresario,
deeming it something less than philosophy. Ferrari interprets that Phaedrus attempts to
pass off his “art” of acting as an “impresario” as the “good” where really it is just the
“fitting” (1990, p. 12-14). And, as aforementioned, Phaedrus attempts to pass this off
as “philosophy” (1990, p. 14). Yet, Phaedrus, in his oratory, knows that “If the physical
arrangements for the performance become the focus of audience attention, those
arrangements have failed their purpose” and that “Phaedrus understands that his
arrangements will give pleasure to the extent that they are appropriate, but must not be
declared appropriate merely because they give pleasure. In this he has a fair grasp of his
art as impresario” (Ferrari 1990, p. 12). The impresario cannot quell the fervor of the
audience, though. The environment becomes part of the performance. And the cicadas
are a key contributor to this soundscape that surrounds Phaedrus and Socrates in their
dialogue.
For, we know, all along, that there is the incessant singing of the cicadas. Can
we call it singing? The cicada produces what some call a deafening noise—the loudest
insect, over 100 decibels—yet it is a hallmark of a bucolic sun-lit summer afternoon.
Should we assume the cicada songs are distant, and thus non-interruptive of the speech
that occurs between Phaedrus and Socrates? How does this sort of feedback from the
environment influence their conversation? We can only speculate—and it is a fictional
account, most likely, of the two speakers—but perhaps the exploration of the concept
of madness in Phaedrus can further direct this exploration.
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Socrates describes four types of divine madness. The third describes the very
sort of state of being “overwhelmed” which gave rise to the death and birth of the race
of cicadas:
Third comes the kind of madness that is possession by the Muses,
which takes a tender virgin soul and awakens it to a Bacchic frenzy of
songs and poetry that glorifies the achievements of the past and teaches
them to future generations. If anyone comes to the gates of poetry and
expects to become an adequate poet by acquiring expert knowledge of
the subject without the Muses’ madness, he will fail, and his selfcontrolled verses will be eclipsed by the poetry of men who have been
driven out of their minds. (Nehamas & Woodruff 1995, p. 523)
I find here a fascinating relationship between this state of divine madness and its
contribution to the creation of art, to “poetry.”11 Is this not also the transcendent state
of the musician in times of creation, of inspiration, of aleatoric moments? It seems that
these cicada people were indeed mad, that is, they were lost in the “frenzy of songs”
that overtook them and thus, in a sense, non-present. Yet, it is also in these
extraordinary moments of divine madness that the artist is most present. Can we relate
this to the Derridean notion of the voice and the non-presence of presence? Is the mad
artist not also a ghost, both here and not here, both alive and dead?

11

Still today we carry notions in some cultures of the mad artist, and so on. Work by
Dr. James MacCabe in the American Journal of Psychiatry showed a link between good
grades creativity and bipolar disorder in students, a fourfold effect compared to socalled average students (2010). This appeared to be especially true for those studying
languages, literature, and music. I’m unsure as of yet what to make of this, though it is
noteworthy.
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Madness and the Ghost: The Non-Presence of Self in Invention
Madness is a recurring topic in the Phaedrus, and its characterization differs
greatly from notions of mental disease or disability. Madness is a sort of gift. A source
of inspiration, a reaching out of the fingers of the divine into the mind of the mortal.
Socrates tells us that: “The people who designed our language in the old days never
thought of madness as something to be ashamed of or worthy of blame; otherwise they
would not have used the word ‘manic’ for the finest experts of all… thereby weaving
insanity into prophecy” (Nehamas & Woodruff 1995, p. 522-523). The academic and
the philosopher often carry the stigma of madness: of working against expectations and
norms. So, too, we think of today’s musician as the Bohemian. The ancient Greeks,
however, found solace in the madness of Homer: the figure of the blind prophet. The
bard, the eccentric, the performer acted as a cultural touchstone to unite pre-Socratic
Grecian culture and thought. We can of course criticize this unity—perhaps this is the
first heralding of nationalism in the lines of epic poetry inscribed, so long ago, then.
But the trust in the blind and the mad as a prophet, as he who has access to another
realm—a metaphysical realm, the realm of Ideas, of gods—might first be located here.
The mad man is both of this world and of another. He is a living ghost, a spectral
figure.
Who now is a ghost? Derrida appears in Ken McMullen’s improvisational film
Ghost Dance (1983). He is asked, “Do you believe in ghosts?” and responds:
That’s a difficult question. Firstly, you’re asking a ghost where he
believes in ghosts. Here, the ghost is me. Since I’ve been asked to play
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myself in a film which is more or less improvised, I feel as if I’m letting
a ghost speak for me. Curiously, instead of playing myself, without
knowing it… I let a ghost ventriloquize my words, or play my role,
which is even more amusing… (McMullen 1983)
We might think of this in terms of Derrida’s Voice and Phenomenon: Introduction to the
Problem of the Sign in Husserl’s Phenomenology. Derrida writes: “When I speak, it belongs to
the phenomenological essence of this operation that I hear myself during the time that I
speak” (Derrida 2011, p. 66). Time and the voice. The immediate past, the present, and
the immediate future are strung together by the voice. The syntax of our Western
conversation is comprised by a logos of repetition. We speak sentences, like melodies.
Strings made of units. Further, “…the soul of language, seems not to separate itself
from itself, from its presence to itself. The soul of language does not risk death in the
body of a signifier abandoned to the world and to the visibility of space” (Derrida
2011, p. 67). The voice presents itself to itself. In Derrida’s critique—or response—to
Husserl, we might find a better understanding; Derrida explains that Husserl imagined
a pre-expressive element to “lived-experience” (2011, p. 13). It is through the difficulty
in discerning between the “element of language” and the “element of consciousness”
that a certain “indiscernibility” arises: this interdiscernability brings “non-presence and
difference” forward, “right into the heart of self-presence” (Derrida 2011, p. 13). Thus,
through the voice, there is a sort of mediation that occurs. The non-presence arises
through the dismissal of the Mind, of the Ideas, of “ideal objects,” which are not ideal
objects at all but “historical products” (Derrida 2011, p. 13). Derrida continues, from
Ghost Dance:
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Therefore, if I’m a ghost, but believe I’m speaking with my own voice,
it’s precisely because I believe it’s my own voice, that I allow it to be
taken over by another’s voice. Not just any other voice but that of my
own ghosts. So ghosts do exist… and it’s the ghosts who will answer
you. Perhaps they already have. (McMullen 1983)
Are we ghosts? Can we merely say that Derrida thinks that language gives us life? Are we
phantoms floating around in overt subjectivity, hosts to language? To the voice? No,
but it is when one believes they are speaking with his or her “own voice” that it can be
“taken over by another’s voice.” What is meant, here? Do we understand this to be a
sort of Heideggerian sense of language—in a reduced or reductive sense, where there is
ready-made content to our language that we inherit? How is it that the voice does not
fall subject to the ideologies already present? Maurice Merleau-Ponty ensures us that
language does more than simply carry ideas. He writes in his Phenomenology of Perception
that “speech accomplishes thought” (Merleau-Ponty 2012, p. 183). That is, language
works reflexively with the world around us. Or is it only language mediated by the
voice? No. Merleau-Ponty uses the example of the author who sits down to write a
book not knowing what they plan on writing (2012, p. 183). Meaning is not directly
transferred outward. Merleau-Ponty argues that words do not carry with them readymade thoughts, that each word we utter is not some “inert envelope” carrying
signification (Merleau-Ponty 2012, p 181-83). We are always engaged in an active
process of making meaning with these words, which have active meaning in
themselves: words are alive. That is, Merleau-Ponty means to say that, almost in a
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memetic fashion, words “import” their “meaning [sens] into the listener’s mind” (202,
p. 185).
Does not also the performing musician react and respond to the world around
him via the “language of music”? Though I much dislike this term, “the language of
music,” so often thought of as a universal language, a lingua franca, for the code of
Western music seems to be a product of Western language itself and not its own
language, though this is thought’s food for another day. Might we say that this
responsivity erupts through the performer’s musicality, through the complex network
of interactions that occur between audience, instrument, voice, technology, audience,
and ghost? Let us return to Derrida’s explication in Ghost Dance. Perhaps he means that
through the illusion of speaking with what might be our “own” voice we are inhabited
by the meanings made by others, by ideologies, but these ready-made constructs preexisting in language. But why is it only in the guise of self-ratified authenticity, of selfassured authentic identity that we are overtaken by the ghosts of ourselves? What, in
fact, does it mean to be haunted by our own ghosts? Through the rote repetition and
recitation of performance—that is, of playing from a scripted piece, for example, or
even from memory—each performance has slight variation but it is in novel invention
that we separate ourselves from our self-history. It is through the process of
composition that we leave our ghosts behind and take up a voice, a voice that responds
to these complex networks and surroundings and emerges as an aleatoric rupture:
The enigma of the voice is rich and profound because of all the things
to which it seems to be responding. That the voice simulates the
“keeping watch” over presence and that the history of spoken language
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is the archive of this simulation from now on prevents us from
considering the “difficulty” to which the voice responds, in Husserl’s
phenomenology, either as a systematic difficulty or as a contradiction
that would be specific to his phenomenology. (Derrida 2011, p. 13)
This “keeping watch”—is it a sort of tie between non-presence and presence, or past
and present?—is the role of the voice. I have attempted here to bring about this figure
of the ghost as a way to understand, perhaps as a metaphor, perhaps as more, the nonpresence of presence, the “being lost in thought” of madness or more than this: that to
be not quite here is indeed to be here. Derrida of course is non-phonocentric and the
voice should not be here given our attention and priority, but the paradox of the voice.
But for Derrida, meaning comes through the figure of the voice: for there to be
meaning, there is a coming together of form and content—of the transcendental and
the empirical—so every repetition is both the same and different. The voice cuts across
the empirical and transcendental. We are then left with a liminal space for music: is
music formed from madness or from conscious composition? If from madness, what
right have we, then, to say that the elephant’s mourning trumpet is not music? If from
conscious composition, where then does inspiration arise? Through Derrida we
abandon the simple notion of the present, for it contains with it always our ghosts and
of future ghosts to come, and perhaps the very condition of being is that of being
ghosts, or of being a being-ghost. Within this notion of the ghost there is, too, the
thought of not-being-at-all, of negative being, in the immediate present the ghost
appears as the far-past—and perhaps the forever-to-come—but is in the present, if it
appears to us, and appears in the voice as both writing and sound. Thus it is for us not
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to see a ghost but to hear it. And to hear it always. There then might be some
reconciliation in the figure of the ghost for understanding how it is that humans come
by musical composition.
Ghosts mean something else to philosopher Slavoj Žižek, channeling Lacan:
The whole point of Lacan is that in order for social reality to establish
itself - by social reality I mean social order, social symbolic reality something must be primordially repressed. Something cannot be
symbolized, and the spectral apparition emerges to fill up the gap of
what cannot be symbolized. So, again, the specter conceals not social
reality but what must be primordially repressed in order for social
reality to emerge. (1995)
We might be reminded of the Freudian construction of the ghost as a kernel of
repressed truth, similar in some sense to the dream. But for Žižek’s reading of Lacan,
the apparition is not part of the symbolic order: “They are always here as the
embodiment of what Lacan would have called a certain symbolic deadlock” (1995).
Through these phenomenological explorations of key thinkers of the 20th
century, I have attempted to expand the notions of composing, to think not only of the
act of creating music as a deliberate and fully conscious structuring of intellectual
content through the technology of an instrument, but also to consider the composition
process as one of rapture, response, and tied up in a thousand hands, not just the hands
of the performer. It is not that the rhetorical act is unintended or the product of the
will of others, but it is in moments of novelty—in the composition of music—that the
artist is there self-identifying and imbued with ghosts, that he is haunted. It is through
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this contribution to a rhetoric of music that we might move beyond the stereotype of
the mad artist or the Bohemian if we are instead to understand the musician as he who
sings with ghosts of his self rather than he who sings alone in a contained madness. We
should still be mindful, however, of the ready-made structures in music just as well as
the structures which come from pre-existing tropes in our language. But we might learn
something here about the analysis of voices, of recordings, and of digital waves. How
can we reconcile this Derridean paradox that it is when we believe we are most
ourselves that we are most haunted, that we have been inhabited by past selves? How
do we reconcile the reality of having to let the voice leave the body, and of letting it be
recreated on our speakers: ghosts born from our household technology, and ghosts
saved for later days? In the following chapter, we bring the figure of the phantasm to
the digital music commodity to better understand those liminal spaces of digitality,
between materiality and virtuality, in which the digital music commodity takes shape
and, too, shapes us.
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Chapter 3
The Digital Music Commodity:
Memory, Notation, Reproduction

To my knowledge, the economic organization of this form of production lacking defined goals,
and the nature of the new relation it creates between man and matter, consumption-production and
pleasure, have never been expressed in theory before.
– Jacques Attali

Song and Civilization
In this chapter, I move from issues in inspiration and invention to our attempts
toward the solidification of music in its recording and notation, the development of the
music commodity in its material and immaterial forms, and our distribution and sharing
of music. What happens to music after we create it? What are the places and spaces
that music operates in as a digital commodity? Herein we come to understand how the
ends of music are now situated in a capitalist framework—while, as Jacques Attali tells
us, music and money have always been tied together, we come to see how the
particularities of the digital music commodity move us, and how music moves itself
across digital networks (Attali 2009). We save our music on scoresheets and in binary
code. We access it through the digital Cloud via the Internet. Much has changed in the
formats—in the media—through which we access and store our music, and we see
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certain patterns in music sales which hedge toward subscription services of music and
the generalized cataloguing of music. We see the ready access to enormous libraries of
music through pay-to-access services such as Spotify, and yet the continuity of the
album as the primary mode of collectivizing discrete songs still remains. We see, too,
the furthered separation of musician from the audience through the flat rate music
library access fee. Having addressed the role of rhetoric in the composition and
performance of music, we begin to see the role of rhetoric in the instances of the
recording, distribution, and ultimately the archivization of music, which now, at the
time of writing, most often occurs in these digital phases. Music is recorded using
digital audio workstation software (DAWs) such as Avid ProTools, Steinberg Cubase,
or Apple Logic Pro in studios or at home. Domestic recording mainstays have
expanded recently, as well, in freeware DAWs such as Audacity, or Garageband, which
comes ready to use on most Apple computers and mobile devices. In this chapter, I
investigate how music is mediated by its recording and distribution as a digital
commodity, and the political economy surrounding the digital music commodity; I
build on Jacques Attali’s framework by calling this the digital-political economy of
music. I examine the role of the extant fragments of ancient Greek musical notation—
sixty-one tattered remnants that remain on papyrus and pottery—to think about how
we now transcribe sound to various visual representations.
Independent music comes as an opposition in more than cultural relations of
power: it comes as opposition in economic, systemic, and social relations. This is
particularly important, here, when we are trying to stake a claim for rhetoric in the age
of mechanical and digital reproduction, and in the independent production of music.
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That is, this occurs in a critical relationship between the musician and recording
technology in the domestic sphere, in the bedroom, the basement, the garage, on
laptops and with hundred dollar condenser microphones. Apple devices typically come
pre-installed with GarageBand, a powerful DAW, and even mobile devices at the time
of writing this are equipped with such software, though we won’t get into the ethics of
Apple at this point. Here is where I make my claim for rhetorical musical
considerations by independent musician-producers—where once rhetoric was a
significant part of a liberal education, and music in theory and practice was given years
of attention in liberal education pedagogy, we now have a population that is
surrounded by the tools to create music but lacking the skills to purposefully direct
their art and to consider its reach, scope, and long-term political, social, and cultural
ramifications.
Perhaps the digital turn in music production, and the ubiquity of home
recording technologies, has not yet made a an apparent, immediate dramatic impact on
the larger machinery of the music industry. Yet, the various roles of music production,
which I have discussed above, have been compressed into the individual: writing,
performing, audio engineering, mixing, mastering, manufacturing, marketing,
distributing. The independent musician must be more aware now than ever of
audience, of how the forms and figures of their audio productions will affect their
listeners, and how to write music such that it will ever be heard in the bottomless sea of
unsigned, independent artists. Too often the musician turns to pop forms, to write a
singular hook that will draw attention from major label interests, or a viral gimmick to
amass YouTube views. But we need not follow such a road. An independent music
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reconstituted by the meditative intents of a population might point toward a different
sign for the future.
Humans work hard to preserve their music, perhaps because of this perceived
understanding of its significant persuasive, political power. Charles Darwin, in his The
Descent of Man, and Selection in Relation to Sex, supposes that “musical” vocalizations may
have worked as a sort of proto-language, and while theories of the origins of music are
still debated widely by evolutionary musicologists and in the archeology of music, we
see a strain in Darwin that limits music to the affective dimension:
When we treat of sexual selection we shall see that primeval man, or
rather some early progenitor of man, probably first used his voice in
producing true musical cadences, that is in singing, as do some of the
gibbon-apes at the present day; and we may conclude from a widelyspread analogy, that this power would have been especially exerted
during the courtship of the sexes—would have expressed various
emotions, such as love, jealousy, triumph—and would have served as
a challenge to rivals. It is, therefore, probable that the imitation of
musical cries by articulate sounds may have given rise to words
expressive of various complex emotions. (Darwin 1871)
Indeed, this should be of much interest to us, as we wonder if this is not an
anachronistic or anthropomorphic sentiment that Darwin is suggesting. Contemporary
work in bioacoustics demonstrates that even the seemingly musical songs of birds are
used to relay significant information, and that the sounds of other animals are used for
more purposes than for sharing emotional states. There is a division known to
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historians of music, set in the disciplines, between prehistoric music and ancient
music—where ancient music as a demarcation begins with the world’s literate societies.
What are we to make of this? Early wind instruments, such as the ocarina, have been
dated to at least 20,000 years ago. This is still early in the larger view of the human
story, and perhaps what we might even deem as late in our protolinguistic development
of communication. Given the shells of old ocarinas, we can guess at the tones and
timbres that could have been played, and recreate some of these instruments. But we
cannot know the melodies that rang out in the early air, or their nature: how they were
structured, what they meant, how they were used, and how they were shared over the
passing of years and over thousands of miles of migration. The preservation of our
early music through memory, through repetition, through communal sharing, sounds
much like our early oral histories, our stories.
We have, for millennia, been aware of the incredible power of music as well as
its elusive and enigmatic nature: I began the first chapter of this dissertation with an
epigraph from Museaus, whose line “Music to mortals of all things the sweetest” is
relayed to us via Aristotle (Jowett 2009). Much strange mythology surrounds the
creation of music, as artists often explain the composition process as one of divine
inspiration—as in Plato’s Ion—or moments of maddened passion, as in the stories of
the cicada in the Phaedrus. Despite the obscuring cloud of history that hovers around,
much has been written on the subject of ancient Greek music. It seems to us, now, that
musical innovation flourished in ancient Greece. Not only this, but music was studied
by the youth—we should remember, of course, that this was prevailingly an education
reserved for young males, exclusively—and much was theorized about its pedagogy
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and role in civilization and the ideal state. Music was not to be regarded as a trivial
matter in early democratic society. Scholarship in the area of ancient Greek music is
widely dispersed among various fields. Despite the insatiable allure of music to our
Western intellectual ancestors, very few remnants of their written musical tradition
survives through written symbolization, as notation. We can attribute this to at least
two causes: a resistance to confine a musical theory to notation—similar, perhaps, to
Plato’s distrust of the written word—and the reality of violence and destruction leading
to crumbling societies, the burning of libraries, widescale human disagreement and the
riotous calamities of nature. But more than anything, it may have been the general
attitudes toward musical notation that has left us with so little. Pohlmann elaborates,
for us: “Quintilian, for all his high esteem for the role of music in the orator’s
education, excludes the use of notation from his programme” (i). We must realize, of
course, that contemporary recording technologies, and the practice of audio
engineering, has not yet and will likely never discover a method to perfectly capture the
subjective experience of music in its perfect totality: the monumental difference
between live performance and either analog or 24-bit digitally mastered recordings is
such that we ought to consider them two very different media, and we shall. The
Greeks seemed to have understood this, too: that the technology of writing intervenes
with that relationship between the artist and art, the speaker and their words.
So often do the immediate limitations of technology—in storage, in space, in
speed—determine our creation and apprehension of media. The American blogger
Andy Baio has published the following analysis from the Whitburn Project regarding
the surprisingly unchanging nature of the hit song length (2008). The Whitburn Project
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analyses were conducted by collecting data from Billboard top songs from the past 120
years. Baio accessed these records and summarized the findings as such after
encountering the documents, where the first column is the decade from which the song
length data is derived, the second column is the average length of a Billboard hit song
from that decade, and the third column or data point is the number of songs sampled
(2008):
1950s, 2:30 (95 songs)
1960s, 2:30 (250 songs)
1970s, 3:30 (153 songs)
1980s, 3:59 (142 songs)
1990s, 4:00 (132 songs)
2000s, 3:50 (58 songs)
We might wonder, of course, why in the 1970s the average song length jumped beyond
the 2:30 mark. Or why the capacity of the original 78rpm record, at 3:30, which
debuted in the 1890s, seems to still have left such an incredible mark on popular music,
considering the advent of the LP record in 1948, thereby increasing recording and time
capacity. Yet, to this day, the average pop song length stays roughly the same as it was
in 1890 (when it was around 2:45) (Baio 2008). We can go back further, here, to assess
the importance of brevity and memory. The early starts of troubadours with their
heroic chanson de gestes of the 12th-15th century and of course the Grecian epics remind us
that the capacity of the mind to recall and remember more than one hundred lines of
lyric per musical unit—the song—is not impossible. Yet, with something like La
Chanson de Roland, though the stanza lengths are variable, only one stanza in I76

LXXXVII breaks a thirty-line cap. Though we can only speculate, one might wonder if
the modern chorus started as a trope of repetition: a rhetorical and mnemonic
technique. A defining characteristic of digital media is its ability to be broken down into
units (Manovich 2002). It might be worth drawing, here, a connection to the early
German theorists who attempted to break music down into discrete units, too: sizable
figures, manageable bits, drawing parallels to rhetorical figures. Like new theories of
digital media, these composers understood the significance of the sample size, the
rhetorical reproducibility of the stand-alone fragment.
We might turn to Jaron Lanier; in his You Are Not a Gadget: A Manifesto (2010),
Lanier views the emergence of MIDI or Musical Instrument Digital Interface—which
was standardized in 1982—as detrimental to the human condition. Worse, still, he
writes, is that it has become a concept that is “locked in.” That is, he worries that,
dependent on human survival, hundreds or thousands of years from now, we will still
be stuck with MIDI tones and tunes, all around us. Yet, the limitation of definition has
been around for a while. Lanier writes:
People have played musical notes for a very long time. One of the
oldest human-hewn extant artifacts is a flute that appears to have been
made by Neanderthals about 75,000 years ago. The flute plays
approximately in tune. Therefore it is likely that whoever played that
old flute had a notion of discrete toots. So the idea of the note goes
back very far indeed. (2010)
And yet, while Lanier tells us that the idea of a “single, precise” musical “note” was not
a necessary element of the “process of making music until the early 1980s,” we know
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of the surviving fragments of ancient Greek musical notation through Pohlmann and
West, despite what seems to be a philosophical and cultural disposition against the
stagnation of music through a formal codification (2010). The appearance of these
early flutes “75,000” years ago with discrete notes perhaps tells us as much about the
early desire to solidify musical processes as much as it does about the fluidity of music.
Monodic musical arrangements prevailed for millennia in the form of the Greek kithara
accompanied by the voice and later the lyre, the guitar, because of the flexibility of the
human vocal chords to sing in key with a singular instrument. The rigidity of the
frequencies of instruments must be carefully monitored and held to precise standards
to play in full concert orchestras—the collective tuning of strings, transposition across
instruments to tune to a concert pitch. Here in this apparent conflict of the rigidity and
fluidity of music do we see a parallel to the present figure of the digital music
commodity, so much like the figure of the ghost: both here and not here, tied up in
trans-oceanic cables as binary code to be passed around on the Internet and then
immediately in our ears, our minds, in their coming to existence through their
reproduction as code as well as their rebirthing through our amplifiers and speakers.

The Physics of Sound
Let us first think about the immediate, physical properties of sound, what is
often called the science of sound. J.W.S. Rayleigh writes in his The Theory of Sound that
“sounding bodies are in a state of vibration” (1896, p. 1). Both he and Horace Lamb—
Lamb, in his The Dynamical Theory of Sound—go on to describe that there is significance
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in distinguishing between sounds that constitute noise, and those that constitute a
musical note (Rayleigh 1896, p 2, Lamb 1910, p. 3-5). Both scientists, however, agree
that there is extraordinary ambiguity in this distinction, and we are certainly still
grappling with this ambiguity today, if anything can be said of contemporary American
subgenres such as noise-rock or the growling vocalizations of Swedish Death Metal
against its melodic—though often distorted—backing arrangement. Comedically, the
Norwegian performing artists Hurra Torpedo use kitchen appliances in their music as
percussive instruments, applying force with large hammers or dropping, smashing, and
banging them together, to accompany original compositions as well as assumedly
parodical renditions of cover songs such as Bonnie Tyler’s saccharine “Total Eclipse of
the Heart.”
Public response to this distinction between noise and note is not new, of
course. Looking back to the early 1900s, there are accounts that on the opening night
of Stravinsky’s Rite of Spring, the dissonant and unexpected tonal characteristics of the
piece caused a great stir in the audience, and caused what was almost a “riot” in
reaction (Chua 2008, p. 59-61). Though it may have been Nijinsky’s choreography of
the performance that incited such a violent response in the audience; Nijinksy seemed
to have been pleased with the reaction, while Stravinsky was apparently infuriated—
though the musical dissonance, here, had a compositional intent and purpose: “Its
basic rhythmic energy and dissonant immediacy, after all, advertises the initial chord as
the primal sound from which the material of spring could erupt” (Chua 2008, p. 83).
Material interference in the transmission did not cause the confusion, here.
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Yet, while the concert hall is designed to, as accurately as possible, allow sonic
curves to travel to the ear through the air with even amplification and clarity, James
Jeans in his Science and Music tells us that even when “the only transmitter is the air of
the room,” in the example of the orchestral performance, the curve of sound still
“undergoes a good deal of distortion on its journey from the orchestra to our ears”
(Jeans 1937, p. 15). We often forget, as Jeans writes, there are “the walls, the roof and
floor, the clothes of the audience, and even the empty seats” and that “a considerable
part of the sound we hear may have been reflected dozens of times before it reaches
our ears” (1937, p. 15). In the case of the Stravinsky riot, then, I identify at least two
types of interference: one is the physical interference from performers to audience, the
second is a sort of rhetorical interference, a dissonance between authorial or
compositional intent and interpretation.
We can look back further than Stravinsky to see that this relationship between
noise and musical note is a tenuous struggle. Aristotle, in his Politics, takes issue with
Plato’s writings in a similar vein, regarding the use of particular musical modalities:
“But Socrates, in Plato's Republic, is very wrong when he permits only the Phrygian
music to be used as well as the Doric, particularly as amongst other instruments he
banishes the flute…” [1342b] (Jowett 2000). While Plato’s Socrates is quite adamant
that the Doric mode is the correct mode to be taught to the Athenian youth, Aristotle
surprises us with a more open position, pertaining to what we might call a sort of
rhetorical parallel between the structures of modes and their purposes (dithyrambic
structures falling into Phrygian tonal patterns, for example):
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…for the Phrygian is to the modes what the flute is to musical
instruments—both of them are exciting and emotional. Poetry proves
this, for Bacchic frenzy and all similar emotions are most suitably
expressed by the flute, and are better set to the Phrygian than to any
other harmony. The dithyramb, for example, is acknowledged to be
Phrygian, a fact which the connoisseurs of music offer many proofs,
saying, among other things, that Philoxenus, having attempted to
compose his Tales as a dithyramb in the Dorian mode, found it
impossible, and fell back into the more appropriate Phrygian. [1342b]
(Jowett 2000).
It might be noted, too, that the William Ellis translation of Politics which I have here
been referencing has Aristotle tell us that “the Doric music is most serious, and fittest
to inspire courage” while the Benjamin Jowett translation tells us that “the Dorian
music is the gravest and manliest” [1342b] (2009, p. 316). Because of the few remaining
fragments of ancient Greek musical notation, catalogued by Pohlmann and West in The
Documents of Ancient Greek Music: The Extant Fragments, we know very little about what
these modes would have sounded like (1970). Scholars seem to agree that the Phrygian
mode of contemporary Western music would have little—if any—similarity to the
Phrygian mode which Aristotle and Plato were referencing. I argue, here, that Aristotle
is as much concerned with aesthetics as he is about the inherent quality of the modality
and its ability to influence the performer and listener alike. Yes, Aristotle is attempting
to identify those musical qualities which will move the soul to virtue. But he is
identifying particular aesthetic qualities of distinct modalities that have the power to do
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so. This is not unlike Horace Lamb’s explanation of the “musical note” in contrast to
“noise”: “the sensation is smooth, continuous, and capable (at least in imagination) of
indefinite prolongation without perceptible change” (1910, 3).
The ancient Greeks, though, did not yet envision graphical waveforms of
sound. In the Aristotelian treatise “On Things Heard” from Minor Works—the piece
was written in the tradition of the Peripatetic School, but most likely not by Aristotle
himself—the theory of sound expounded is that of the movement of air: “contraction,
expansion and compression” (1955, p. 51). This is very much how we understand the
movement of sound through air today: through series of changes in air pressure caused
by vibration, comprised of what is now called compression and rarefaction. There is
also an early strain of what we now think of as the “physics of sound,” in this work; it
is noted that the long necks of “geese, cranes and cocks” make “violent sound”
because of the length and narrowness of the windpipe, and the widespread use of such
stringed instruments as the kithara in ancient Greece demonstrate that mathematical
principles were widely applied to music: both in its composition and by luthiers who
designed and built the instruments. Anthropologically, some of the earliest discovered
instruments—up to 20,000 years ago—worked on similar principles by using stopholes
to change the length of the pipe. Although, the early ocarina used what we now call
Helmholtz resonance: a sort of intra-reverberatory bouncing of waves to produce a
sonorous, almost human-like tone. As we see in the largely unchallenged work of these
physicists in the late 1800s and the early 1900s, the transmission of sound through
matter by moving matter is still very much how we understand the physicality of sound.
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We should note, too, that sound does not only travel through air, though air has
become the sort of normalized medium of sound transmission.
The material nature of sound is evident in our anatomical reception of it, as
well. The structure of the ear is a very mechanical one: the eardrum acting as a sort of
diaphragm to note the changes in pressure. We can contrast this with other sensory
functions which seem to rely more on chemical reactions: touch, smell. The ossicles—
tiny bones of the inner ear called the malleus, incus, and stapes—are effected by the
movement of the drum and create fluid waves in the cochlea that correspond to the
pressure changes in the air. Tiny hairs in the cochlea—each with distinctive resonant
frequencies—react to the fluid waves and send electrical impulses through the auditory
nerve to the brain. Or such is more or less the current understanding. Here it would
give me great pleasure to embark on a sort of elementary philosophical inquiry and ask:
where is sound, then? Is there sound independent of the human—or animal—body?
And why have we come, through evolutionary processes, to hear this distinct range of
frequencies, while other species produce and receive sounds in ranges we call
infrasound and ultrasound but are everything natural to them? Still, as little as we know
about how the reception—could we say creation?—of audio works, we will have to save
this for another time.
We can ask, though, what happens to the physical sound wave when it is
recorded, digitized, and transmitted electronically via our computational technology?
As Jeans points out, distortion of sound occurs even in the orchestral hall. Are we
dealing with an altogether different phenomenon here, in the electrical transmission of
data? Does digital sampling of an analog wave destroy the inherent quality of the
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sound, or is it merely another form of distortion? Is it the brain that makes the note
“musical,” somehow, from what would otherwise be a simple, trivial disturbance in air
pressure? Sound as a physical movement of molecules must be transformed to be
stored, whether in memory, on reel, or as digital data. Here is where, traditionally, the
digital/analog divide is discussed in recording technologies. But there is much interplay
between analog and digital signals, despite audiophiles and purists often arguing for the
superiority of such analog recording technologies for music as magnetic tape and vinyl
for playback. Here we start to slough around in questions too big for the scope of this
immediate project, for all audio begins and ends as analog signals, and subjective tests
to determine if listeners could differentiate between high quality analog and digital
reproductions are largely inconclusive (Blech & Yang 2004, p. 1-9). The microphone
uses a diaphragm not unlike the inner eardrum to gauge changes in air pressure and
render these variations as electrical signals, whether the medium of recording is analog,
such as tape, or digital, as in digital audio workstation (DAW) software operating on a
computer. Jeans, Lamb, and Rayleigh all find that music constitutes a wave—that is,
the collective elements and instruments form a sort of whole, singular arch that excites
the listener (or bothers or inspires or so on). Adorno can help us, here, as he writes that
“good serious music” is a sort of complete totality, where the details of a musical
composition are “cogs in the machine” that work toward a totality (2002, p. 19-20).
Adorno writes of popular music, as opposed to serious music: “The composition hears
for the listener. This is how popular music divests the listener of his spontaneity and
promotes conditioned reflexes” (2002, p. 22). But I propose this dichotomy between
serious music and popular music is not unlike the apparent dichotomy between noise
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and note. Here, Adorno is concerned more with the structure and composition of the
music than its sonic integrity. Though we might guess that he would find issue with
highly compressed digital audio files such as the MP3.
The digital music commodity is both virtual and real, material and immaterial,
here and not-here: a curious parallel to the Derridean figure of the ghost, of the self, of
the voice. This is a starting point for thinking about the digital music commodity. But
we do have some precedent to stake this claim. Lev Manovich, in his The Language of
New Media, gives us a sort of framework, which I can here outline. New media, for
Manovich, consists of “the digital medium itself, its material and local organization,”
the “interface” through which we access the media, the “software” that works on this
interface, the “Illusions” and “appearance” of the “images created using software
applications,” and the “conventions” or “Forms” used to organize new media (2002, p.
11). Even in the “material” itself, the code, the signals, the energy of electricity, we
come unto a point of physics: energy is not matter. But does not electricity have a sense
of materiality: its blue-white appearance, its sparks, its shock? And is it really so that the
images on my computer screen are illusions? The pixels are there, and in my case, are
being lit up by an LED screen, using light-emitting diodes from behind. What of
sound, then? Do the small, tinny speakers on my laptop not produce compressions and
rarefactions in the air of my office so that I can be prompted by applications on the
computer and hear music?
From the previous discussion of rhetoric as that which moves the soul, and
music as that which, in its best form for the ancient Greeks, points toward truth, we
should ask, at least in play: What do rhetoric and sound do in a secular world? Of
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course we must account for the indubitable condition that the meaning of soul has
changed through time and across cultures. The Greek soul of movement, of selfmoving eternality, is different altogether from the Western Judeo-Christian soul: a sort
of actual self inside the corporeal self that after physical death houses itself in an eternal
afterlife. But perhaps this retrospective analysis can shed light on our contemporary
sonic situation as well as that of the ancient Greeks. We cannot simply see rhetoric as
that which leads us to see beyond the outer edges of heaven into the absolute and
infinite, as Plato’s Socrates suggests in the Phaedrus, nor we can we understand music as
that which simply moves the body and moves the emotions, and moves the mortal
being.
Could rhetoric be a sort of ordering, as some have suggested that music is an
ordering? Yes, we have the canon of Arrangement. Perhaps more than ordering, we
can say it is an embodied synthesizing. The theoretical sort of underpinning, here,
should not be to equate practices of rhetorical composition and musical composition,
but rather to suggest that rhetorical considerations play into and play along with
musical choices and performativity. Still, countless problems persist: what do we make
of the moment of unexpected inspiration, whether in song or image or word or speech
or thought, where there seems to be no source from which it is derived? Must we
constantly look for that source, assuming it to be somewhere? Can we be “gifted” by
our own inner workings and given “something out of nothing”? 12

12

What I might call the ex nihilo question of musical inspiration. It does seem to
assume some grand narrative, though, to think that every song takes after another. If we
take either extreme polar position on whether musical inspiration must come from
other works of music or that music can come ex nihilo, out of nothing, in the mind of
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We do re-materialize digital music. Various processes alter digital music in its
transmission: compression, digitization, codification. A sort of intensive listening
should help us recognize what has occurred in these stages and be mindful of what
happens when audio transverses through wires, just as we should be mindful of old
English folk ballads that have survived for eight-hundred years through oral and
written form. We must always ask: how has this been transfigured and disfigured? For
all we sing, there are only faint echoes. For all we dance, there are only footprints on
beachsand washed away in the morning. For all the melodies hummed from mid-day
inspiration, there are only the trampling hooves of mass-produced culture: or at least
the slight radio annoyances. Perhaps more importantly, I sense some duty in the digital
to resurrect what has been lost to the sonicatacomb: the Web, with its nearly infinite
tendrily threads, is too often a place for self-published art and song to sit and die, to be
lost and unfound.
But from invention our music is then solidified: in its recording, in its notation,
in our mind’s memory. We must turn to assess the relationship between the music
commodity and this disruption of the first invention: all of the twists and turns the
song must traverse before it reaches its audience. Where does that brilliance of
invention go when the solidity of music prevails and we are left with the digital music
commodity? Is it in the moment of hearing the melody by the varied audience, or when

the composer, we are left with a theoretical stalemate on either end: if music is also
derived from other music, then wherein does it begin, and how does it change? Or, if
music comes from mysterious brilliance or genius, where are those characteristics
cultivated, and then is that not the source of the music, and so on? Thus through
offering the idea of musica ex materia and the figure of the ghost we can attempt to
reconcile these conundrums.
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it is plucked out on the strings by someone learning to cover the song and it
reverberates off the basement walls? Or is it forever last, in the moment it is first
recorded at home on a cell phone by the composer, so that the song is not forgotten,
or when it is first tracked in the studio? Or is it when it is first played back after mixing
and mastering and the “final product” is produced? Jacques Attali’s return to Attali on
the assessment of the music as commodity might help us, here:
When money first appeared, music was inscribed in usage; afterwards,
the commodity entraps, produces, exchanges, circulates, and censors it.
Music is then no longer an affirmation of existence, it becomes valorized. Its
usage did not prevent its entering into exchange: since the time that
societies' regulatory codes, prohibitions, and sacrificial rituals broke
down, music has been unmoored, like a language whose speakers have
forgotten the meaning of its words but not its syntax. (Attali 2009, p.
36)
The valorization of music, like the fetishization, is indicative of its commodification.
And so here we transition from the material properties of music and its processes of
invention and composition to the digital music commodity and its ephemeral gravity,
its reality as data and its reality as sound in our speakers. Musical recordings, whether
they consist of data for sonic reproduction or written on papyrus as musical
symbolization, allow for our attempts at the performative recreation of music. Inherent
in the text of musical scores is the onus of interpretation: and in musical performance,
critical and new interpretations of scores are often celebrated. Yet, the historical and
symbolic distance fascinates us: what would it have been like to experience the music as
88

did the ancient Greeks? Perhaps we crave some semblage, some semblance of the
“truth” of historical reality. Fueling our fascination further, no doubt, is that there have
been recovered, at the time of writing this work, only sixty-one fragments of Greek
musical notation. Many of these papyri scraps are made up of only a few discernible
symbols—short phrases, which may not even be full melodies—and we must know
that many of these fragments have been subjected to “imaginative reconstructions”
(Pohlmann 5). And yet, they remain as only “a few chance items” that have been
passed down to us, and we cannot be sure if they are representative in any way of the
sort of sound and music that our ancient friends found themselves theorizing over
(Pohlmann 5). Some attempts have been made to create both virtual and physical
reconstructions of ancient auditory culture. We have, for example, Hawkins (2011) and
his three-dimensional computer graphic model of the Theater District of Pompeii,
which we might imagine closely resembled the amphitheaters of ancient Greece. Still,
this digital reconstruction, while fascinating and applaudable by all respects, is based on
fragmentary and partial knowledge of the period, its music, instruments, people, and
culture, among other, perhaps greater unknowns. I have no question in my mind that
Hawkins understands this, but I believe we must be cautious in our excitement lest we
begin to take modeling for a new, definitive reality. Hawkins in some sense reifies a
past for us, but it is just that: some past.
Now, Pohlmann and West’s Documents of Ancient Greek Music is oft cited as the
most comprehensive scholarship available on surviving Greek music fragments. The
work has since been amended, and was published in 2001, as new fragments and pieces
of musical notation from the Classical to Roman period of Ancient Greece are
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occasionally uncovered and found, as recently as William A. Johnson’s contributions
on two tattered papyri in 2000: the Yale fragment, pieces of two vocal notations, and
the Michigan fragment—so named because of its shape, which resembles the Lower
Peninsula of Michigan—which contains lines of instrumental notation. As of the 2004
edition, Pohlmann and West identify sixty-one remaining works of Ancient Greek
music, found on scrolls and pottery and paintings, including instrumental pieces and
sung lines of tragedies: found as silent but singing somewhere. How do we access these
silenced songs? Or must we reinvent them? Music played an integral role in the lives of
the Greeks, in many ways similar and may ways dissimilar to our current cultural
atmosphere. Were our ancient friends more musical, and what would that mean?
Stefan Hagel notes in his Ancient Greek Music: A New Technical History that
“musical notation was already firmly established” by the middle of the 3rd century BC,
the period of time from which the oldest surviving documents of ancient Greek music
were born (2010). Thus, there are portions of the past which will remain sealed, at least
for now: “There is no sense in searching for the secret of what anyone may have
known” (Derrida 2011, p. 100). Is there no sense? Do we need sense? The great
university of Alexandria, which housed the famed Library of Alexandria—a sort of
grand attempt at collecting all the ancient world’s written texts—would have also
housed works of poetry and music in its “museum” (Liddel & Scott 1940). The
Μούσειος, rendered as “mouseion”—“shrine of the Muses” or even “haunt of the
Muses”—would likely have been the dedicated housing place of the collected work of
our ancient musicians, though we might wonder about the existence of folk music or
“popular” music that may have gone unrecorded, deemed illegitimate or unworthy of
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archiving, in opposition to religious ceremonial works and the art-music of the time
reserved for stage productions (Liddel & Scott 1940). We now attempt some similar
projects: the Library of Congress houses the Alan Lomax Collection in its American
Folklife archive, and released in 2011 the “National Jukebox”: an archive of roughly
10,000 sound recordings performed by Americans in the years 1901-1925. We haunt
ourselves through unearthing our past and allow ourselves to commune with these
ghosts. Yet, to haunt is to inhabit, and where there is habitation there is life.

The Haunt of the Muses
Where is the haunt of the song in today’s world? Where does the song sleep
and slumber to be awakened? The song prevails now as a commodity, though music
and money have always been closely related (Attali 2009). With these few fragments of
ancient Greek music remaining, we should be interested in Attali’s comments about the
destruction of a commodity in Noise: The Political-Economy of Music: “the object is
produced, sold, consumed, destroyed, worn out” (Attali 2009, p. 37). With the digital
music commodity, perhaps it is first worn out on us before it is destroyed—digital
storage prolongs the life of a song, though mass distribution ruins our ears to music
quickly: the abundance of overplay. Distrust of radio stations to play culturally relevant
music, the intrusive, maddening repetition of holiday music in American department
stores in November and December—the employees who have to endure hearing the
line “I saw mommy kissing Santa Claus” in its hundred different renditions like
Sisyphus pushing a giant ginger snap he can never taste up a mountain of candy canes.
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Who makes these decisions regarding the habitations of songs? Not just the immediate
decision, but the decision to produce and distribute this music initially? Why was it
created?
Here is where—and why—music as a commodity concerns us: that dissonance
between what is perceived to be wanted, and what sells well across a diverse
population. This dissonance between the arithmetical mean of desire and subjective
desire, if we grant the imagination the ability for such a thing to be quantified. But the
supposed mean desire of a large population leads music industry marketers, talent
scouts, A&R representatives, and all levels of managers to make low-risk decisions
about the sorts of music—and the sorts of musicians—which they produce with their
funds in the pursuit of profit. And yet we also see the occurrence of such strange
entities as that which we might call postmodern joke music: such as Rebecca Black’s
“Friday,” which only becomes so widely known through its distribution and rapid
Internet popularity: the “fail” culture. A completely fulfilled desire is the death of the
desire itself. Do we stray away from “the perfect song”? Here is where a politics of
music matters most, in the intersection of public and private life, in the intersections of
our desires and the realities of production and distribution, and in the peculiar role of
the musician-citizen as something-of-a-subversive-character [Attali], when we all are
continually shaping the sonic realities around us by the very necessity of living. As long
as we are alive, we are always sounding. And the sheer number of independent artists
who are producing music is, to me, a positive sign of the cultural vitality of the nation
but also as a symptom of the state of popular music on a global scale.
To understand what draws us to the digital music commodity, we can look to
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Marx. What is the “mystic character” of commodities that Marx writes of in his Kaptial?
It is something “metaphysical” and “transcendent,” but Marx does not stop here. We
must think, too, of the “social form” of the labor that is involved in music production,
and in its performance and in the production of the commodity (Marx 1887). How is
performative music commodified? We hang on to our ticket stub from a concert. We
retain a memory and we tell a story of the musical performance. We might buy a
token—a t-shirt or an album or a poster—to support our much-loved artists, especially
at the smaller, local level. But the performance of live music is also restrained by the
expectation of the solid, discrete commodity: we expect, from our popular rock and
country and folk and rap and metal artists to hear discrete song units, between three
and four minutes of length.
Commodities are “social things” with some “imperceptible” qualities: wherein
are the ideological underpinnings of music, in the perceived or imperceived, or both
(Marx 1887)? Can this ever be stripped from a commodity: that is, its social nature of
production? Is there not something peculiar about the music commodity that lends us
to quickly empathize with its production in a way that, say, a coffee cup does not? In
the music commodity, we hear the voice, the creak of a chair, the squeak of fingers on
oily fiddle strings. Scholar Huw Hallam writes of the Walkman and introducing “layers
of private experience” into public life: we all produce sound and organize sound in
such a way as to contribute to the music of the world, whether we compose
harmoniously or with dissonance or strike out and sing anew (2012, p. 10). We might
call this a sort of sonic interpellation. Hallam sees this, too, though, in channeling
Xenakis on the explosive sounds of protest (2012).
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Jeremy Wade Morris creates an important distinction with the recent
emergence of the digital music commodity (2010). There is not a singular sort of music
commodity—vinyl records have even made a resurgence in popularity, and with Morris
we see that there is a fluid nature even to the digital music commodity, with countless
file formats, such as FLAC and lossless file types for the audiophiles and MP3s for
their compressed, smaller file sizes that can be more easily flung around the Internet,
and on top of this various sorts of metadata. We here come across the division which
sparks much ethical debate: whether we are sharing music or stealing music through
the use of Internet torrents and downloads. Adams channels Bataille in exploring the
“potlatch” culture and the phenomenon of the gift-giving economy, which precedes, it
seems, even barter (Adams 2008, p. 2). And indeed, some musicians do give their
digital music out as gifts: with the purchase of a vinyl record, a digital download code is
provided, or, in the case of Radiohead’s album In Rainbows, the individual can decide
how much they want to pay for the music, hosted on the band’s official website. Some
musical artists elect to offer free downloads of their music across the Internet in hopes
of its propagation and widespread distribution, to capitalize on other markets. We use
terms such as “piracy” and “stealing” to describe the downloading music, but we also
use such terminology as file-sharing. And, indeed, those who choose to allow music to
be seeded from their library through file-sharing programs put themselves at serious
legal risk.
Yet, when a digital music file is shared, it is not given away, it is replicated. Thus,
the overabundance of output that Adams critiques in Bataille as a general economic
principle seems slightly off (Adams 2008, p. 2). It does not seem that the independent
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music explosion facilitated by Internet file-sharing and self-publishing on the web
cannot really be deemed an overabundance—for there is not a singular type of music
commodity. We react differently to songs individually, produced in the same style, or
even by the same artist. I am on par with Adams in thinking that this access to free
culture is incredibly important in the sovereignty of the individual, in a sort of personal
freedom – this is undoubtedly how I began my own interest in philosophy, through
finding PDFs of Greek philosophy on the Internet at the Peter White Public Library– I
remember Googling “why am I here?” A question still unresolved, of course.
What is distinct about the digital-political economy of music? What has
changed? Morris writes that “Music and computing are not interdependent and
conflicted bedfellows” (2010, p. 27). Yet, Morris’s pessimism about the revolutionary
potential of the digital music commodity should be closely regarded:
It is too early to tell how disruptive the Internet, file sharing, and the
digital commodity will be relative to other transitions in the history of
recorded music. The form and character of the music commodity are
currently in flux and, as with previous format changes and innovations,
there is hope this instability might re-organize the economics and/or
power structure of the music industries. However, for every beacon
that change is afoot, there are equal reminders that complete disruption
is unlikely, or at least overrated. Models for the retail of digital goods
seem strikingly similar to their analog precedents and digitization has
provided numerous opportunities for new forms control and power
(e.g. surveillance, data mining, advertising) that limit rather than
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enhance the rights of users and musicians. (2010, p. 67)
Is this not a more realistic vision of the digital music commodity? Here we are
absolutely right to consider “control and power” and how it manifests surrounding
digital music distribution. Attali, too, recognizes that there have been concerns about
the plight of the musician as a laborer throughout Western history. How has the digital
music commodity changed the way the labor of musicians is understood? Is music now
simply a “tool of regulatory power” rather than an “affirmation of existence” (Attali 2009,
p. 36)?
To understand this, we must look at the production of the music commodity.
We can return to Karl Marx’s explication of commodity fetishism from his Capital
(1887, p. 46-52). To think of music as a commodity, we must understand it as existing
as a sort of material good and consider the labor involved in producing it. To start, the
labor of creating the contemporary independent music commodity occurs in multiple
stages and across time: there is the home-recording of demos, the performance of
music at often unpaying venues or where excessive travel is involved for minimal
economic return, and the printing and distribution of this music, where we often see
musicians having to act as curators of their own personal websites and storefronts and
thus be visual designers in conjunction with their audio creation, production, and
distribution. Of course, this is not to say that less work or time is spent in major label
music production, though work roles are widely distributed and specialists handle
multiple artistic projects of the same vain simultaneously. The music commodity, then,
is not simply an aesthetic, sonic production. Yet, whether it is through digital networks
or physical media, the replication and distribution of the music commodity—indeed,
96

the commodification of music, first—has separated the labor of the production of
music and its reception, or consumption. Music, as a commodity, has become
fetishized. And the digital music commodity, Jonathan Sterne tells us, presents “fetish
qualities” as well: “digital music’s packaging and presentation” (Sterne 2009, p. 39). We
might wonder if the digital files themselves stored on a user interface such as iTunes
might present additional fetish qualities.
The music commodity, like other products of artistic endeavor, is distinct in the
initial labor of artistic struggle, of the necessity of inspiration and invention. The
independent musician is almost always at-work in other fields, and holds musical
creation as a dream or a hobby or a side-art. The inspiration that leads to musical
composition does not simply occur always at will: here, there are moments of anxiety
and unpredictable highs-and-lows of productivity. There is, too, the necessity of
purchasing equipment of varying degrees of quality. Though certain “lo-fi,” or lowfidelity genres have emerged—even in American folk music, an already bare and
stripped genre, as we have seen with Sub Pop’s representation of Samuel Beam in
2002—there are audible differences in commercial condenser microphone quality and,
perhaps more importantly, in the skill and knowledge applied in mixing and mastering
processes in operating complicated digital audio workstation software. And before
operation, we must ask: Can the musician-laborer afford a digital audio workstation
(DAW) such as Pro Tools and the necessary hardware to run it, including—but never
limited to—a computer with significant RAM to run the program and plug-ins, the
multi-input interface for processing signals between the computer and equipment, or
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even the lowest-end condenser microphone to capture an appreciable range of signals
produced by the subtleties of the voice and our instruments?
It is no wonder, then, that there is such a phenomenon as the “one-hitwonder,” when all the factors of creation and cultural reception are considered. Even
the most talented and experienced of musicians might only find one point of
connectivity in their writing that meets or melds with the expectations of the public
and also serves as a meaningful expression of their intent. What can this tell us about
the “use value” of the music commodity? For, it is difficult to ascertain the amount of
time of labor that is necessary to produce a popular song, so contingent on reception
and cultural troughs and crests. And what of the labor to compose a truly novel and
revolutionary piece of music which simultaneously captures public interest, in the
modality of what Adorno calls “serious music” (2002, 19)? Jacques Attali clarifies, from
the outset of his Noise: The Political Economy, that music has been subsumed into this
paradigm of commodity fetishism:
Fetishized as a commodity, music is illustrative of the evolution of our
entire society: deritualize a social form, repress an activity of the body,
specialize its practice, sell it as a spectacle, generalize its consumption,
then see to it that it is stockpiled until it loses its meaning. (Attali 2009,
p. 5)
Attali goes on to write that this “heralds” a “society of repetition” (2009, p. 5). How is
it that we can reclaim music from its commodified form? Can music be given a noncommercial meaning? Popular music, for Adorno, “is manipulated not only by its
promoters, but as it were, by the inherent nature of this music itself”—the nature of
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this music being that of the “song-hit,” where the composition and structure of the
music is modeled after all others, but it will have “at least one feature by which it can
be distinguished from any other” (Adorno 2002, p. 21-27). Serious music—that is,
“good serious music”—on the other hand, acts as a complete totality, where the details
of the composition act as “cogs in the machine,” constituting a totality (Adorno 2002,
p. 19-20). In the standardized pop song, or “song-hit,” or in Adorno’s rendering of
“popular music” in general, there is nothing “novel” introduced: thus, a cultural
repetition with only slight, trivial variation (Adorno 2002, p. 18). Could there be a place
in contemporary, independent music production for “serious music”? Can we rework
this idea of “serious music” and play with Adorno’s formula—could a serious music be
that which works toward political rupture, for example? Let us have some help from
Walter Benjamin to assess the digital music commodity. Benjamin writes, in his “The
Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction,” that “…the unique value of the
‘authentic’ work of art has its basis in ritual, the location of its original use value” (1968,
p. 5). Ideal music for the ancient Greeks—at least in the work of Plato and Aristotle—
would move men to virtue, would ascertain some “truth,” as has been mentioned.
Lesser forms of music might move us to relax, to feel pleasantry. As Attali tells us,
music and money are now welded and melded together, and we see this in the digital,
as well. The digital turn in independent music production is heralded by the appearance
of low-end, inexpensive recording equipment and the ability to sell the music
commodity via the Internet. When we examine such self-publishing sites for
independent music like BandCamp, we see that the inherent structure is made to act as
a virtual storefront. Via BandCamp, musician-entrepreneurs can sell a range of file
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types of their music, from the very compressed MP3 to lossless files—that is, files
which are purported to have retained all of their data and have thus lost nothing
through conversion, though we should be skeptical of this. Physical packages can also
be sold through BandCamp—which has a transaction system based through PayPal,
the sort of Internet standard for payment. A playful problem: If I am the only person
to purchase my friend’s 4-song LP through digital download via BandCamp, is there a
degree of authenticity retained in the files that I then play back? For Benjamin, we
ought to say “no,” for there may have been nothing authentic in the tracks to begin
with: “To an even greater degree the work of art reproduced becomes the work of art
designed for reproducibility” (Benjamin 1968, p. 5). With models such as BandCamp,
this point seems especially salient. Often our independent music is developed for the
purpose of being reproduced: digitally manufactured through replicatory processes, so
to speak. Douglas Davis offers a sort of counterpoint, in his “The Work of Art in the
Age of Digital Reproduction,” in which he argues that the individual copy of a work of
art retains this Benjaminian aura, or that it undergoes a process of “transfer” and is
embedded in the individual copy (1995, p. 381).
Poetically, Carl Sagan introduces his Pale Blue Dot with a description of the
human species as being nomadic (1997). We have explored all of the earth, so we must
now move to the stars. It is in our evolutionary profile to move about our planet, to
chart, to discover, to migrate. Eventually, though, when “the climate was congenial”
and “the food was plentiful, we were willing to stay put” (Sagan 6). Attali tells us,
though, of the bard, of the Medieval troubadour, of the traveling court musician. The
poet, the musician, the bohemian has seldom found a home in city walls. In popular
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culture, we still have this phenomenon in the touring musician who may be “on the
road” for most of a given year, as oppose to the concert musician or studio musician,
who might have salaried income and reside in one city or town most of the year. But
the digital-music-laborer, the independent recording artist who uses digital spaces to
sell their work, is landlocked. The domestic sphere must become a recording studio as
well as a place of inspiration and creation.
We can turn to philosopher Slavoj Žižek to frame the political gravity of music
in relation to potential for social change. In his Violence: Six Sideways Reflections, Žižek
writes:
Adorno’s famous saying, it seems, needs correction: it is not poetry that
is impossible after Auschwitz, but rather prose. Realistic prose fails,
where the poetic evocation of the unbearable atmosphere of a camp
succeeds. That is to say, when Adorno declares poetry impossible (or,
rather, barbaric) after Auschwitz, this impossibility is an enabling
impossibility: poetry is always, by definition, “about” something cannot
be addressed directly, only alluded to. One shouldn’t be afraid to take
this a step further and refer to the old saying that music comes in when
words fail. There may well be some truth in the common wisdom that,
in a kind of historical premonition, the music of Schoenberg articulated
the anxieties and nightmares of Auschwitz before the events took place.
(2008, p. 4-5)
Attali and Žižek come together neatly here in thinking about music as a sort of
prophecy, that “the music of Schoenberg” anticipated the “nightmares of Auschwitz,”
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for example (Žižek 2008, p. 5). We see here, as in Attali, the function of music in its
ability to communicate when “words fail” and an even further possibility in music to
act as a sort of premonition of both helpful social change and terrible nightmares
(Attali 2009). Jeremy Wade Morris writes in his “Sound in the Cloud: Cloud
Computing and the Digital Music Commodity that “the music commodity is an
increasingly mobile and shape-shifting one” and that “Music in its digital form can
arrive on computers or mobile phones but it can equally appear... as a giant floral print
in the shape of a horse” (2011, p. 2). Morris is slightly obtuse in his analysis of recent
musical trends in the cloud: Pandora is a free service and plays more like a college radio
station than anything, while Spotify resembles Netflix in its pay-by-the-month access to
what only seems like a limitless selection of content. How can we hope for social change
from music when our access to the digital music commodity, already forced to be made
for sale in the capitalist society, is even further restricted in the form of the digital
music archive? Here we turn directly to these problems of archivization and access:
who determines which content is available on services like Spotify, and who gets to
access it? If our music is locked behind a paywall and requires Wi-Fi—which is another
costly monthly service—can we call it still, simply a digital commodity? Morris
concludes:
Digital music, like countless other technologies, may never live
up to all its promises. It may never fully disrupt the structure of
music industries or reduce the number of intermediaries
between artists and their listeners. (2011, p. 18)
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I wonder what to think of this, when an easy majority of my composition students
openly admit to pirating, discuss their techniques, and despite my warnings and
cautions and in-class debates about the involved ethics, licensing, and copyright law
involved, grinningly share their techniques for evading university and ISP protocols for
monitoring such activity. Here again the problem of archivization: you can’t find any
album to download freely on the Internet, and with torrenting, access to the content is
dependent on the availability of seeders: that is, users who have the files who are
willing to risk sharing it over a network. Thus, artists that are popularized by major
labels, trend-setters, late-night talk shows, Billboard ratings, and so on, are easier to
find. At least, here, the users are the archons. Morris goes on:
As much as digital music promises greater accessibility, mobility,
interactivity and control over music selection, this review of cloud–
based music services shows that it also lends itself to contingent
technologies, data mining, the exposure of personal information and
the abridging of personal rights. But digital music’s less grandiose
promise — to turn our attention back to the meaning and form of the
music commodity and to re–engage us with the role of music in our
lives — is already being realized. (2011, p. 18)
Sterne can help us, here, from his “The Preservation Paradox in Digital Audio,” in
which he asks: “Why are some recordings available to us today and others not? The
answer has much to do with will and selection choice, but also with broader cultural
attitudes about recordings and the sound they contain” (2009, p. 57). Sterne recognizes
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the importance of a sort of forgetting, seen in his “Death and Life of Digital Audio”
(2006). We are faced not only with a wide variety of file formats, playback devices,
operating systems, and the consistent change of digital technologies, but also the
materiality of these objects themselves: our computer’s hard disk memories won’t last
twenty years at best (2006, p. 55-56). But it is not our goal to create some ideal archive
of everything ever created, nor should it be, for Sterne.
Much of the data-mining that’s done on musical services like Spotify are cashed
in on in the eruption of media analyst consultants and related industry positions that
have opened up in response to the knowledge economy’s pining for pretty data. Paul
Lamere’s firm, The Echo Nest, sees itself as a Music Intelligence company. A recent
TIME Newsfeed article published the sensational title: “Here is a Map of Every State’s
Favorite Band” based on information published by The Echo Nest (Roy 2014). What
Paul Lamere has done, however, is simply shown the relative popularity of fifty artists
for each US state, not necessarily the most-listened to artist in each state. This sort of
data is interesting, and bridges genres—we see pop artists such as Ciara as well as
lesser-known “indie” artists such as Kurt Vile and The Head and the Heart, as well as
old mainstream favorites such as George Strait and an apparent fascination with “jambands” Phish and The Grateful Dead in the far Northeast—and yet we should be
careful in the application of it, not only because the methodology here is misleading by
not looking at a full spectrum of all artists, but selective artists and their relative
popularity, but also because of the marketing, distribution, and of course cultural
repercussions of such purported facts about aesthetic musical choices in geographical
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regions. This data was collected using Zip codes provided by registered users of music
services such as “Rdio, Spotify and MTV,” and according to Roy, this constitutes “a
ton of data” (2014).

The Archivization of Sound
Preservation may not have been of the utmost importance to the Greeks,
though we cannot make such brash assumptions with any certainty. Anxiety over
mortality, and the mortality of our artistic productions, has no doubt been seen
throughout history. Leonardo Da Vinci wrote, interestingly, in his work The Art of
Painting, a short chapter on the subject: “Chap. ccxxx.—How to paint a Picture that
will last almost for ever” (Da Vinci 1957, p. 141). We might find either humor or great
sadness in Da Vinci’s fascination with the longevity of his own art, in the fact that only
a relatively small number of his works have been preserved. Perhaps Da Vinci’s
method of “baking” the painting and applying a “varnish” of “nut oil and amber” was
simply unsuccessful: or perhaps we must consider the greater social and cultural
violence, the catastrophes of civilizations in order to better understand not only our
processes of archivization but also to question our re-constitutions of our own history.
Archivization is now seen as a critical element in musicology: Philip Bohlman writes:
Each modern institution of ethnomusicology supports some form of
archive for the storage and study of data and fosters field study by its
staff and students, which in turn enriches the holdings of the archives:
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the locus of the archive, therefore, is inextricably bound to the center of
theoretical work. (Bohlman 1986)
Thus, the archive has become a powerful tool for the musicologist. Though, as John
Vallier (2010) notes, there is usually an “archival ennui” that surrounds university music
archives: a boredom, dissatisfaction, and malaise much unlike Derrida’s archive fever. A
very different sickness of apathy, which arises perhaps from the ubiquity of online
digital music archives and the ability to retrieve endless music. Having access to moremusic-than-we-could-ever-listen-to-in-one-million-life-times might cause some anxiety,
it seems. Does the ubiquity of music make it more dangerous, more invisible? I believe
so. Which is why we especially need a revised understanding of the political economy
of music.
The Library of Alexandria is an interesting point of analysis, then, in that it
could have had the archival potential to preserve the music of our ancient Greek
cultural ancestors. Though we cannot be so idealistic. Music is never perfectly archived.
Indeed, it is fundamentally altered through transcription, and, like Heraclitus, we might
realize that no single act can be recreated, especially a musical one, which is so
contingent to time and space, always in flux and movement. Yet, in a pragmatic sense,
written notation is incredibly helpful in sharing, distributing, and performing music in
harmony, in community. Ptolemy’s Harmonics was translated most recently into English
by Jon Solomon (1999). Ptolemy “seems to have lived in Alexandria” according to
Andrew Barker in his Scientific Method in Ptolemy’s Harmonics (2000) and we thus might
think of him as a messenger between these monoliths of human interest: music and
museum, song and star. Ptolemy’s primary work was in astronomy, and his empirical
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and spatial approach is evident in his musicological writings, and especially with his
geometric diagrams illustrating mathematical, proportional relations between tones.
Yet, Ptolemy was more Platonist in the sense that “beauty” was left to be best
discerned by the “ear” rather than “theoretical constructions” (Ptolemy 1952, p. 271).
As aforementioned, music was seen by Plato and Aristotle as an incredibly
powerful medium that could move the soul to virtue. Yet, the Greek philosophers
seemed to be at wit’s end as to how to address the widespread fascination with song.
Aristotle, in Book Eight of his Politics, affirms the necessity of teaching music to our
youth, especially because of its incredible emotional power (Jowett 2000). And this
power has not been lost through time. Since at least the time of Ancient Greece, and
surely earlier, humans have been well aware of the special capacity of music to move
the mind. It is no wonder that both Aristotle and Plato were concerned with the
pedagogy of music—something we’ve shed entirely from American public education,
or have attempted to waive off with once-a-week out-of-tune tooting session on cheap,
plastic “recorder” flutes. I make a connection, here, though, with the ancient Greek
mystification with music and their resilience to classify notation and to create a
standardized notation system. Song was likely to be of greater cultural importance to
the Greeks than it is now to us—usually reserved for celebration, ceremony, funeral
(though this may have heightened its thoughtless re-use, replication, and ideological
entrenchment)—yet they had no systematized process of recording, storing, or
distributing their music. It thus necessitated live performance and embodiment. Music,
in our world, is more often found in its recorded, digital state than in instruments and
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bodies and fingertips. Or were our Greek friends playing music in the streets, was every
inch of Athens alive with song? We cannot know certainly.
Here is where the difficulty with the archivization of music, and of culture,
comes into play. If the ancient Greeks stressed the process of musical composition as
one of creation—that is, a process that blesses kairotic moments, improvisation, and
even aleatoric gestures and movements—then how can it be archived? How can it
survive through time? Is it possible to archive an attitude toward music? It is lucky,
perhaps, that there are at least some surviving theoretical/reflective writings on ancient
music, such as Ptolemy’s Harmonics. Strange, though, that our contemporary
pedagogical approach to musical education in America stresses the reading and even
memorization of notation rather than creative composition. Yes, the archivization of
music poses many difficulties. This is evidenced by the example of ancient Greek music
I have here provided, but it remains the case even today. Music is often a collaborative
and performative experience. Still, these problems exist in all archives: how do we
stabilize and preserve what is alive? More importantly, we must ask ourselves for what
purpose we attempt to archive the sounds we produce, and why we produce these
sounds. Music, like writing, emerges from particular social and cultural climates and is
understood in the contexts from which it is born. Yet this feels trite and not entirely
true: perhaps it is simply a movement in academia whose blender I’ve tripped into.
Oftentimes music taken out of its “original context” can be more meaningful and more
elucidating, not just historically interesting but genuinely moving. Yet again, there is
something trite, I think, about the widespread study of “classical” music and even
classical literature: the romanticizing of the canon. Musicologist Bujic tells us more:
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In music history there existed for a long time a deeply entrenched belief
that because music (by which I mean European, primiarly written,
music) is a universal language, there is less danger there of falling into
the trap of ideologized or narrowly localized views, since there was an
implication that the language of music transcends the linguistic and
political barriers. But cosmopolital and trans-national as it might have
been, music has always been a part of its world and those writing about
it brought into their historical accounts all the beliefs and prejudices of
their time or nation. (Bujic 2006, p. 68)
And as Pohlmann ensures us in the introduction to his DAGM, his collection is “not
published with the intention of providing materials for the reconstruction of the sound
of ancient music” (1970, p. i). We cannot revive entire civilizations, and thus must let
the ideal of the archive die in some sense with the phantasm of a past that stays with us
only through lingering lights and flickers, a few notes. So frustrating, though, that we
know we must have so much in common with those specters singing beside us.
Our anxiety over our music is not unique. The Hornsleth Deep Storage Project
is such an example of a general or universal archive that hopes to preserve the human
species for future generations. Kristian Von Hornsleth, the Danish artist responsible
for this intriguing venture, explains the drive behind the pointed, star-shaped sculpture
which houses human and animal DNA:
My idea with Deep Storage Project was to create an art project
investigating the concept of eternity. One of my first questions to
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myself in the initial phases was, how and why do we humans store our
cultural identity in the hope of passing ourselves on to further times?
(Hornsleth 2012)
While contemporary work in archive science demonstrates that we must be mindful of
the ideological sway of the archivist, Hornsleth conjectures that “maybe the genes of
art lovers wouldn’t be the worst building material for a new human race” (2012). We
must be highly critical of this position. Though I find the desire to preserve humankind
in some capacity rather hubristic but quite admirable, we must understand that no full
truths or whole kernels survive time and always pass. The archive is not a lie, but it is
an illusion built to satisfy.
Hornsleth continues to describe the rational behind his alluring and enigmatic,
albeit problematic, Deep Storage Project:
Think about the cavepaintings, the pyramids, and all the other great
voices from the past, why was it so important for them to save and
secure their cultural identity? Was it mere vanity or maybe a survival
instinct related to evolutionary psychology? Will we have problems with
saving the human race as such? Who will be here in 30.000 years to read
our signals and we enjoy the signals from former times? (2012)
Any archivist must seriously ask a similar question: why are we driven to store, to
preserve, to catalog and save? Yet, we cannot be so certain that remembrance after-theevent-of-catastrophe were the driving goals behind “cavepaintings” and “pyramids”
(or, for example, our remaining sixty-one fragments of Greek musical notation). But
can we say they are simply the accidents of culture? Does every civilization expect to
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live forever, or do we only now understand the ghosts and tombs we will leave after
death for others to stumble upon? Is there not some strange deviation from history in
this desire to protect ourselves from global catastrophe? For, to attempt to archive our
civilization is to recognize that we are not only mortal as individuals, but that we are
mortal as a multitude. In the humbling words of Carl Sagan, on our “mote of dust
suspended in a sunbeam,” that is, our astronomically insignificant planet, can continue
onward without us (1997). This is, perhaps, the great philosophical and political divide
of the techno-optimists and the radical ecologists: there is a rough intellectual circle
who believe we can control the earth and a rough intellectual circle who argue that we
are subservient to the earth. This debate is not irrelevant but it is dismissible. For, we
are the progenitors of our own demise. And we know it.
There is a growing cultural consciousness; it is exemplified at its extreme by the
ridiculous Roland Emmerich film 2012 which feeds our fascination with apocalypse, as
if to alleviate that very guilt which we feel by externalizing it to a mis-reading of an
ancient Mayan astronomical calendar that is then hogwashed into ‘prophecy’ and
mutated into a feature length abomination of virtually rendered explosions and
metropolitan flood and fire (2009). We are as afraid of natural disaster as our ancients,
who ascribed these phenomenae to disgruntled gods and goddesses. We know no
better if we do not take these signs into our responsibility and, rather than resort to
mere archivization, allow our archives to become centers of public knowledge in
temporal spaces. We must accept our mortality and the feeble, transient nature of paper
and circuitry. Roots and wires.
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Derrida, in his Archive Fever, unburies the Freudian notion of the ghost and how
the specter is involved in the “carrying of truth” (Derrida 1998, p. 86-7). The archive is
a haunted place, where dead voices still sing. And with the advent of musical recording
technology—and now its widespread use and relative inexpensiveness in the United
States and throughout much of the world—we haunt ourselves daily. Each musical act
recorded is in itself an archive: carrying not only truths but ideologies. Carrying not
only ideologies but human breath. But perhaps there needn’t be a biological death for
our music to haunt us. The very act of recording is to reify a ghost, and allow a secular
spirit to leave the body. Perhaps, we can follow this further and attest that every
performance is, every communicative act is, at once, both the taking and giving of life.
The notes come together to form the ghost, which relay back to us the sea-salt and
rosebuds. History, then, is our greatest ghost. To construct an archive is to build a
haunting ground for dead voices, and we are born, not always already interpolated—we
think in ways with Althusser, here—but always already in the presence of specters.
This, in turn, allows us to wonder what ghosts we will leave behind.
Foucault, in his “Of Other Spaces,” criticizes the “general archive” (Foucault
1986, p. 26). For Foucault, these attempts we have made to catalog and archive the
entirety of humanity—all our arts and letters and science and history—is characteristic
of modernity. Yet, the great museum of Alexandria made similar attempts to store all
the world’s knowledge in a physical location, on a single substrate. What ghost will this
give breath to? And in what many have deemed the postmodern era—though I have
never been comfortable with this designation, so we might refute it later—we still have
made such attempts at universal archivization. The Voyager Golden Records,
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phonograph records which were launched with the Voyager space probe in 1977, were
inscribed with sound and images to demonstrate a representative picture of life on our
planet. Though the possibility of a distant civilization coming across the Golden
Records is incredibly unlikely, this was known by its designers, as it’s known by us. This
interesting example of archive-as-communicative-device demonstrates, I believe, a
counter-argument to Derrida’s rendering of the archive as that which must be situated
on a permanent and singular substrate (1998, p. 13). It is also telling of our coming-toterms with our potential mortality as a global civilization. Due, perhaps, to the
manifold, latent leftovers of a global economy and communication technology, we are
ever-more tied to the fates of others, to all of us. As we become more interconnected
we become more anxious, and more involved in pending global catastrophe. The reality
of the smallness of the world becomes apparent, and the fragility of our global
civilization.
There might be something distinctly anti-postmodern about Lorene Scafaria’s
Seeking a Friend for the End of the World (2012). It is not depicted as a farcical account of
some great imaginative scenario. A man hears on his radio that the last attempt of the
astronauts to save the planet from a giant asteroid named “Matilda” has failed: their
shuttle has exploded, and society unravels in contemplative and at times, even selfreflective dignity. Keira Knightley finds love in Carrel, and the film ends with a bright,
unbearable light flashing—as to signify the end of all the world, of course it would be
two explosions followed by a bright, white light—while the man and woman stare in
each others’ eyes and speak of their inner peace, how it will be okay. This is a topic for
anti-postmodernity: how does the human function in the wake of global apocalypse?
113

This film is classified by IMBD as a “Romance/Sci-Fi/Drama,” while it features
prominent comedic actor Steve Carell in the primary role of the male protagonist.
What does this juxtaposition of the seriousness of the end of the world with a
comedian acting in a dramatic position have to say about our current cultural climate?
Nothing, because this would be a misreading. Rather, Carell here churns reality from
comedy; he makes the transition into post-postmodernism by throwing out the joke
and waking up from the pervasive illusion that was Finnigan and drugs and Courtney
Love. This bridging from the comedic to the actual, to the reification of our fears and
the facing of them with self-discovered truth and meaning: this is the generative
essence of what I understand as the anti-postmodern. And certainly it needs a name
that is not less critical but more explanatory. We will return to the naming of names in
another time, on another page, or another space.
The possibility of apocalypse is part of our everyday consciousness and appears
throughout our Western popular culture: film, literature, and video games (Bethesda’s
popular Fallout series among others). Though there has been, throughout human
history, various end-of-the-world tales, and the anxiety of the nuclear age was absolute
and real, it seems we have in some sense accepted our own individual mortality through
sensing the fragility of civilization as a whole. We have found ourselves through finding
each other. Rather than scare ourselves with the tremors of mythological eschatology,
we might consider what ghosts we will leave behind, whether we are in our last days or
whether we will colonize other worlds over vast expanses of space. If the obvious isn’t
already implied: we cannot “make guilty our disasters the sun, the moon, and the stars,”
we must make guilty ourselves.
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That Which Is Not Seen
From ancient Greek musical notation to the present binary codification of
music and its travels through virtual space, we have for millennia been attempting to
keep still our songs: to quiet them on paper, to house them in archives, to save them as
files. And this recent change to the music commodity as a digital entity is beginning to
have significant effects on the music industry. The state of the desire for digital music
at present times can superficially be understood through industry reports. We must
start here to grasp a picture of market trends and to see where the digital music
commodity is headed, and what it means to have our music wrapped into the digitalpolitical economy of music. From the International Federation of the Phonographic
Industry, we have the following account:
Growing digital revenues were the driving force behind the industry’s
positive result in 2012. Digital revenues increased by 8 per cent to
US$5.8 billion. There was continued expansion of the download model,
acceleration in the take-up of subscription services, better monetisation
around music videos and growth in digital radio audiences.
More than 20 million people paid for music subscription services in
2012, an increase of 44 percent on 2011. Meanwhile, download sales
continued to grow in 2012, increasing by 12 per cent to 4.3 billion units
globally (combining digital singles and albums).

115

Although the industry is less reliant on income from physical format
sales, with their share declining from 61 per cent in 2011 to 57 per cent
In 2012, they still account for the majority of industry revenues. (2014)
Subscription services, independent services for artists like BandCamp: what does the
increase in digital music consumption mean for us? In his Essays on Political Economy,
Frederic Bastiat told writes that an “act” within “the economic sphere” has a “series of
effects”: in which “it is seen” and in which the effects “are not seen” (Bastiat 1848, p. 6).
He writes that it is the “bad economist” who “confines himself to the visible effect,”
and indeed, we must try to look for this effects which might be “foreseen” (Bastiat 1848,
p. 6). Mirroring, to some extent, Attali’s argument regarding the prophetic significance
of music, we might learn here to think about the potentialities—both the helpful and
harmful—that have arisen from the shift to the digital-political economy of music, the
digitization of sound, and the methods through which we now most commonly access
our music. With projected—though seldom doubted—growth rates for the digital
sector of the music industry, and the coupling of physical sales with digital downloads,
we should be wary of what the digital-political economy of music means for the
listener. And it is hardly right to think of digital music sales as being in any way
sectored off from physical sales—for, we so often come to first contact with song
through the digital interface, or as a result of its digitization and its sharing through
social media. And, music has been for some time subsumed in advertising, and indeed
the careers of many artists have been launched and supported by television commercial
royalties: the group Freelance Whales found further network television support after
their song “Generator ^ First Floor” was used by Chevrolet in a 2011 television
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advertisement for the Chevy Volt. Though music is so often seen as an add-on in
advertisement—a secondary feature—it sells itself through its attachment to other
commodities: in this case, an automobile.
Andre Nusselder, in Interface Fantasy: A Lacanian Cyborg Ontology, identifies three
fundamental domains of the world following the “digital revolution”: there is 1) the
“matrix,” the sort of invisible dimension of “zeros and ones” in which “codified
objects” reside and exist as signals which are imperceptible to us, 2) the “mental space
of the conceptualization or representation of code objects,” the mind’s rendering of the
information we receive, the experience of the “codified objects” themselves, and 3) the
“interface,” the “crucial medium” of these objects which acts as the “gate leading
humans into cyberspace” while ultimately “still separating us from it [the matrix] as a
whole” and “thereby preventing the psychotic realization of desire” (Nusselder 2009, p.
4). This matrix, what Nusselder also conflates to “cyberspace,” can be seen as an
extension of the base-superstructure model (2009, p. 11). In the same sense in which
the political economy of music, for Attali, shows “the possibility of a superstructure to
anticipate historical developments,” so too might we look to music in the digital age as a
way to read potentialities—of both the “dystopic” and “utopic” variety, as well as all
and whatever may rest between—in such a light (Jameson 2009, p. xi-xii). The
phantasmic character of the digital music commodity—seen in its codification, its
immediate invisibility, its quick and ceaseless reproduction through replication, its
shape-shifting reification through the interface—is not unlike Derrida’s figure of the
phantom. But this does not entail that we should adopt a superstition and fear the
ghosts that haunt us, but rather that we should adopt a critical lens with which we view
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the changing scope and nature of the creation and distribution of digital music, in all its
manifestations. Though Attali was writing at the beginning of the widespread adoption
of computer technologies in the domestic sphere, he notes that the proliferation of
music in society is a relatively recent occurrence:
Among sounds, music as autonomous production is a recent invention.
Even as late as the eighteenth century, it was effectively submerged
within a larger totality. Ambiguous and fragile, ostensibly secondary and
of minor importance, it has invaded our world and daily life. Today, it is
unavoidable, as if, in a world now devoid of meaning, a background
noise were increasingly necessary to give people a sense of security.
And today, wherever there is music, there is money. Looking only at the
numbers, in certain countries more money is spent on music than
on reading, drinking, or keeping clean. Music, an immaterial pleasure
turned commodity, now heralds a society of the sign, of the immaterial
up for sale, of the social relation unified in money. (Attali 2009, p. 3-4)
The immaterial pleasure is turned into the material commodity, and so “heralds a
society of the sign,” of the “immaterial up for sale” (Attali 2009). And yet, our digital
music retains immaterial properties itself, and so we are faced with a sort of paradox, of
the immaterial pleasure turned immaterial. In such, we further that distance between
understanding the conditions of labor under which the commodity is produced and so
further distance our understanding of music. In the following chapter, I discuss the
violence of sound. From the material and immaterial properties of the digital music
commodity and the way it moves itself, we turn to look to the way that music in the
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ideologies it carries moves us politically—through the immediate, subjective violence of
musical torture to the role of silence in the suppression of the political protest.
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Chapter 4
The Violence of Sound

Music is not ideology pure and simple...
-Frederic Jameson

Sonic Bullets and Objective Violence
Those aforementioned classical attitudes toward music—such as those by Plato
and Aristotle—in which music is described as that which moves men to virtue through
instructing them how to experience emotions properly, and perhaps even to truth, are
complicated by the widespread distribution of music and its many forms. This merely
emotional dimension of music has carried through into contemporary conceptions of
music as that which incites in us particular emotional reactions—similar to that Grecian
notion of music imitating the emotions—or that which allows us to experience new
palettes and dimensions of subjective psychological experience: music as transcendence
or music for escapism. Yet, music also moves us physically—in simple and complex
choreography, but also in organized revolt, in the march of the drum, in the formation
and dispension of the political protest. This chapter seeks to expand our understanding
of music beyond the emotions by demonstrating the subjective and objective
properties of violence as it is demonstrated through music. In this coupling of rhetoric
and music, one such approach to build on our understanding of the argumentative
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power of music is to understand its political and ideological implications and
applications. In this chapter I will explore how government-sanctioned violence
through the use of sound has been legitimated and challenged. The extraordinary
persuasive power of sound and music has been appropriated by military and police
forces to attack those deemed as enemies as well as to subdue protest and quell urban
riots. I will explore issues in sovereignty through Carl Schmitt and Agamben—
sovereignty as I see it here, as a suspension of law, as a decision on an exception of
when sound transverses from the aesthetic to the violent—and the rhetoric of music
and see how this relates to contemporary understandings of subjective and objective
violence in Žižek (2008). The goal, in this chapter, is to examine how sound functions
in these spaces, and especially spaces of torture: who is the sonically tortured subject?
And, then, who is the musician-citizen, who through the independent production of
music in opposition to the music-industrial-complex is able to resist the objective
violence of music and make songs anew? In this chapter I aim to shed light on how
music is being used in acts of violence and to better understand the ways in which the
power of sound is both misused and misunderstood. I ask: what are the forms in which
sound and music are appropriated by violent activities: in both subjective and objective
violence? How can this help us build up a framework for understanding the
contemporary relationship between rhetoric and music—to understand how music
works persuasively—by moving to a profound understanding of musical influence,
beyond the apparent emotional surface?
An ABC News article by Judy Muller from July 16th, 2012, titled “Sonic Bullets
to Be Acoustic Weapon of the Future” describes new developments by the American
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Technology Corporation in “ultrasound technology”: they have “developed a nonlethal acoustic weapon that stops people in their tracks.” Muller describes that the
device projects “sonic bullets along a narrow, intense beam up to 145 decibels, 50 times
the human threshold of pain” (2012). This device is operated by a computer, on which
an “annoying sound” is picked—such as the sound of a baby crying—and then is
played backward and amplified (2012). The United States army plans to adopt this
technology for use in Afghanistan in the form of a handheld model and a mounted
model for armored vehicles. The use of sound to induce and facilitate violence is not a
new phenomenon. The roar of a tiger has been studied by Elizabeth von Muggenthaler,
who explored how the infrasound produced by a tiger—that is, sound produced and
projected at frequencies that are lower than the 20hz bottom range of human
hearing—can be used to quite literally freeze small prey (2000). Infrasound travels
farther and more easily permeates dense environments because of the naturally longer
waveform of lower frequencies.
The violence of the sonic bullet technology expands further, however. Muller
explains how the ultrasound technologies of American Technology Corporation are
being used to persuade consumers toward purchasing commodities:
Not all the applications of this new technology are pain-inducing.
Norris has invented a related acoustic device called the Hypersonic
Sound System. Only when he turns the speaker in your direction, do
you hear the message. For instance, liquid being poured over ice was
the sound requested by a soda company to inspire people within
earshot of a vending machine to quench their thirst. Norris tried out the
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acoustic beam at a mall near his office and passers-by all stopped to
listen when the sound was aimed at them. "That is absolutely amazing,"
said one woman, "it sounds like the sound is inside your head." (2012)
Here we can see how invasive uses of sound enact a different sort of violence. We can
turn to Žižek’s work on Violence to better understand how systemic violences affect us
(2008). Žižek writes that “Objective violence is invisible since it sustains the very zerolevel standard against which we perceive something as subjectively violent” (2008, p. 2).
Žižek creates a framework in this work that distinguishes between subjective and
objective violence. Subjective violence is an immediate, visible, physical enactment of
violence. Yet, Žižek is more concerned with the underlying, systemic violence. This
objective violence establishes the “zero-level” of normality from which subjective
violence is determined in a sort of relativistic relationship (2008, p. 2). I am particularly
interested in Žižek’s rendering of Heidegger, here, in thinking about a symbolic
violence that is “embodied in language and its forms” (2008, p. 1). Heidegger, in his
“Letter on Humanism,” describes how in language, in the very formulation of
“grammar” and syntax there is a sort of ready-made metaphysics (1947). This
metaphysics of presence holds a presupposition of reality. This seems closely related to
Žižek’s notion of ideology and his reading of Althusser’s interpellation, in that there are
predetermined forms and orders that impose upon us and enact a sort of violence
upon us systemically.13 Ultimately, we must “resist the fascination” with subjective
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The notion of interpellation is significant for understanding how we are addressed by
ideology in music and how the subject is constituted by ready-made meanings in music.
We are faced with, in the musical-industrial society, sorts of music which are pre123

violence and come to understand objective violence (2008, p. 11). How does music
work to contribute to an objective violence?
This is, of course, a difficult question. However, we can start with something
like the notion of noise—especially something like the notion of noise pollution in an
urban environment. We can recall our discussion of the limited nature of the
soundscape from Chapter 1. Here, we are faced with a sort of zero level of violent
noise even in the given soundscape of the urban subject’s life. Beyond this, there is the
pervasive inclusion of the radio in every automobile and the broadcasting of radio
waves throughout society: the normalization of noise. The advertising jingle that we
“can’t get out of our heads.” These are simple examples of how the objective violence
of the greater structures of capitalism have normalized violent and invasive sonic
realities into everyday life. And, as in the above example by Muller’s interviewee, with
advanced sound technologies being targeted at individuals, the song goes from being
“stuck in the head” to quite literally having the song incorporated into the living
experience: “it sounds like the sound is inside your head” (2012). More can be said
about how violent sonic scapes become ideological and thus utilized by an objective
violence—not that we can say that there is a singular architect who is orchestrating this
objective violence, but perhaps we can say that it is the product of a pervasive
capitalism. We live in spaces which are expected to be always sounding, and take
silence as an absence of some normalized level. Here we have a conundrum, for we

existing and “hail” us as a mechanism of appropriating the subject into the dominant
ideology. Yet, if we come to understand the persuasive power of music and its political
gravity, we can better understand how it attempts to interpellate the subject and be
critical and mindful of its uses.
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wish for silence to better engage in self-reflection, to separate ourselves from the
dominant structures and to attempt to reclaim some semblance of self, and yet we also
seek a new silence within which we can compose for ourselves the sounds of our lives.
Yet, it is not impossible to compose anew from the given backdrop.
Perhaps we can better begin to understand this rendering of objective violence
through an analysis of instances of subjective violence. How does sound appear in
instances of subjective, observable, immediate violence, and how do they relate to the
normalization of violent sounds? Clive Stafford Smith wrote a 2008 article for The
Guardian about the use of music in torture at Guantanamo Bay:
Binyam Mohamed, the British resident who is still held in Guantánamo
Bay, knows a bit about such torture. The CIA rendered him to
Morocco, where his torturers repeatedly took a razor blade to his penis
throughout an 18-month ordeal.

When I later sat across from him in the cell, he described how psyops
methods were worse than this. He could anticipate physical pain, he
said, and know that it would eventually end. But the experience of
slipping into madness as a result of torture by music was something
quite different. (2008)
Another account, relayed by Andy Worthington in his “A History of Music Torture in
the War on Terror” tells a similar story:
Describing how he experienced music torture "on many occasions,"
Ahmed said, "I can bear being beaten up, it's not a problem. Once you
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accept that you're going to go into the interrogation room and be
beaten up, it's fine. You can prepare yourself mentally. But when you're
being psychologically tortured, you can't." He added, however, that
when music was introduced, at the end of 2003, "It makes you feel like
you are going mad. You lose the plot and it's very scary to think that
you might go crazy because of all the music, because of the loud noise,
and because after a while you don't hear the lyrics at all, all you hear is
heavy banging." (2008)
There might be a strange phenomenological area we could discuss, here. The
experience becomes unbearable when the music is no longer recognized as music by
the mind or the body or the collaborative listening of the two—if even want to bother
with a mind-body distinction at all. What I mean to say is that we seem to place forms
on the experiences that we encounter, such as with the stringing together of what are
altogether separate, individual notes into a complete melody. In both experiences, the
stripping away of the meaning through intense repetition and amplification leads to an
incredibly violent and disturbing experience of hearing only “heavy banging” and no
longer recognizing that this is music at all. And perhaps it is not music to begin with,
for those being tortured. Western rock, heavy metal, and rap music is often used in
music torture, which are forms that are already unfamiliar to many detainees.
This sort of music torture is not new to American tactics. Worthington assess a
report by the Senate Armed Services Committee that looked into the torture and
breaking techniques that have been employed during the War on Terror, which seems
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to place their origin—or at least inspiration—in Chinese Communist techniques “used
during the Korean War”:
During the resistance phase of SERE training, U.S. military personnel
are exposed to physical and psychological pressures ... designed to
simulate conditions to which they might be subject if taken prisoner by
enemies that did not abide by the Geneva Conventions. As one ...
instructor explained, SERE training is "based on illegal exploitation
(under the rules listed in the 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the
Treatment of Prisoners of War) of prisoners over the last 50 years."
The techniques used in SERE school, based, in part, on Chinese
Communist techniques used during the Korean war to elicit false
confessions, include stripping detainees of their clothing, placing them
in stress positions, putting hoods over their heads, disrupting their
sleep, treating them like animals, subjecting them to loud music and
flashing lights, and exposing them to extreme temperatures. It can also
include face and body slaps, and until recently, for some who attended
the Navy's SERE school, it included waterboarding. (2010)
The efficacy of these techniques is thus under question. Prisoners from these torture
and detention facilities describe hearing the screams of fellow torturees and the sound
of banging their heads on the wall. The use of music torture, Worthington describes,
was also used in simultaneity with visual sensory deprivation in dark prisons which
were said to have resembled Medieval torture chambers. Chained to the wall, forced to
listen to blaring rock and rap music for sometimes weeks or longer with no stop—not
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even to sleep—Mohammed and Vance, two former captives, describe how they were
not even able to form thoughts. This sort of subjective violence becomes an objective
violence. Music is at times employed biopolitically and most often without our
knowing, beyond the torture chamber. We too are often subjected to a sort of cultural
infection that is produced in the music-industrial-complex in the form of the pop song
or even in the national anthem. I do not mean to downplay the extraordinary suffering
that was endured and is still being endured by so many detainees, but the message here
is strong. The violence of music in these instances steals minds and destroys identities.
Baudelaire writes in the preface to his Flowers of Evil: “How can poetry become
music through prosody whose roots dig farther into the human soul than any classical
theory might claim?” (2008).

Who Orchestrates Musical Torture?
Who is the sovereign who decides when sound can be used as torture, and, at
times, are we ourselves to blame for the violences of sounds? For Carl Schmitt, the
sovereign is he who decides on the exception: “He decides whether there is an extreme
emergency as well as what must be done to eliminate it” (2005, p. 7). What is the
emergency which warrants a state-sanctioned use of musical torture? The War on
Terror seems to be one of retribution veiled as an attempt to extract what could be
deemed as critical information about the enemy from detainees. But as we have already
discussed above, the use of music torture works more as a means of psychological
debilitation than one of extraction. Madness does not produce clarity nor cooperation
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in the instances that we have seen. However, without more information about the
success of these methods of tortures, we cannot be sure. This is not to say that we
should condone such methods even if they are proven to produce situations in which
critical information or information that concerns “national security” appears. This
controversial notion of national security often employed by state powers to defend acts
of torture might be further analyzed. We can even return to the Hobbesian notion of
security. The violence of torture is normalized in public discourse because of this play
on the idea of security: Chapter 17 of Leviathan begins by attempting to define the
nature of man—his “final cause” and “design”—which he argues is centered around
“preservation” (1962, p. 129). We can return again to the figure of the sovereign in
Hobbes: In order for humankind to find “security,” men must:
confer all their power and strength upon one man, or upon one
assembly of men, that may reduce all their wills, by plurality of voices,
unto one will… and therein submit their wills, every one to his will, and
their judgments, to his judgment. (1962, p. 132)
The spectral figure of the terrorist—especially in a post-9/11 America—has allowed
our submission to the deciders of unjust practices—such as musical torture—in
military and government positions. For Judith Butler, this is where sovereignty
reappears—for her, traditional sovereignty has all but vanished—in contemporary
political fields: in the bureaucracy of the military. In this paradigm, and in the example
of indefinite detention she provides, we see that decisions are made by “governmental
bureaucrat[s]” rather than legitimate, accountable individuals or elected officials.
Sovereign power finds itself in the hands of “managerial officials with no clear claim to
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legitimacy” (2006, p. 54). We can think of this in biopolitical terms. We may even
wonder how this new form of control might appear in new contexts. In the new
literary trope of The Matrix, there is complete biopolitical control as the body is plugged
into a sort of virtual environment. This is perhaps the greatest enactment of ideology,
where the present conditions are so veiled they are not present at all: an absolute false
consciousness. Yet, we are already enacting and enabling this sort of psychological
torture in the War on Terror through musical means: these prisoners describe in their
experience of music torture the inability to think, to sleep, to live. It is quite like
Agamben’s homo sacer in that the prisoner can be murdered without committing
homicide. But instead of murder we allow the prisoner to live but only in a state
beyond absolute agony, in a state where the self is no longer the self and the sensory
experience of the individual is manipulated absolutely and entirely by whoever here
wields sovereign power, usually some commanding officer who would issue permission
for a torture method.
In responding in a dialogue with Lucien Price who claims that “music is a
mathematics of aesthetic,” Alfred North Whitehead writes:
I would accept that definition… for I think we take in quite as much
through our sense of hearing as by our sense of sight, perhaps more.
Mind you, I don’t mean to compare our dependency on the two senses,
for we are more dependent on sight, since we have mobility. But I think
we respond more to a solemn sound, to music, or to a great bell. It
establishes the emotion almost instantaneously, and we think about it
only later… Your national anthem, which I hear frequently over the
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radio, does not, fortunately, lend itself to being shouted by mobs in
unison, but it admirably serves its purpose and, hearing it, I am more
moved than I am by the sight of your flag… The point I am
making is that, with the sense of sight, the idea communicates the
emotion, whereas, with sound, the emotion communicates the idea,
which is more direct and therefore more powerful. (2001)
Whitehead here understands the extraordinary rhetorical power of music. So, too, did
Walter Ong, who writes in his Orality and Literacy about the centering nature of sound:
that is, we become ensounded in environments and are always at the origin of our
sound-world, whereas with vision we are always dissecting the world around us (2002).
This might be a mere biological reality or it might mean something more. Perhaps this
absolute centering nature of sound can help explain why musical torture is indeed so
effective, because it places the victim in a state of existential crisis as well as immediate,
physical pain. Psychological suffering, rather than the gaining of meaningful counterterrorist information, seems to be the sadistic goal of musical torture. Further, the
national anthem, as here discussed, is perhaps the most pervasive of all forms of
musical violence and an example of how the power of music is employed by states on
not just those deemed as the enemy, but also the public. The national anthem gives
security and unity to populations—we see similar figures in religious hymns, which are
shared experiences of groups, or in folk music of particular localities and regions. The
national anthem, however, goes beyond these instances and attempts to unify all
citizens into its argument: and it is unpatriotic not to stand and stare at the flag while it
is being played, say, even at a small-town sporting event. It is the training of a
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population through song to unquestionably admire and follow the actions of the state,
and are we not in some way to blame, that is, the people of a nation, for so eagerly and
willingly standing in obedience to the melodies crafted for us? Do we not have the
power to write our own anthemic proclamations in search of new liberties and in
envisioning new worlds and political realities? In the following section, I hope to look
at how this power of music and all its intricacies and capacities for violence are
appropriated by revolutionary groups and draw on some conclusions from this analysis.

The Political Spaces of Sound
Can we re-think the noise-ordinance as a wall, and as a wall-against-revolution?
How can we sound out against both these literal and figurative sound-barriers?
Leyshon, Matless, and Revill describe in “The Place of Music,” through channeling and
interpreting works by Lawrence Grossberg and David Harvey, that in geographical
studies we must re-think the role of music (1995). The role of ethnomusicology, for
example, or of geographers of music, has been to track the “diffusion” of particular
styles or genres of music and to think about how they work in various local, regional,
and national environments (1995, p. 425). Leyshon et. al suggest, instead that we think
re-think space and place not “as sites where or about which music happens to be made,
or over which music has diffused, but rather different spatialities are suggested as being
formative of the sounding and resounding of music”; they write that this would
provide a “richer sense of geography” that could “highlight the spatiality of music and
the mutually generative relations of music and place (1995, p. 425).
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Space and place are central to the framework of occupation. Yet, the concrete
spaces of modernity—and I intend to mean both the material concrete of urban
environments as well as their visually determined concreteness in lines and grids and
geometry, the walls of Wendy Brown are perhaps more prevalent than she even
construes them in her Walled States, Waning Sovereignty, so much so that every street is a
wall, leaving citizens of urban environments in a state of always-being-in-Frogger and so
on—these concrete spaces of modernity are ideological constructions and perhaps
more liminal than concrete (2010). The Arab Spring might point to how revolutionary
movements of the strategy of occupation transcended the borders of the nation state.
Though I am not a techno-optimist, and each revolution procured a different style of
protest—a different song in each nation being sung—there is a sort of universality here
in the movement of occupy, both the inhabiting of a space in its concrete terms in its
sort of spatial reality as well as the theory of inhabiting, delimited by territoriality. It is
in these very capitalistic spaces of urban environments—the actual streets of Wall
Street and their edifices as well as the “parks,” Zuccotti for example, an intended public
space—which are reified and dominated by a corporation’s independently contracted
security guards as much as by the state-sanctioned police force that attempt to subdue
protest and feeble but good-willed attempts at occupation. We can return, then, to the
role of argumentation via music in movements such as occupy. We might start with
examining Slavoj Žižek in his recent declaration that we need a new “Master” of the
Left (2013). Žižek’s prolific writing and his insistence on veering from linear argument
leaves many contradictions in his trajectory as a philosopher and political thinker,
which many writers find problematic, the least but most recent reaction of Jereme
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Roos in his attempt at a response to Žižek’s “The Simple Courage of a Decision” in the
New Statesman (2013). We must be critical of what we can call democraticocentricism—
the unquestioned narrative of democracy as the final and complete political reality—
and the apparent inadequacies of a democracy to preserve fundamental human rights,
and often not even a feasible element of human safety. We are more endangered now
than ever by international corporate influence and by inflictive ideologies. Such I say
knowing well there is the risk of seeming polemical—though not such a folly would
that be.
A common criticism of the American Occupy movement is its lack of
leadership and centrality, and so might think again about how sovereignty plays a role
in revolution. Arendt warns of the dangers and inefficiency of the “professional
revolutionist,” who does not cause revolution to occur—his or her influence here is
almost insignificant—but the professional revolutionist rises to power in the springs of
revolution (2003, p. 520-521). Žižek warned at his address to the Occupy Wall Street
movement at Liberty Square in NYC that:
The only thing I’m afraid of is that we will someday just go home and
then we will meet once a year, drinking beer, and nostalgically
remembering “What a nice time we had here.” Promise yourselves that
this will not be the case. We know that people often desire something
but do not really want it. Don’t be afraid to really want what you
desire. (2012)
Other influential thinkers appeared at American OWS protests, such as Judy Butler,
Astra Taylor—who directed a documentary on Žižek and the popular interview-based
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“philosophical” documentary Examined Life (2008)—as well as Taylor’s wife, the
revered North American folk-rock legend Jeff Mangum, who played songs from the
1998 In the Aeroplane Over the Sea, a concept-album reflecting on the Holocaust. What
can we make of this intersection of protest, protest against capitalist practices as well as
Capitalism, in defined, concrete spaces? Are we still thinking too often in terms of nonliminal spaces and thus letting sound, which is seldom defined by visual boundaries
which we construct—the wall, the street—to be condemned as a power of protest?
And who is the sovereign sound-maker in these situations?
We can turn this analysis into the astounding loudness and silence of the
American Occupy movement. Because of particular ordinances in New York City,
amplification and sound systems were not permitted in public protests. Yet, silence did
not prevail. For these aforementioned speeches and performances, a relay system was
used by the protestors to repeat back the messages of the orator. This rhetoric of
repetition is a strong current of Western communication which can be at least traced to
ancient Greece—repetition and parallelism as employable rhetorical structures, as in
Phaedrus—yet this is a collective sense of repetition. I am critical, here, still, however, of
how the logic of repetition is also a logic of ideology, of recreating rather than critically
assessing a message. Still, here it was used as a means of transmitting a message to a
gathered crowd, throughout the occupied space. Perhaps there is an objective violence
in the logic of repetition, but there is an immediate subjective celebration of repetition
when collective voices can be used as a technology of amplification. The speaker
pronounces his message and it is echoed by the wave of sometimes thousands of
listeners, who, in this instance, also become speakers.
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What can we say of our contemporary folk music and the appearance of Jeff
Mangum at the Occupy Wall Street movement and the appearance of reflections from
the camp tragedies of 1940s Europe? In returning to Žižek’s notion of needing a new
“Master” of the Left—a notion also introduced by Lawrence Grossberg, of needing a
new “song” for the Left and collectivization—we might be nostalgic about the folk
protest songs of the 1960s in the figure of Bob Dylan or return to the Americana of
Woody Guthrie to attempt to conceptualize an authentic American folk, but this is
problematic. The American folk tradition draws heavily on musical tropes from
English folk ballads, and is not in any way an authentic source of protest. But may
there have been something that we are now lacking: do we not see our contemporary
folk being forced into being only pastoral, a sort of unequivocal praise of nature and
the self (as in American Grammy award winners Bon Iver, whose empty, bucolic lyrics
and self-deprecation are more whiningly postmodern than revolutionary?), in
comparison to something like Pete Seeger’s songs of solidarity? Contemporary folk and
“country” music is more often an extension for the justification of military violence
and thus constitutive of an objective violence through the establishment of an ideology
through the industrial-musical-complex. See, here the lyrics from the bridge of
“Chicken Fried,” from the Zac Brown Band’s album Home Grown, 2005:
Salute the ones who died
The ones that give their lives
So we don’t have to sacrifice
All the things we love. (2008)

136

Is this the far reaches of the right’s ideology? Or something more serious? I am
skeptical of this left/right traditional political distinction. Is this not the extension of
the ideological justification of murder, of the constitution of homo sacer and a veiling of
not just the “sacrifice” but also the self-evident murder of military service?
I move on: What would it mean to have a voice for the left? Did Jeff Mangum’s
appearance at the Occupy Wall Street movement signal some hope for the future of
American folk music as a sovereign source of inspiring revolutionary thought and for
thinking outside the spaces of capitalism? Is the performer some sort of sovereign, in
his ability to decide on the exception, or to at least recognize moments of exception
and call public attention to these ruptures? Could the aleatoric moment of musical
composition be related to the possibility of revolutionary rupture? Or am I too
optimistic?
I’ll end, here, with a lyrical analysis from Neutral Milk Hotel’s “In the
Aereoplane over the Sea,” the title-track from their 1998 album:
What a beautiful face I have found in this place
That is circling all round the sun
And when we meet on a cloud I'll be laughing out loud
I'll be laughing with everyone I see
I can't believe how strange it is to be anything at all (1998)
Is this empty or fruitful? Must we not first break through immediate ideologies and
realize the “strange” reality of existence, to begin to question what it means to “be
anything at all” before we can protest meaningfully or envision new possibilities
beyond the modern nation-state, beyond Hardt and Negri’s Empire, beyond Capitalism
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(2001)? Sound is limited by the noise-ordinance: not just the laws of municipalities of
the suburban West where tickets are issued after 10pm for excessive noise in a
residential neighborhood, but the greater noise ordinances that constitute an objective
violence. We are skeptical of sound, of chants of protests. And yet we are also most
indoctrinated by the rhetorical power of music such as in the figure of the national
anthem. We allow the noise pollution of capitalism in the revving of engines and
clicking clacks of trains which transport workers and citizens, yet we do not allow the
noise of protest and of revolution. There are some private revolutions occurring,
digitally. The Occupy Wall Street protest speeches by Žižek, Butler, and the
performances of Mangum were not allowed-to-be-amplified for the public to hear,
though we readily broadcast into our private homes the television and radio waves of
the music-industrial-complex: here lies so much more to be analyzed and much of
further research. But where these public protests were silenced, they were also repeated
not just in the immediate echoing of the audience but in the echoing of sharing in digital
spaces. How else would a sixth-generation Upper Peninsula native as the author be able
to watch and listen to this movement? The Logic of Occupy perhaps did not rely
enough on this idea of sound as a possibility for transcending immediate geographical
spatialities. Where do these sounds come from? Perhaps in the sovereign composer,
the orator: but we need responsive and responsible orators, a new configuration of the
sovereign as those for us to echo and to whom we can respond.
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Ode to Whom?
In understanding the particular political gravity of music, we must wonder
where the process of musical composition is then situated. Susan McClary ties notions
of the objective violence of music and its ideological stakes neatly back into musical
invention, recitation, and composition, in her video lecture “On Why Cultural Context
Matters to Understanding the Music You Play”:
So many of the things that otherwise just pass as playing the notes on
the page, just a mechanical exercise, how to execute those, how to make
sure you’re playing in tune – sometimes that is what musicians think
their task is: don’t make mistakes, make it as beautiful as possible.
When you understand the context within which the music was
composed—the aesthetic priorities, the sorts of, even, cultural tensions
that are articulated in the music, the ability to perform, I think, rises
exponentially. To take something like Beethoven’s 9th Symphony, for
instance, we’re very accustomed to thinking of the last movement as the
“Ode to Joy.” There is a hymn that many people sing in church
services, in English, that just has the tune. And the use of the 9th
symphony, politically, for purposes of celebration, such as the fall of the
Berlin wall, has made people hear that piece in exclusively celebratory
terms. Now, in order to hear it that way, you have to ignore a lot of the
things that made that piece so difficult to play when it was first
performed. It was regarded even as unperformable for quite a long time
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after the premiere. And it was thought to be that way not just because
of the enormous performing forces that it takes, but also because of the
ruptures that take place, because of the really shocking events. (2010)
Such is why I began this chapter with an epigraph from Frederic Jameson, which reads
“Music is not ideology pure and simple...” (2009). We cannot simply say that music
functions in the ideological realm and thus should be avoided or immediately criticized.
Music is pervasive and takes on endless forms, and in the digital age it is presented to
us across media. Music, too, is so often reappropriated, that we must be willing to
examine its various levels of functioning. We can relate this to the ground covered in
Chapter 2 in the sense of musical invention—of the indeterminancy of “finding”
inspiration, in understanding that musical invention occurs from our interactions with
the materiality of sound and the world. Susan McClary here understands that musical
composition arises from particular tensions in social, cultural, and political situations,
and it is in these situations that a composition arises. McClary continues:
....I sometimes tell my students who want there to be a single right way
of performing a piece of classical music that that is probably the wrong
question. There have been hundreds, thousands of productions of
Hamlet, each one with a completely different take on that very, very
complex text. Each one imagining a different motivation for Hamlet, a
different motivation for Ophelia, and we go to see productions of
Hamlet not because it will duplicate the one that Laurence Olivier did
on film, but because it will give us new insights, because it will cause us
to see not only Hamlet differently, but will allow us to experience our
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own lives in a different way. And that’s what the performance of a great
piece of classical music ought to do, also. That’s why I think that we
have to think about what is being said, what is the nature of the
meaning of these pieces, and how is that meaning being articulated in
the very smallest details of articulation, of bowing, of dynamic marks,
or anything else, I think all of these things must be brought together.
(2010)
For McClary, a musical text is tied into the social, cultural, and political pressures which
formulated the exigency out of which it arose. And for McClary, the reconstruction of
the musical reality from notation must be done with a close reading, to think about the
initial purpose of the piece, and to think about its current positioning in new political
realities. To extend this to the music commodity, we recall in Attali that “music is not
innocent: unquantifiable and unproductive, a pure sign that is now for sale, it provides a
rough sketch of the society under construction, a society in which the informal is mass
produced and consumed, in which difference is artificially recreated in the
multiplication of semi-identical objects” (Attali 2009, p. 5). As we have herein seen,
music is certainly not innocent, nor are we who use music for the purpose of subject
violence in torture, or even in the subjective violence of instances of Muzak. Tied into
these subjective acts of violence, however, is an objective violence. The subsumption
of musical culture into the music-industrial-complex and the facilitation of this through
the digital-political economy of music should leave us to be even more aware of the
argumentative power that music holds on us, its ideological lurkings. We must perk our
ears to these sonic workings.
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Chapter 5
The Significant Function of Music

At first there’s hardly anything, and then nothing.
Then some more, and then nothing again.
And then in the end there’s just an inferno.
-Marten Hagstrom14

Beyond “Figures of Rhetoric”
Joddy Murray, in his Non-Discursive Rhetoric: Image and Affect in Multimodal
Composition, writes that “By considering non-discursive texts, all possibilities of
symbolization become tools for the rhetor: the symbols of math, music, textiles, food,
poetry, commerce, violence, inaction, and even silence” (2009, p. 12). Further, for
Murray, “human social life depends on our ability to use various symbol systems to
communicate meanings to one another” (2009, p. 191) The question therein turns to
whether we best understand music as a symbolic system, or whether it might be a
reduction to think of music in terms of Sausserian semiotics. And the posing of this
question leads us to the driving question of this section, which is to wonder what
currently sits on our knotted and tangled pile of ropes at these particular cross sections
of human interest: what is the current state of scholarship regarding rhetoric and
14

From the documentary Konstrukting the Koloss, by Anders Bjorler and Owe Lingvall,
2012.
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music? Stedman, in Musical Rhetoric and Sonic Composing Processes, has situated a “musical
rhetoric” in the framework of Aristotle’s five canons—Invention, Arrangement, Style,
Memory, Delivery—though I find this limiting and limited in scope (2012). We see
certain pitfalls in the attempt of a direct application of this framework to the prerecorded, discrete digital music commodity. So we must ask: should a rhetoric of music
account for both performative aspects of music, as Stedman addressed—such as with
“Memory,” where Stedman considers the musical performer’s adhering to the written
transcription of music or “Delivery” where improvisation is considered, but might not
this be as easily fitted into the canon of “Style”?—as well as the recorded music?
Quintilian, in Ch. X of Book One, “Education of an Orator” in his Institutes of
Oratory, writes:
Music, however, by means of the tone and modulation of the voice,
expresses sublime thoughts with grandeur, pleasant ones with
sweetness, and ordinary ones with calmness, and sympathises in its
whole art with the feelings attendant on what is expressed. 25. In
oratory, accordingly, the raising, lowering, or other inflexion of the
voice, tends to move the feelings of the hearers; and we try to excite the
indignation of the judges in one modulation of phrase and voice, (that I
may again use the same term,) and their pity in another; for we see that
minds are affected in different ways even by musical instruments,
though no words cannot be uttered by them. (Watson 2006, p. 82-3)
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Through Quintilian, we return to the problem of Murray: do we take music to be
something of Quintilian’s rendering: that there are no words that music cannot express,
that “no words cannot be uttered” by “musical instruments” (Watson 2006, p. 83)?
Brian Vickers, in his “Figures of rhetoric/Figures of music?” asks: “how far can the
terms of rhetoric be applied directly to music? How far can one aesthetic system, a
linguistic one, be adapted to another, non-linguistic?” (1984, p. 2). Vickers answers
himself: “It is surely in the nature of things that we can describe one art in the language
of another only up to a point” (1984, p. 18). And Roland Barthes tells us, too: “No
doubt the moment we turn an art into a subject (for an article, for a conversation) there
is nothing left but to give it predicates; in the case of music, however, such predication
unfailingly takes the most facile and trivial form, that of the epithet” in his Image, Music,
Text (Barthes 1978, p.179). In other words, to speak of music, to offer critique of
music, is, for Barthes, to reduce it to the level of the adjective. This conflagration of
language and music was seen especially in the Renaissance treatises which attempted to
identify and apply “specific musical-rhetorical figures,” beginning with Joachim
Burmeister in 1599, up to Unger, who gave “tables listening up to 163 figures of
rhetoric, or music, or both” (Vickers 1984, p. 21). It seems to me, too, that it is quite
simple to attempt to create parallels between common rhetorical figures and particular
tropes in musical composition: we see anaphora—the repetition of a sequence of
words in neighboring clauses: “We seek in our minds the truth. We seek in our hearts
the everlasting!”—both in the lyrical content of songs as well as in the repetition of
melodic phrases beginning with parallel structures and concluding with variation:
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Figure 6.1: Simple illustration of the application of the rhetorical device of anaphora to
musical composition. The first four eighth notes of each measure are the same, both in
their discrete notes, in their rhythm, and key. If, in this case, we equate each measure
to a sentence—and we can even call the eighth note rest at the end of each measure a
sort of “punctuation,” much like the orator pauses in his speech to create a sense of
suspense, or gravity—we can see how this common trope of a variation on a melody
looks similar to the syntactic construction of anaphora.

However, we must ask: what is the significance of this? What does this actually help us
understand? We can reverse, in part, the above structure and see how we can just as
easily say it resembles epistrophe, or the repetition of a sequence of words at the end of
neighboring clauses, or in this case the repetition of a sequence of notes at the end of
neighboring measures:
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Figure 6.2: Here we see a repetition in the second half of the measure with variation in
the first half. Such a model might be said to imitate epistrophe. As Vickers writes: “To
modern students, even well-informed historians of rhetoric, the doctrine of the figures
can seem incomprehensible, tedious, distasteful” (20). I suspect, too, to most
composers, such direct applications between rhetorical figures and musical figures is
largely unhelpful either in the composition or the analysis of music. Certain tropes
exist in musical composition as in rhetorical composition, and there is something to be
said about this. The relationship between repetition and memory, for example, is
important: we repeat phrases and vary phrases to remind listeners of what ground has
already been covered, what turns and twists a piece has taken. But what should be of
concern to us is why these tropes function to incite affect, to stir the reader or listener,
across both written and musical composition.

We return to our initial question of whether we should regard music as a sort of signal
system in which particular arrangements of sounds—whether in figure, form, timbre,
pitch, or otherwise—signify particular meanings. We must rephrase our question, here.
For, music has a certain syntactical system, although there are variations from it and
outliers from the apparent rules. But we know that certain musical-syntactical
structures—that is, certain arrangements of certain notes in a certain order—often have
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a particular emotional response for the listener, or at least cue certain learned responses
from our cultural saturation. The question of whether music is a semantic system, one
imbued with meanings, is easily answered with a “yes”: we regard music as one of the
most meaningful of our art forms. But the question on these hands formulates itself as
such: from where is the meaning in music derived? Is it chiefly derived in the
arrangement of units, as is language? And here we must answer no, and here is where
the direct application of rhetorical figures to music falls apart, and why it must fall apart,
for it is not helpful to a musical-rhetorical framework. Words of course are slippery,
too, and we change their meanings with and in different contexts—but we allow for
certain, more or less, accepted denotations. Music lacks a broad denotative structure—
we have only a handful of learned, cultural reactions to music which might be
predictive of our response.
In figure 6.3, below, I have composed a very bare, monodic arrangement in Am
for voice and accompaniment. The top staff represents the vocal melody and the
bottom staff is made up of whole note cords, held for four counts each. This
fundamental structure is representative of the skeleton underneath most of Western
contemporary pop music as well as other genres: folk, rock, country, even metal and
punk. The primary variations between these genres as we now know them tend to
manifest in vocal timbre—metal “growls” or country “twang”—and in the instruments
and signal processing used, as well as varying percussive styles. But what we see across
these genres, typically, is chordal accompaniment to the voice, which sings lyrical lines,
typically in Verse-Chorus-Verse-Chorus-Bridge-Chorus fashion, wherein the voice
carries the dominant melody and is mixed more loudly than the accompaniment. I have
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provided what would account for a bit of a verse in this figure. We would then likely
see a switch to the relative major, in this case C, for an uplifting chorus with long,
drawn out notes and a reassuring change of melody. If we are lucky the chorus will
follow thematically from the verse, but often we are left with a perplexing non-sequitor:
listen to “Rule the World” by the popular UK group Take That, for an example.
Something about astral phenomenonae and human love in the verse, and then taking
over control of the entire human population in the chorus. Well, perhaps I just don’t
“get it,” as is said. Yet, the monodic arrangement is so prevalent in Western music for
many reasons that we can guess at. Firstly, it takes little effort to compose such an
arrangement: we are almost always working in 4/4 time with no key changes
throughout a song unit. Four chords are played for the verse, a different set of four
chords are played in the chorus, and a vocal melody is sung on top. More than this,
though, we are culturally accustomed to this form, and it is a very accessible way to
relate an idea or an emotion through lyrics, which take the primary focus in a monadic
arrangement featuring the voice.
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Figure 6.3: A monodic arrangement in A minor. Most popular genres of
contemporary Western popular music are written in the format of the monody,
which is to say that there is a prevalent vocal melody with instrumental, chordal
accompaniment. Monodic arrangements are often homophonic as well, in that
there is kept a direct rhythmic relationship between the melody and
accompaniment.
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Adorno, as we have discussed, in his critique of popular music, suggests that
these types of variations are superficial, compared to serious music (2002). However,
symphonic composition follows certain forms and guidelines and patterns as well, and
I do not see how we might praise one or the other based on its apparent complexity,
for we know that many monodic arrangements allow musicians to demonstrate
complex technical skills—say, in the form of an instrumental rock solo or in detailed
fingerpicking patterns of folk—and that we find many examples of insightful lyrical
content embedded over simple, derivative chordal structures. We can see, for example,
in Neutral Milk Hotel’s “In the Aeroplane Over the Sea,” a simple strumming of the
“cowboy chords” G-Em-C-D, a pattern we see in pop music from Taylor Swift to
Katy Perry, yet “In the Aeroplane Over the Sea” we have the wonderful, existential
closing line: “How strange it is to be anything at all!” (1998). And perhaps the
recognition of rhetorical figures in musical composition might help us identify certain
patterns in Adorno’s idea of “serious music,” where these rhetorical figures play into
the totality of the whole arrangement (2002). Yet, we must abandon this simple
transference of lingual figures of argument to musical figures of argument to
understand the persuasive power of music.
A rhetorical-musical framework for the analysis of song must take into
consideration the material and immaterial properties of music, as aforementioned and
explored, as well as the diverse digital and analog networks through which the digital
music commodity is shared and transferred. It must also consider the non-linear
process of music composition. We cannot simplify the musical process into a chart:
“Creation—Notation—Recording—Signal Processing—Publishing” or some variation
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of this, for it has never been so simple, even before widely available digital recording
technologies, and it is not so simple now. Here is where I echo Vicks in his assessment
of previous attempts at establishing disciplinary connectivity between rhetoric and
music, for the rhetorical-musical figures that many authors have recorded, such as
Unger, there seems to be no theory as to why these figures function, what they are
suggesting semantically, or from where they come. A framework for the rhetoric of
music must look beyond creating parallels between figures of music and figures of
rhetoric and instead address the situations out of which music is composed, the
networks it is distributed in, and the contexts in which it is played back. For such a
project, we may look to the work of Llyod Bitzer, who defines rhetoric for us as that
which initiates change, “a mode of altering reality”:
...a work of rhetoric is pragmatic; it comes into existence for the sake of
something beyond itself; it functions ultimately to produce action or
change in the world; it performs some task. In short, rhetoric is a mode
of altering reality, not by the direct application of energy to objects, but
by the creation of discourse which changes reality through the
mediation of thought and action. The rhetor alters reality by bringing
into existence a discourse of such a character that the audience, in
thought and action, is so engaged that it becomes mediator of change.
In this sense rhetoric is always persuasive. (1968, p. 3-4)
And, as we have seen, works of music come out of complex social, cultural, and
political scapes which effect their composition, their structures, their arrangements.
Music carries political gravity and arises from conditions, from a rhetorical situation,
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into which it is called into moments to not only comment on the world but also to
foresee that which can occur, to prophesize, to permit for new ruptures. As Bitzer tells
us: “a work is rhetorical because it is a response to a situation of a certain kind,” as a
“response to a situation” (1968, p. 3-5)
Though I have paid much attention to independent musical composition, we
must note, too, that musical groups that are supported by the music-industrial-complex
are also experimenting with new ways of creating music, and this is documented
especially well in the film Konstrukting the Koloss, by Anders Bjorler and Owe Lingvall,
2012.
You both have budget constraints and a time frame to work with. So,
you can never fully do the things you want. I mean, in your head. In the
end it will be awesome, and you’re pleased, but it’s not really what you
aimed for. (2012)
The rhetorical-musical analytical process, as I here suggest it, ought begin with a
listening. The particular pieces of music I have here used for analysis are discrete songs.
These studies may certainly be expanded into future research on such entities as the
music video, wherein proxemics, gestures, visual arguments, and so on act together
with the music to shape particular stances and arguments. I herein, however, focus on
this coming-together of the social, cultural, and political realities surrounding exigencies
for musical composition, production, and distribution.
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Rhetorical Listening
It is a very real sort of ethical responsibility to listen to and to react to the world
around us. Joanna Demers channels Adorno’s Aesthetic Theory in her work Listening
through the Noise: The Aesthetics of Experimental Electronic Music and writes that “musical
material engages in a dialectic with surrounding society, never completely reflective
while never completely autonomous, either” (Demers 2010, p. 11). She argues, too, that
we have seen a shift in framing with the advent of electronic music. And we must
remember, with musical technologies in the 21st century, that almost all of our music—
at this moment of writing—whether live or recorded, is mediated to some extent by
digital technology: in the studio by DAWs (Digital Audio Workstations), microphones,
pre-amps, cables, computers, and appears to us on monitor screens as waveforms. Or
on stage, the DI boxes, effect pedals, amplifiers, and audio projection systems. With
this turn of electronic music, Demers argues that we have lost many of the framing
devices of “Western art music” such as tropes in “tonality, dance rhythms, predictable
forms, standard orchestration, and concert venues” though not all of this entirely true,
and many musical paradigm shifts have occurred throughout Western history:
Stravinsky is a quick go-to as a herald of a new spring of innovation (2010, p. 12).
Demers is right in saying, though, that with the disappearance of some of these old
restrictions, we also began to see that we lost our “reasons for regarding music as
separate from the outside world” (Demers 2010, p. 12). This regarding of music as an
external entity is criticized in Tim Ingold’s Being Alive in his section on “Four
Objections to Concept of Soundscape” (2011).
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Tim Ingold criticizes the notion of the soundscape by saying that we are in the
sound. Sound is a medium itself through which we live, much like weather is a medium
through which we live. I will outline now my understanding of Ingold’s four objections
to this idea of an acoustic ecology, which I understand to have “originated”—a
problematic thing, to try to trace an origin, and an unthought-of part of our Western
tradition of scholarship, at times—from R. Murray Schafer. Ingold objects to the idea
of thinking of sound as a “soundscape” because: 1) We are an individual center, so to
have multiple “scapes” is insensible. 2) We are active listeners through our ears—they’re
not just “holes in the skull” (2011, p.137). The ears are not instruments of playback,
not in the recording. 3. Sound is a medium. It’s what we hear in. Like weather. We’re in
it. 4. A medium has materiality. Just as air is not in our imagination, sound has a very
immediate sort of reality (2011). Ingold’s objection immediately reminded me of this
passage from “The interiority of sound” in Orality and Literacy by Walter Ong, who is
discussing how sight “dissects” while sound “harmonizes” in a sort of
phenomenological sense:
When I hear, however, I gather sound simultaneously from every
direction at once: I am at the center of my auditory world, which
envelopes me, establishing me at a kind of core of sensation and
existence. This centering effect of sound is what high-fidelity sound
reproduction exploits with intense sophistication. You can immerse
yourself in hearing, in sound. There is no way to immerse yourself in
sight. (2002)
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Strange, though, that we often do seem to immerse ourselves in sight: early silent films
in dark theaters, quiet meditation on a walk through the woods. Still, I am immediately
skeptical of how biological restrictions play into Ong’s notion of sound. If we had “360
degree vision” for example, would we think of vision more as centering? Even so,
binaural hearing is often inconsistent and unreliable. This is why we have learned to tilt
our heads in confusion—as we often see a dog do—to help us locate the source sound
and hear “better” by accentuating the spatial difference between our ears in creating
vertical difference to accompany the biological horizontal separation. Yet, I think this is
exactly Ingold’s point. In a sense, we do feel in every direction, just as we see in every
direction, or the “direction” we see is every direction for us. Thus, the idea of having
separate scapes—scapes of vision, scapes of sound, etc.—inherently dissects our
perception of reality, which is, really, centered by the individual. We do not sense, we
are the sensing.
This is a phenomenological strain of thought that stems, perhaps, from
critiques of Kant’s formulation of the transcendental unity of apperception, which is no
doubt part of the Platonic tradition. That is, thinkers such as Merleau-Ponty and
Derrida have objected to the notion of a self before the sensing, that there is a “mind”
behind all of our thoughts that then decides, and acts out upon the world. We might
take issue to this with the problem of selective listening and of focus. We seem to be
able to direct our attention. Or do the sounds of the world call out to us? Yes, we can
purchase ear plugs or roll up paper towel into our ears if the neighbors are having a late
night party and we are bothered by the sounds. We have some control. But in a
panicked state, for example, most mammals will have “heightened” aural attunement—
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a physiological reaction to the threat of a predator—which is accompanied by a fuzzied
vision, a de-focusing of sight to better detect movement in the surroundings, as Cassano
et. al explain in their “Derealization and panic attacks: A clinical evaluation on 150
patients with Panic Disorder/agoraphobia” (1989). Thus, we cannot forget that there
is a sort of violence to sound. We make sound to convey meaning, but we also call out
in distress, we sob, we scream. Other animals, too, cry out in pain and bark for our
attention. The agitated squeals of a blue jay help scare off predatorial birds looking for
eggs. The roar of a tiger can create a bioacoustic, physiological response in its pray,
using infrasound to “freeze” its victim. Yes, there is a violence in animal sound, as
there is a violence in human sounds: our screams, our cries, our passionate expressions
of unrequited love or lost life even in popular radio music, across genres. Further, we
are limited in the frequencies we produce and reproduce. As aforementioned, Aristotle
wrote of the involvement of the organs in creating sound, in the voice, as a very bodily
experience, in his “On Things Heard.” For Aristotle, sound rises up from the lungs and
throat and clashes with the air. This is true in our “scientific” understanding of sound
as vibrations that are transferred through molecules in the air. But there must be a
listener to perceive the movements in the air, there must be an ear somewhere. For
Sartre:
listening to music is an experience built out of the relations between
and among the notes, and it is an active experience in the sense that it
requires a well-prepared and engaged listener (via Russon 2003, p. 14)
If we return to Derrida’s apparent paradox of the voice in his Voice and Phenomenon, we
can begin to explain this (2011). For Derrida, the voice is something that comes from
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us, but we are our own listener, as well. This creates a problematic construction. The
practicing musician is not performing for another, but performing for the self to hear.
Or the solitary musician invents. For, the stage is a place of pre-written, scripted
performance. So, too, can be the practice room. But in the practice room—or whatever
spot the musician might find themself in, perhaps an old couch in an unkempt
apartment in Hancock—there are aleatoric moments. It is often when there is no
audience, when there is no one to hear but the self, that improvisation and invention
occur. Here is where I see Ingold’s objections to the notion of soundscape to be
incomplete. Is there not a difference in listening to music as an audience and listening
as a performer? Some musicians, perhaps, do not entirely hear themselves alone, such
as the orchestra violinist who is part of a whole, and must hear themselves in the music
and not as just those notes which are being played, in time with the conductor, from
the script. Yet, the solitary musician might also imagine an accompaniment while they
perform to the self. What sense can we make of this distinction between listening as a
performer and listening as one “in the audience”?
In rhetorical studies we often speak of the audience. The etymology here is not
exact but this stems in part from the Latin audire, to hear, but further back relates to the
Greek root au, to perceive, and perhaps even to grasp. In the 14th or 15th century it
came to mean “persons within hearing range” or an “assembly of listeners,” and
recorded in 1855 is the sense where it means, close to our common contemporary
understanding, as a “reader of a book” (Harper 2013). From this we see where the split
has occurred. For, the author, the writer, does not hear a voice come up and out from
the lungs, does not hear the own-voice, the self-voice. The voice, here, is heard in
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silence—a rich sort of paradox, as in the internal monologue, as the words come to the
page. Perhaps later the piece is vocalized, read aloud. But the orator, the musician, the
performer: they must hear the self. The self is thus part of the audience, of those who
are within hearing range, for the performer is at once the source of the sound and the
most immediate reactor and responder to the sound. In order to perform, we must
hear ourselves closely and attentively. There is a strange phenomenon, though, that
occurs, where we are not precisely present. It is not as though we stop and think about
each note, or each word that emits from our mouth or sings from the contact with
strings in our hands. We retain—or in phenomenological terms, synthesize—the
immediate past, the present, and the immediate future. We allow the melody we are
producing to pull us somewhere, even though we are the architect of that melody.
I will turn to the example of Colonel Chris Hadfield, a Canadian astronaut who
has a public SoundCloud page onto which he publishes sound recordings from the
International Space Station. One upload, “Ambient noise of the International Space
Station” gives listeners an idea of what it might “sound like” to be aboard the space
station: the clicks and hums. He has also uploaded original songs, such as “Jewel in the
Night Sky,” a singer-songwriter style acoustic guitar piece with vocals. Yet, these socalled ambient noises of the space station are still present in the latter recording. It has
become part of contemporary recording practice to find isolated areas with nonintrusive sounds: the recording studio is padded, sound-proofed: sound isolation
booths, insulation, acoustic panels, barriers. Who is listening to Colonel Chris
Hadfield? There is the tagline—perhaps popularized by the 1979 science-fiction film
Alien—that “no one can hear you scream in space.” Yet, Hadfield hears himself as he
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performs, and through various manipulations of the electromagnetic spectrum, these
recorded transmissions were broadcast back to earth and published to the Internet for
public listening. To flip this notion over and around: it is precisely in space, and in spaces,
that we are heard. Here, perhaps, is the definitive difference in listening as a performer
over listening as a “traditional” audience member. There is a delay. The performer is in
rapture, in a moment of creation as well as performance. The performer has access to
the immediate future of the song-to-come through responding with the self. I would
like to problematize my own account. What if the audience member, the listener, has
heard this piece before? Not all performances are alike, but in many cases, especially
large orchestral demonstrations, there is a sort of robotic recitation of music rather than
a process of active aleatoric creation. Does not the listener then hear in advance the
immediate future of the melody to come? Perhaps in these instances, differences—
these aleatoric moments—might be even more dramatic. I am not sure. I will
problematize my account further. I have provided some agency to the melody itself. I
say it “pulls” the musician. Is this not just a re-externalization of the melody? Perhaps
this is problematic. I have not yet fully made sense of this, yet. For more insight, let us
examine the case of varying rhythms in live music. Whereas recorded music is often set
to a click track—a sort of metronomic device—to maintain consistency and for ease of
adding overdubbed tracks, the live performance is a dynamic performance. The
musician—even the speaker, we can say, here—enjoys transcendental moments in
which these aleatoric moments of notes held out of time, jumps in the voice, new
emergences of grain, incite excitement in the performer. Yet, each experience of
recorded music varies, too, depending on where we are and how we hear the music, the
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medium through which it comes to us and what others might be present in our hearing:
the same songs which move us to dance might also precipitate deep introspection.

Significant Function
Whitehead might help us parse out this difficult area between the rigidity of
music as a mathematics and the persuasive nature of music. Price says to Whitehead, in
conversation recorded in the Dialogues of Alfred North Whitehead:
For the past year I have been spending evenings with the last quartets
and piano sonatas of Beethoven, which are some of the most abtruse
music ever written. I don’t pretend that I understand them except in
parts, but they, too, like the beauty of a star, gain from the grandeur of
their surrounding immensities of thought. They plunge one for hours at
a time into a world of abstract values, like higher mathematics, and I
actually think they have made me better able to comprehend some of
the higher mathematics of abstract thought which I hear from you.
Music is of course highly mathematical and it is also abstract. It is
peculiar, too, in having at one and the same time an emotional and an
intellectual content. I do not presume to define music, but I do think
that music is a mathematics of aesthetic. (2001, p. 227)
Whitehead responds:
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…with the sense of sight, the idea communicates the emotion, whereas,
with sound, the emotion communicates the idea, which more direct and
therefore more powerful (2001, p. 228).
We can relate this notion to Barthes’s concept of the grain of the voice in his Image,
Music, Text, where he discusses the place where sound and semiotics meet: in the grain
of the voice (1978). Could the “intellectual content” of music, in the terms used here,
just as well be ideological content? Music and language harbor deep ideologies that
constrain and command us. This is the role of the rhetoric of music, to explain places
of rupture and creation, and this is what I have attempted to lay out as a groundwork,
to explain how listening to the self can cause aleatoric moments of creation, and to
argue that we must avoid the machination of musical performance. So, too, is it true
that as orators we often fall victim to machination and repetition, of inanities begot of
rearticulations of premeditated empty phrases. I am as guilty as any. Perhaps looking
beyond human music and song can help us understand these issues further. Are there
ideologies present in animal sounds? Is there “intellectual content” in the songs of the
humpback whale? The humpback whale uses tones that range beyond even the full
extent of human hearing, and are long, complex structures imbued with repetition, and,
undoubtedly, meaning. This is why we call them songs. Are they more than songs? What
would it mean to have our primary mode of communication to be more like Homeric
epics than short bits of exchange? Richard Dawkins, from his The Selfish Gene, in which
he coins the word “meme” for a unit of cultural transmission, writes:
Cultural transmission is not unique to man. The best non-human
example that I know has recently been described by P.F. Jenkins in the
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song of a bird called the saddleback which lives on islands off New
Zealand… By comparing the songs of fathers and sons, Jenkins showed
that song patterns were not inherited genetically. Each young male was
likely to adopt songs from his territorial neighbours by imitation, in an
analogous way to human language…. occasionally Jenkins was
privileged to witness the ‘invention’ of a new song, which occurred by
mistake in the imitation of an old one. (1989, p. 189-190)
Dawkins concludes: “Song in the saddleback truly evolves by non-genetic means”
(1989, p. 190). But can we be so sure that these variations are the product of “mistake”
alone? There are several problems, here: agency, authorship, expression, will, among
others that occur to me immediately. Do we perceive the sounds of birds as musical
only because human melodic phrases tend to be similar in length? Can we learn from
Dawkins, here, and think about how rhetoric and memetics relate? Perhaps there is
something rhetorically effective in the short, repetitive nature of bird song, much like
we have repetition in popular music: often just four repetitions of the same melody
with parallel lyric patterns, sometimes with a variation on the fourth to signal a
transition back to the verse or to a bridge between a final repetition of the whole
chorus structure. We can ask further questions, here: why have we labeled the call of
the “mourning dove” as such: a sound of profound sadness that seems to resonate with
us? Have we only retroactively applied this label after certain musical tropes defined
sounds of sadness for us? Or is there something intrinsically mournful about this
sound? Perhaps we are not listening to the mourning dove at all, but
anthropomorphizing it, falling into this mythologization that Derrida discusses through
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Haraway, here. There is clearly a difference between Emily Howell, the “robot”
classical composer created by David Cope—really a work of software, or program—
that composes “original” material based on the canon of classical music that it has
analyzed, and the bird, who calls upon the history of its hearing, and not data. Or could
it be that what Jenkins saw as “mistakes” and the song-differences created by Emily
Howell are more similar than we might first think? Is all our music a “mistake”? [And
as a side note, how do we even credit such a piece of music: who is the author, Cope or
Howell? Or is there something more at stake here?] The songbird is perhaps a prime
example of the biotechnologization of an animal, and both the commodification of
song and animal (Haraway 2007, p. 56). Why does the caged bird sing? To turn this
literary trope around: might it actually be singing to us, and not for us? Or to ghosts of
birds that are unseen to it? To go back to Dawkins, and to relate to Haraway’s question
of “Can animals play?”, I turn to Johan Huizinga (1950, p. 22). Huizinga writes in Homo
Ludens in a section entitled “Nature and Significance of Play as a cultural
Phenomenon”:
Play is older than culture… Animals play just like men… And—what is
most important—in all these doings they plainly experience tremendous
fun and enjoyment. Such rompings of young dogs are only one of the
simpler forms of animal play. There are other, much more highly
developed forms: regular contests and beautiful performances before an
admiring public. (1950, p. 1)
Huizinga goes on:
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…even in its simplest forms on the animal level, play is more than a
mere physiological phenomenon or a psychological reflex. It goes
beyond the confines of purely physical or purely biological activity. It is
a significant function—that is to say, there is some sense to it. In play
there is something “at play” which transcends the immediate needs of
life and imparts meaning to the action. All play means something.
(1950, p. 1)
Here is where I will mark a difference, then. The robot composer does not seem to
play. And it is play—which seems to be something like a variation from expected
behaviors, at least in a human sense, but we see this too in animals who know they are
being observed, who have an audience—that contributes to creation and innovation and
change in music. We are too quick to say that musicians “play” their instrument, when
they are only repeating or reading scripted songs. This is not play, at least in Huizinga’s
sense. What do I mean to say? We must expand our understanding of audience to
include the self, so that we can play and create alone. Through understanding that
music has a significant function, we learn to play differently, to cultivate musicality over
rote repetition, and to learn to cultivate the aleatoric moment in which forms can be
broken and new musical—and followingly, political—ruptures can ensue.
Who is listening? It’s not just the self, of course, but we can start, here. And
with so much music published in digital spaces, we ask ourselves, what should we listen
to? Do we listen too much? Silence, too, is important. What can we say of ethics and
responsibility in sound? Let us “listen” to John Donne’s “Meditation XVII”:
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No man is an island, entire of itself; every man is a piece of the
continent, a part of the main. If a clod be washed away by the sea,
Europe is the less, as well as if a promontory were, as well as if a manor
of thy friend's or of thine own were: any man's death diminishes me,
because I am involved in mankind, and therefore never send to know
for whom the bells tolls; it tolls for thee. (1624)
The author here forgets that the bell tolls for me, the self-same author, as well as thee.
For reader and author alike. Is there, perhaps, some greater continuity between
performer and audience that we have forgotten? We have ushered in an era of the
“death of the author” too readily. We are all authors and all singing songs. Before this
famous passage, the work reads:
Who casts not up his eye to the sun when it rises? But who takes off his
eye from a comet when that breaks out? Who bends not his ear to any
bell which upon any occasion rings? But who can remove it from that
bell which is passing a piece of himself out of this world? (1624)
With each sound we make are we letting some piece of ourselves escape into the
world? No, the living thing is not a closed system. Though, as Walter Ong notes in his
Aurality and Literacy that words are always leaving us—that we cannot say the word
“existence” without losing the “exis-“ by the time we get to the phonetic utterance of
“tence”—we must ask, to where do they go? We do not lose the self through the
expulsion of sound and meaning, but gather more through our emission. We let some
air go and take some in. We sometimes, too, speak to ourselves, as if we are drawn to
make sound for comfort. A breathy sigh. The angered individual can erupt into a
165

frenzy over hearing the sound of his own voice escalating—this, too, can be cathartic, a
primal scream therapy. And so we are responsible in listening as performing, in
knowing that the bells toll for us, and that we have always the dream through which to
build and build over again the carillon.

Conclusion: Musical Locality in the Digital Age
At last, I will here look at the particular situatedness of musical argument in a
localalized, cultural occurrence. We must first set the stage of Upper Peninsular musical
culture in Michigan. An article appeared in The Atlantic Cities in October 2012 titled
“How Far Can You Live From an Interstate Highway?”. In the piece, Henry Grabar
hunts for rural America’s most remote locations—in terms of vehicular transportation,
at least. As a sixth-generation “Yooper,” I wasn’t surprised to read the following:
I found that the farthest places from the Interstate are actually east of
the Mississippi, on a peninsula that juts north into Lake Superior from
Upper Michigan. (Grabar 2011)
Yet, music in the remote Upper Peninsula city of Marquette, Michigan, flourishes
because of its localized nature. Local musicians write and sing their own songs. They
draw on old traditions and inflect with the new. Marquette has dedicated, talented
artists who have been strumming and howling for decades. New bands and acts and
recordings springing up in basements, on cassette tapes, and in downtown bars. One
can hear Heather Evans at the Wild Rover restaurant at an afternoon, or Troy Graham
at the Ramada Inn’s little bar at night. Michael Beauchamp hosts a summer concert
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series at the Presque Isle Bandshell, overlooking Lake Superior. I remember seeing
Sycamore Smith singing at Breaker’s Roadhouse some chance night I was wandering,
and there’s a certain house where music lives on into the morning. There’s endless
springing up from the little city. There’s a real reason to sing, up in the far north: to
make it through the winter, to celebrate the sun, to look back into time and into the
self. To look ahead. Many genres can be heard in the Upper Peninsula, but there is so
much in common across them, so much to be heard. Yet again, the geographically
remote is no longer the disconnected. President Barack Obama visited Northern
Michigan University, in February 2011 to applaud their WiMAX initiative, a city-wide
wireless Internet service for no cost to students. The service now covers an incredibly
expansive area: “the cities of Marquette, Gwinn, Ishpeming, Negaunee, K.I. Sawyer,
and Chocolay township” all have access to NMU’s WiMAX network (NMU 2012).
Tuition wasn’t raised, and the entire system was installed by six people in four days.
Obama commended this connectivity, and went on to discuss the role of infrastructure
in economy, even at the local level, using Marquette’s Getz’s Clothiers as an example:
This is a third-generation, family-owned, Marquette institution. They’ve
occupied the same downtown store for more than a century -– but with
the help of broadband, they were recently listed as one of America’s
5,000 fastest-growing companies. Now how did they pull that
off? (Applause.) Obviously they’ve got great products, great
service. But what’s also true is online sales now make up more than
two-thirds of their annual revenue. Think about that. You got a
downtown department store; now two-thirds of its sales are online. It
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can process more than 1,000 orders a day, and its workforce has more
than doubled. So you’ve got a local business with a global footprint
because of technology. Now, if you can do this in snowy U.P. -(laughter) -- we can do it all across America. (Obama 2011)
The message is clear is clear: digital networks in remote geographical locations are
facilitating all sorts of human interactions. And this is true beyond economic
transactions.
Universities work as physical centers of access to popular culture in the Upper
Peninsula. There are no major commercial music venues. However, there is a
thoughtful and reflective collective of musicians who live in the distant, snowy north
and have been producing, distributing, and performing their music for decades. The
physical substrate of this collective was, for some time, Marquette’s 231 “House of
Muses” on West Washington Street, until a January 2007 fire rendered the building
uninhabitable and left few remnants of several lives’ collections of audio and musical
equipment (Diem 2008). A hardwood-floor that once packed two-hundred bodies to
see Michigan legends Sah, Sycamore Smith, and Hell Town Trio on stage now stands
as an empty shell in Marquette. My own silly teenage band, Tommy Kilometer and the
Nautical Mile, a rocky, surf-pop confusion, frequently performed at the House of
Muses and other small venues in the Upper Peninsula: He-Brews coffee shop in Iron
River, a music store in Calumet. When the thing disbanded—and I’m thankful it’s
buried—I began producing and recording my own acoustic-oriented, experimental,
digital music using a laptop and a cheap condenser microphone. I published to hosts
online, as many local musicians did, and a collective was reunited in the fires and sparks
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of wired and wireless networks. Digital musical networks and communities provide a
cultural infrastructure to connect the Upper Peninsula folk and independent music
scene not only across the region but across the world. Independent record label Van
Party Tapes run by Marquette native Jeremy Moran sells its home-made “split
cassettes” via BandCamp and regularly sells out of its limited edition runs. This
juxtaposition of antiquated technology, the cassette, and the virtual marketplace is the
controversial oven of the analog-digital debate.
Yet, we need not tire ourselves with the old “which is better: a CD or vinyl?”
Rather, we have to be conscious of how these new virtual spaces are having an effect
on the music being produced and distributed, as well as its reception. This is why I
have advocated for a rhetoric of music in the past and why I continue today: I dare to
clash with a titan. Marshall Mcluhan wrote that the medium is more significant than the
message itself—though of course not so simply, and I don’t intend to reduce his
argument, here—yet I hold that the message is in the invisible, in the ideological realm
of what we produce and consume (McLuhan 1967). Can we access this ideological
realm? Perhaps. Yet philosopher Slavoj Žižek warns that when we believe we have
escaped from ideology, we are most entrenched in it (Žižek 1989). Music is
commendable in its ability to resist the throes of capitalism. It is shared, celebrated, and
produced as part of a general, universal counter-culture. But in its ubiquity it can
become silent.
Žižek writes, on finding the location of ideology:
The crucial thing is to locate ideology where it belongs. Let’s take a
clear example: the well known song “Tomorrow Belongs to Me” from
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the film Cabaret. Some of my friends, after seeing the film, Bob Fosse’s
Cabaret, thought that after they heard this song they finally understood
what at its deepest as to its emotional impact, what fascism is. But I
think this is precisely the mistake to be avoided. This song is rather
ordinary, popular song, incidentally it was composed, when they were
shooting the movie, by a Jewish couple. Nice irony. If you look not
only at the music, at the way it is sung, but even at the words,
“awakening of a nation,” “tomorrow belongs to me,” one can well
imagine with a slight change of words, [a] radically leftist, communist
song. (2012)
And herein is where I see the potential in the digital-political economy of music to
revitalize the process of musical composition—although of course with such potential
to revitalize is also the potential to condemn. Jacques Attali, too, envisions this twosided potentiality in the political-economy of music, in telling us “what composition
can mean: each person dreaming up his own criteria, and at the same time his way of
conforming to them” (Attali 2009, p. 145). We see, in Marquette music, in the
geographically remote but digitally connected culture of the Upper Peninsula, such
songsters as Sycamore Smith whose music calls upon both local traditions in songs
such as “The Man With the Skeleton Arms,” tales of drinking, death, and Flannigan—
weaving local fables with mythology, commentary on religion, the machinations of
society, and the human condition in the wintry north. Here, in Sycamore’s “Hokum All
Ye Faithful,” we see in the lyrics a dry-witted atheistic tone:
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Tell me, have you heard the one
About the prophet with the perfect soul?
The heavenly bastard with his own slasher flick—
The greatest fairytale ever told
Weekly he receives
A kneeling ovation from a sleepy nation
They're swallowing the old routine, the holy saltine,
And backwash from the cup of salvation
----Have you heard the legend sweeping the land?
They're saying we all sprung from some invisible man
And when he finished up, he took a little rest
And he's been resting ever since I guess... (2014)
Sycamore’s lyrics, with all the other dimensions of his musical performance—the use
of a shiny, brass kazoo over the traditional singer-songwriter’s harmonica, devil horns
adorned on his acoustic guitar—come together as a non-discursive argument, and, if
we understand further the biography of the musician, the growing rate of atheistic and
agnostic demographics in the United States, the we come to see the complex relations
that situate the music commodity. If we take Tolstoy’s reckoning of history in his
epilogue to War and Peace, that historical events are not the result of the actions of what
historians deem to be significant people—the apparent genius of Napoleon Bonaparte
is but an illusion, for Tolstoy—but rather that history is determined by the wills of
individuals who are sometimes swayed to various actions rather than commanded, that
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power is only illusory in those who give commands and that they are merely acting
some small part in the greater movement of human events, we can come to understand
the intricacies of the political-economy of music and its further complications in the
digital interconnectedness of a global economy (1869). Through Tolstoy’s struggles
with the concept of free will—and, as he writes, so it should be a struggle for anyone
who has ever given the notion a worthwhile dedication of thought—he reasons
ultimately that freedom, the essence of the life of a human, lies somewhere between
absolute free will and absolute inevitability. Though the composition of music may be
tied up in the current economic structures of human making, and so they may have
always been, we still retain the agency to write our music anew and to sing some new
song for ourselves. As Tolstoy tells us, it is not that the Bonapartes who make history,
they are only remembered as such because the course of human events seem to align
with those decisions that have been recorded and retrospectively selected as being fit—
the illusion of the genius of a historical figure is constructed through chance, through
the writings of historians. So, too, with our musical history, with Western stardom and
Grammy Awards, we attempt to identify particular moments in the progression of
music as being definitive ruptures, changes, and significant genius. Yet, there are always
working underneath this illusion the efforts, creations, and genius of a civilization that
is constantly reshaping itself, throwing wood on the fire and stoking the flames. We
remember that Jacques Attali tells us that music is prophetic, that, again, the
superstructure is not determined indefinitely by the base of society, that indeed our
musical culture can play reciprocally back into the base, then we might think that in the
present digital-political topography of music, we have the same opportunity—and
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altogether the same dangers ahead of us. Yet what is certain is that the onus is on us to
be mindful, to listen to ourselves, to understand the persuasive power of music and to
appropriate it for the foundation and shaping of new political realities. So here we have
mapped the digital-political topography of music, and so we may now use this renewed
understanding of the power of music in its many ways of moving us: in the
composition of music, in its performance, and in our listening and sharing of our songs
across our societies.
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